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Summary 
The thesis provides a critical analysis of the problems and possibilities for 
developing cosmopolitan ethics in global finance. With reference to Ideas and 
debates within the campaign for a Tobin Tax, it is argued that cosmopolitanism is 
a promising, but limited, agenda for global reform. Extending principles of zn 
justice to support the re-distribution of wealth from financial markets towards an 
expanded program of global welfare provision is laudable. Likewise, the 
possibility of improving accountability mechanisms and fostering democratic 
inclusion in the global financial system should be supported. However, the thesis 
identifies and reflects upon some important ethical ambiguities relating to 
financial, institutional and democratic universalism. A requirement for capital 
account convertibility, a cash-based approach to global justice and proposals for 
state-centric world authority to administer the Tobin Tax infers that the proposal 
would entrench many of the logics its supporters might oppose. The thesis 
develops a pragmatic approach to these questions based on the philosophical 
pragmatism of Richard Rorty. A pragmatic approach acknowledges the historical 
and cultural contingency of cosmopolitanism, but questions how the ambiguities 
and tensions that pervade global ethics can be engaged. In this sense, and 
developing Rorty's concept of sentimental education, it is argued that the Tobin 
Tax campaign has generated a broad-based public conversation about global 
finance, increasing sensitivity to the suffering caused by global finance and the 
ways in which it might be changed. While such conversation may not solve all 
the dilemmas identified, it does allow for increased awareness of the ambiguity 
of ethics. The thesis points to a number of instances in the campaign where the Zn 
constitutive ambiguities of the Tobin Tax have been questioned and alternative 
practices suggested. A pragmatic approach to the Tobin Tax campaign therefore 
situates cosmopolitan ideas in the extant dilemmas and indeterminacies of global 
ethics, looking to suggest alternatives where possible. 
0. Introduction 
... once we have become fully aware of our intellectual tradition 
with its deep split between head and heart and its not always 
beneficial consequences, the first step toward healing that split 
has already been taken. Down the road, it is then possible to 
visualise a kind of social science that would be very different 
from the one most of us have been practicing: a moral social 
science where moral considerations are not repressed or kept 
apart, but are systematically commingled with analytic argument, 
without auilt feelings over any lack of integration; where the 
transition from preaching to proving and back again is performed 1-n r: ' frequently and with ease; and where moral considerations need no 
longer be smuggled in surreptitiously, nor expressed C: 1 -- Zý 
unconsciously, but are displayed openly and disarmingly. 
Hirschman (198 1) 'Morality and the Social Sciences: A Durable 
Tenslon', pp. 305-306 
Twenty-five years after Albert 0. Hirschman's invocation towards a moral social 
science political economists and writers in their new 'disciplinary' home 
International Political Economy (IPE) are recognising the problems and 
elucidating the possibilities of Hirschman's 'durable tension'. In their critique of 
positivism neo-Gramscian's have exposed the 'deep split between head and 
heart' in many approaches to IPE and insisted upon "an ethical dimension to 
analysis, so that questions of justice, legitimacy, and moral credibility are 
integrated sociologically into the whole and into many of its key concepts. " (Gill, 
1991: 57). For her part Susan Strange (1991: 17 1) recognised the problem was a 
two way affair. Globallsation also requires moral philosophers to extend their 
purview: "[t]he horizons of moral philosophy, as of the social sciences no longer 
end at the frontiers of the state. " And Richard Higgott has noted the importance 
of working across theory and practice in the evolving politics of global 
governance. As he argues, 
Politics, in the context of the emerging global conversation about 
governance, needs to be understood as not only the pursuit of 
effective and efficient government, but also as a normative, 
indeed explicitly ethical, approach to the advancement of a more 
just agenda of global economic management. (Higgott, 2000: 
133). 
But despite such integration IPE theorists have not reflected deeply upon the 
question of 'ethics'? In the race to discredit the 'scientific' assumptions of 
previous work and usher in a greater reflexivity to the relationship between 
theory and practice in IPE, morality and ethics have been introduced in a 
straiahtforward, almost caricatured fashion. As above, ethics is taken as an : -D 
'inherently good thing', as a panacea for the ills of hard headed materialism, or a 4: ) 
positive increment to the (power) politics of global economic governance. 
A fundamental contention of this thesis is that ethics - like positivism and power 
politics - should be a subject of critical scrutiny for IPE theorists. While 
Hirschman is correct that "moral considerations need no longer be smuggled in 
surreptitiously" such considerations do not necessarily act to simplify and/or 
improve matters. Ethics, like politics, is contested terrain and it is only by 
workin- throuah ethical arguments critically and sensitively that IPE will benefit 
from such inter-discipli nary engagement. 
This thesis critically assesses cosmopolitanism as an ethical approach to global 
governance in general and global finance in particular. Specific cosmopolitan 
proposals regarding justice and democracy are addressed in the context of an Z, JI 
actually existing campaign for global financial justice: the campaign for a Tobin 
Tax. The aim is to engage the ethical dilemmas that pervade global ethics and in 
so doing increase sensitivity to these very dilemmas. 
The Introduction establishes the subject area, research objectives, theoretical 
framework, research activities, central thesis and chapter structure. It is divided 
into six sections. Section I defines cosmopolitanism and analyses how 
cosmopolitan ideas increasingly provide an account of global governance in 
general and global finance in particular. It briefly outlines the scope of the debate 
in IPE and identifies some key weaknesses. Section 2 argues that current debates 
fall short of a grounded ethical critique of cosmopolitanism in global finance and 
proposes to operationalise cosmopolitan ideas via a case study of the Tobin Tax. 
Section 3 establishes the theoretical framework that draws on the philosophical 
pragmatism of Richard Rorty. It is argued that a praxeological method - in 
Rorty's (1979: 378) terms, a conversation - allows for a movement back and 
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forth between cosmopolitan arguments regarding global justice, global 
democracy and global civil society and the substantive possibilities, ambiguities 
and ethical linfits provided by the Tobin Tax. Section 4 details the research 
process and how it consolidates the central theoretical claims of the thesis. By 
engaging in participant observation of civil society discussions of the Tobin Tax 
within social forums and NGO campaigns the substantive content of 
cosmopolitan ideas can be engaged. Section 5 outlines the central argument of 
thesis: A cosmopolitan approach to global finance must recognise a number of 
potential ethical ambiguities regarding financial, institutional and democratic tý' 
universalism. However, through developing a pragmatic approach, the ethical 
possibilities which remain once the pretence to universality has been dropped are 
highlighted and pursued. In particular, the sentimental aspects of global finance 
and the potential alternatives to a monolithic image of global finance are 
important elements in an evolving conversation about the ethical reform of 
global finance via a Tobin Tax. And finally Section 6 outlines the chapter 
structure of the thesis. 
0.1 Cosmopolitanism and Global Finance 
Cosmopolitanism has undergone a recent resurgence across the social sciences 
(Beck, 2006; Caney, 2005; Held, 1995; Habermas, 2001; Linklater, 1998; 
Nussbaum, 1996; Pogge, 2002). Cosmopolitan ideas have been deployed to make 
sense of, critique, and improve practices of global governance (Bohman, 1999, 
2004; Held, 1995; Falk, 1998). Notwithstanding the fact that 'governance' is a 
contested concept (Higgott, 2000; Murphy, 2000), the project to extend 
cosmopolitan reform is important because it introduces questions of ethics and 
justice into the previously technical, bureaucratic, but nevertheless, politically 
salient field of global economic and legal organisation. In particular, this thesis 
addresses a nascent extension of cosmopolitan ideas regarding autonomy, 
legitimacy, democracy and justice to the reforin of the global financial 
architecture (Coleman and Porter, 2000; Germain, 2001,2002,2004; Porter, 
2001; Porter and Wood, 2002; Scholte, 2002b; Thirkell-White, 2004). The 
possibility for a cosmopolitan reform of global finance is the broad concern of 
this thesis. 
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This section first establishes a working definition of cosmopolitanism. It then 
identifies some of the key ways that cosmopolitan thinking has been applied to 
global governance and global finance. And it then addresses the central responses Cý, 
to such arguments within IPE. Z-) 
0.1.1 Cosmopolitanism as an Ethical ParadiQým 
Cosmopolitanism has a long theoretical lineage stretching back through Christian Z: ý 
Theology, Kantian critical theory and on to present day articulations of global 
democracy (See Brassett & Bulley, 2006; Vertovec and Cohen, 2002). The word 
is made up of cosmos and polis. This very combination is a contradiction since 
the concept of polis is based on an exclusive demarcation of political community, 
whereas cosmos refers to the universal. However, it may be argued that this very 
contradiction has allowed for an area of creative ambiguity, permitting numerous 
interpretations. 
Broadly speaking cosmopolitanism "refers to the consciousness of being a citizen 
of the world whatever other affiliations we may have" (Fine, 2005: 243). A 
common distinction is made between moral cosmopolitanism, which is 
concerned with the expansion of the scope of ethical concern, and political 
cosmopolitanism, which is concerned with envisaging institutions that might 
better orgamse world society (Beitz, 1999: 287; Dallmayr, 2003). But again the Z: ) 
two sides often cross over to make cosmopolitanism a fertile and adaptable 
ethical tradition. For instance, there are few moral cosmopolitans who have not at 
some stage made a political intervention. And, vice versa, it is difficult to 
conceive of a political cosmopolitan who did not have occasion to reflect on the 
moral underpinnings of their agenda. 
In the past, cosmopolitan ideas have been associated with grand projects such as 
the construction of a world federation of republican states (Kant, 1948), and even 
the possibility of creating a world state. In more contemporary articulations 
cosmopolitans have celebrated the historical evolution of norms against harm 
(Linklater, 2001,2002; Bobman, 2004), human rights (Pogge, 2002, Rorty, 
1998b) and various elements of liberal democracy (Arcbibugi et al. 1998; Held, 
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1995,1997). In particular, a number of cosmopolitan thinkers have developed a 
sophisticated ethical praxis which addresses how norms of citizenship, liberty 
and autonomy can be generalised in a changing global context (See Linklater, 
2006). And a number of models including cosmopolitan democracy (Archibug] 
and Held, 1995), post-Westphalian order (Linklater, 1998), 'Republican 
Cosmopolitanism' (Bohman, 2004) and a purported 'cosmopolitanization' of the 
world (Beck, 2006) have been articulated. 
With such a broad range of ideas and potential applications it is perhaps hard to 
define what cosmopolitanism actually is? Indeed, cosmopolitans have diverged 
on a number of issues. Many have diverged over whether the use of force is 
necessary/desirable to achieve their ends (See Smith, 2006). Some have 
advocated the legal entrenchment of democracy (Held, 1995; Falk, 1998), while 
others have sought to locate democracy in a more creative realm of ongoing 
dialogue and deliberation (Bohman, 1999; Patomaki, 2003). And there is an 
ongoing debate about how and to what extent 'justice' can be extended beyond 
state borders (Buchanan, 2000; Caney, 2005; Rawls, 1999) 
In the face of such a plurality, this thesis understands cosmopolitanism as an 
ethical 'paradigm'. Rather than tying cosmopolitans to any one agenda, 
cosmopolitanism is perhaps better viewed as broad research area whose 
proponents are motivated by certain common ideas (Fine, 2006). These ideas 
might be that of the world citizen, human rights, the avoidance of harm, or global 
democracy and they may lead in starkly different directions. But it is argued that 
they share a common concern: the scope of ethical concern should not be limited 
by parochial boundaries. As Kok-Chor Tan (2004: 1) argues, "From the 
cosmopolitan perspective, principles of justice ought to transcend nationality and 
citizenship, and ought to apply equally to all individuals of the world as a 
whole. " Underpinned by such concerns, the cosmopolitan paradigm offers fertile 
ground for developing a nuanced and sophisticated ethical approach that is 
embedded in contemporary social realities. 
The thesis follows the social theorist Robert Fine (2003; 2006) who seeks to de- 
centre, cosmopolitanism from its doctrinal elements and instead pursue the 
5 
important role of cosmopolitan thinking in the academy and beyond. On this 
view, cosmopolitanism is not understood as something that can be proved or 
disproved. Rather, it is to be seen as a 'way of thinking' that influences the 
academy and policy makers to different degrees and with varying amounts of 
ethical appeal. As Fine critically surmises, even though there are faults, apparent 
contradictions and dilemmas inherent in cosmopolitanism, this should not detract 
from an appreciation of the importance and impact of cosmopolitans and their 
ideas: 
In one case they begin by asking specific questions on important 
matters, for example, the prevention and punishment of genocide, 
and end with the utopian project of overcoming the structures of 
wealth and power associated with the modem system of nation 
states. In another, their project appears liberal or even 
conservative, designed to make fine adjustments to international 
institutions in the hope that all will then be well with the world. 
Sometimes they look utopian and liberal at the same time: 
constructing a new world order and expressing the 
phenomenology of a privileged class whose experience of global 
mobility is a far cry from that of stateless refugees. Yet for all the 
defects of the new cosmopolitanism as a doctrine, I would 
conclude by saying that today cosmopolitan thinking plays an C) 
indispensable part in the social sciences and that this makes it all 
the more urgent, as it were, to take the 'Ism' out of the 
cosmopolitan. (Fine, 2003: 466). 
0.1.2. Cosmopolitan Approaches to Global Finance 
An increasingly salient articulation of the cosmopolitan paradigm has sought to Z7) 
respond to contemporary global changes by articulating reform agendas towards 4: ) 
global governance. Writers like David Held, Tony McGrew, James Bohman, and 
Richard Falk have, in different ways, sought to respond to current global political 
and ethical questions by articulating a set of legal and democratic reforms to 
existing and potential global institutions. 
Cosmopolitan arguments for the reform of global governance proceed with some 
straightforward and powerful assumptions. Changes in the extent and intensity of 
global social relations provoke a set of questions to state-centric political theory. 
For example, what is the appropriate constituency for global environmental 
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change? How can systems of welfare survive when large global capital is in a 
position of unfettered mobility? And why do we retain national systems of 
accountability and legitimacy when it is increasingly global institutions that 
make the decisions? David Held (1995: 2 1) expresses the dilemma as one which 
unravels previous conceptions of the congruence between territory, community 
and political legitimacy and brings into question the very possibility of zn 
democracy: 
As substantial areas of human activity are progressively organized 
on a alobal level, the fate of democracy and of the independent 
democratic nation-state in particular, is fraught with difficulty. In 
this context, the meaning and place of democratic politics, and of 
the contending models of democracy, have to be rethought in 
relation to overlapping local, national, regional and global 
structures and processes. 
The response, therefore, made by many cosmopolitans is to articulate forms of 
multi-level governance that promote maximal accountability and facilitate the 
inclusion of as many relevant actors as possible. While liberal cosmopolitans 
develop accounts of the appropriate cosmopolitan legal structures that would 
underpin this system (Archibugi & Held, 1995), others, like the deliberative 
cosmopolitans, have been more concerned with the practice of building 
cosmopolitan public spheres (Bohman, 1999; Dryzek, 2006-, Habermas, 2001). 
These arguments build upon actually existing sites of interaction between global 
civil society and global economic institutions, promoting cosmopolitan reasons 
and cosmopolitan publicity (Bohman, 1999). Both approaches assume that the 
cosmopolitan ethical reform of global governance is both possible and desirable. 
Again with a broad domain of interest that encompasses the governance of 
security, ecology, trade, finance, communications, and citizenship it may be hard 
to grasp what is at stake? This is not a critique so much as an exhortation to build 
up the cosmopolitan armoury by further developing these different areas within 
the paradigm. In this vein, the thesis examines the specific domain of global 
finance and the problems/possibil ]ties that face cosmopolitan agendas. 
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A number of recent approaches have sought to extend cosmopolitan principles to 
the reform of global finance (Coleman and Porter, 2000; Germain, 2001,2002, 
2004; Porter, 2001; Porter and Wood, 2002; Scholte, 2002b; Thirkell-White, 
2004). While the complex and technical nature of finance may strike many 
ethical theorists as a strange place to begin an ethical discussion, it is clear that 
the dimensions and scope of contemporary global finance make it no less 
important in ethical terms. Global finance is a paradigm case of globalisation. In 
temporal terms the rise of global finance in the second half of the twentieth 
century reflects the time line of many accounts of accelerated contemporary 
globalisation (Held et al. 1999; Scholte, 2005). In terms of size and speed global 
finance provides a good illustration of the importance and impact of global 
economic interdependence (Strange 1986; Cohen, 1996; Coleman, 2001; Scholte, 
2002a). And for cosmopolitans concerned with the migration of authority away 
from states, the role of bodies like the IJ\4F, the World Bank, and the Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS) in the setting of financial rules policies is a major 
challenge (Cemy, 1994; Pauly, 1997; Underhill, 1997). 
In response, cosmopolitans have suggested that the global financial architecture 
should be reformed to increase transparency, participation, representation, and 
fairness (Coleman and Porter, 2000; Scholte, 2002a, b). For his part Randall 
Germain (2004) has advocated the development of deliberative principles in line 
with the work of James Bohman (1999,2004). He suggests that an 'ethic of 
inclusion' - of developing states and civil society - can be fostered alongside 
current changes associated with the reform of the global financial architecture. 
And Heikki Patomaki (2001) has drawn on Rawlsian theories of justice to 
advocate a re-distribution of revenue from financial market actors to the global 
south. 
Chapter One argues that within IPE the response to these ideas has been mixed. 
Existing critiques of ethics in global finance have tended to portray it as 
'important' but at best unlikely and at worst, merely the legitimising rhetoric of 
power (Best 2003; Coleman & Porter, 2000; Underhill & Zhang, 2003: 379-380). 
As Chapter Two argues this emerges from a history of difficulty with engaging 
ethics and 'the ethical' in IPE. Numerous theoretical traditions provide grounds 
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to dismiss talk of ethics in the context of global finance. For 'positive 
economists' talk of ethics - or normative theory - is often taken as a hallmark of 
bad social science. Such a positive-normative dichotomy is retained in the titles 
of influential texts in that discipline (Friedman, 1966; Lipsey and Chrystal, 
1995). For neo-realists the appropriate dichotomy is between politics and ethics. 
Despite laudable ambitions the hopes of cosmopolitans will always be trumped 
by power politics. And for their part writers in the Marxist tradition have 
confirmed the argument albeit in more sophisticated terms. For instance, in a 
criticism of Germain, Tim Sinclair (2001: 442) argues, 
"In a sense there has already been a "private reform" of the IFA 
[International Financial Architecture] whether this is endorsed in 
Base] 11 or not. Lack of real substantive progress on the 
architecture proposals could be said to have been sidelined by the 
development of a new quasi -regulatory structure. Even if Randall 
D. Germain is correct and the politics of inclusion are now 
characteristic of some features of the IFA, it is not clear that the 
official IFA is where the substance of regulation now lies. " 
While questioning feasibility, these critiques fail to question the substance of 
cosmopolitan ethics. While it may be argued that historical power structures, 
vested interests and privatised forms of capitalist governance present important 
obstacles to the realisation of ethics, these critiques fail to undermine 
cosmopolitanism itself as the appropriate normative framework. 
On the one hand, the critique fails to question the content and normative hopes of 
cosmopolitans. Even though it may hard - perhaps impossible - to realise a more 
cosmopolitan ethical approach to global finance, neither dichotomy 
(posit] ve/normati ve or power/ethics) provides good reason to question the 
appropriateness of the cosmopolitan version of ethics. ' On the other hand, 
existing critiques fail to interrogate the implications of a widespread acceptance 
of cosmopolitan principles amongst policy actors, academics and activists within 
global civil society. This goes back to the point raised in part one: 
cosmopolitanism is an increasingly embedded and influential way of 
While Best (2003) has suggested that a more situated Aristotelian version of ethics/gJ obal 
finance may be developed, this is developed as a critique of the 'rhetoric' of ethics, not 
cosmopolitan ethics per se. 
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thinking/acting in the world that should be scrutinised. In short, when faced with : -n 4n) 
such scepticism, the committed cosmopolitan could well be forgiven for taking 
the attitude, "OK. So I need to try harder then! " Another approach is required. 
0.2 Towards a Grounded Ethical Critique: the Tobin Tax as a case study of 
cosmopolitan ethics in global finance 
We need a framework that can comprehend cosmopolitan legal 
forms in terms of their limits. This is not to deny them all veracity 
or value, but neither is it to see them as milestones along a 
unilinear journey with a recognized beginning and identifiable 
and achievable end. (Fine, 2003: 465). 
The preceding section outlined the research topic of this thesis, namely: the 
problems and possibilities for developing cosmopolitan approaches to global 
finance - and identified some of the current limitations with the way in which the 
subject is considered in IPE. Broadly speaking current questions turn on a 
dichotomy between cosmopolitan proposals and certain political 'realities' - 
state power, private interests, elitist decision making, etc. - which render 
cosmopolitanism unlikely. What is missing is any form of ethical critique. This 
thesis is therefore concerned not only with the possibilities for developing a 
cosmopolitan approach to global finance but also with the potential constitutive 
ambiguities and ethical 'limits' within such a project (Brassett and Bulley, 2006; 
Connolly, 2000; Parker and Brassett, 2005; Vaughan-Williams, 2006). 
This section will outline the central research question and relevant sub-questions 
in the context of an argument for developing a grounded ethical critique of 
cosmopolitan global finance. It will then make a brief case for the development 
of a pragmatic approach that will be continued in the next section. 
0.2.1 Central Research Questions 
The possibility of developing a cosmopolitan approach to global finance is an 
important and original area of scholarly research. On the one hand, global debt, 
instabilities in financial markets and low levels of democratic 
inclusion/transparency in decision making procedures suggest a number of 
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ethical 'bads' which require some form of address (Porter and Wood, 2002; 
Scholte 2002a, b). On the other hand, the potential benefits of a stable, 
inclusionary and redistributive global financial architecture are normative 
possibilities that imply massive corrections to current levels of poverty and 
welfare provision (Eichengreen, 1999; Patomaki, 2001; Bello et. al. 2000; ul Haq, 
1996). 
However, as currently constituted the discussion of cosmopolitan approaches to 
(global finance is extremely nascent. Moreover, as argued above there are some 
general and repeated difficulties with the way in which ethics and the ethical are 
engaged within IPE (See Chapter Two). This thesis therefore seeks to develop a 
grounded ethical critique of cosmopolitan global finance. What does this mean? 
Firstly, much of the debate over cosmopolitanism in global finance has been 
carried out at an extremely broad level. As Chapter One argues, general changes 
in a number of quite large institutions have been seen as relevant to the 
emergence of cosmopolitan ethics in global finance. For instance, Randall 
Germain (2004: 232) speaks of an emerging 'global public sphere' comprised of 
a global institutional framework, international financial markets, the global 
media and global civil society. 
While important for making an initial graft from ethical theory to the rather more 
technical subject of global finance, such generalities may detract from 
developing detailed critical knowledge of a grounded empirical case. In addition, 
the discussion thus far has tended to follow the discourse of cosmopolitan 
democracy instead of other equally significant discourses like cosmopolitan 
justice (Coleman and Porter, 2000; Germain, 2001,2002,2004; Porter, 2001; 
Porter and Wood, 2002; Scholte, 2002b; Thirkell-White, 2004). 
To rectify these generalities and potential blind-spots the thesis therefore 
proposes to develop a case study of the Tobin Tax campaign as a way to ground 
the substantive concerns of cosmopolitan authors. The Tobin Tax is a well 
known proposal to place a small tax on foreign currency transactions (Tobin, 
1978). Over the course of the civil society campaign the proposal has expanded 
to include rather more political than technical issues (Singh, 2000: 200), the 
possibility of global re-distributive justice as a result of the potentially vast 
revenues (Spahn, 1995) and, in some articulations, it sustains a logic of 
emancipation via the construction of global democratic institutions (Patomaki, 
2001). The proposal was at the heart of early initiatives to reform the 
International Financial Architecture (IFA) and has been a focus of numerous 
attempts to lobby global institutions (Porter, 2005: 146). For these reasons a case 
study of the Tobin Tax suggests a useful way of to animate and extend 
cosmopolitan concerns with justice (Pogge, 2002), democracy (Held, 1995) and 
civil society (Bohman, 1999). Such a case study embeds cosmopolitan ethics in 
political practice enabling us to think through the possibilities, ambiguities and 
limits of the paradigm. 
Secondly, it is argued that cosmopolitanism has been given something of an 
easy ride' by existing critiques from within IPE. Many have been content to 
simply write it off as unlikely. And only a few have gone on to develop what they 
regard as more feasible ethical alternatives, even if they do this from largely 
political -realist or Marxist perspectives (Best 2003; Underhill and Zhang, 2005). 
Instead, this thesis develops an ethical critique of cosmopolitanism in global 
finance that draws on more constitutive conceptions of tbeory/practice 
(Rosamond, 2003; Walker, 1993). That is to say, the thesis is concerned by the 
possibilities, constitutive ambiguities and 'ethical limits' that may be contained 
within a cosmopolitan approach to the reform of global finance. 
The thesis is therefore an exercise in critical reconstruction, identifying 
possibilities and limits in the paradigm. The aim is to provide a grounded ethical 
critique of cosmopolitan ethics in global finance by operational ising key 
proposals and themes via a case study of the Tobin Tax. The central research 
question and sub-questions can be summarised as follows: 
Taking as a case study the civil society campaign for a Tobin 
Tax what ethical possibilities, ambiguities and limits are 
constituted by cosmopolitan ethics in the context of global 
finance? 
a) How has global Justice been understood by cosmopolitan 
theorists and Tobin Tax advocates? Are there any ethical 
problems with their understanding? z::, * 
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b) How has global democracy been understood by cosmopolitan 
theorists and Tobin Tax advocates? Are there any ethical 
problems with their understanding? 
C) How as the ethical agent of global civil society been understood z::, 
by cosmopolitan theorists and Tobin Tax advocates? Are there 
any ethical problems with their understanding? 
0.2.2. Secondary Research Question 
With these questions in mind the research agenda is clear. The aim is to make the 
discussion of cosmopolitan ethics in global finance more sophisticated by 
grounding it in a specific case study - the Tobin Tax - and render it more 
sensitive to the potential ethical problems it may face by subjecting its 
constitutive ambiguities to critical scrutiny. For instance, one argument advanced 
throughout the thesis, is that forms of financial, institutional and ethical 
universalism are found to pervade many cosmopolitan arguments in a way that 
militates against small, contextual experiments in finance/ethics. In this sense, 
cosmopolitan approaches may act to re-produce the very things they criticise? 
However, the thesis is not an exercise in ethical critique for its own sake. The 
normative aim of grounding this discussion is to identify potential routes beyond 
the current conjuncture and suggest alternative practices that may further the 
development of cosmopolitanism in global finance. 
To that end, the thesis is guided by a secondary research objective which is to 
develop a pragmatic approach to these dilemmas in order that they might be 
engaged and overcome. Specifically the work of Richard RortY (1979,1989, and 
1998) will be developed and deployed as a theoretical framework for addressing 
these questions. Thus my secondary research question can be summansed as 
follows: 
1) How can the philosophical pragmatism of Richard Rorty be developed to 
engage with the constitutive problems and possibilities of cosmopolitan 
global finance via a Tobin Tax? What would a pragmatic 
cosmopolitanism entail? 
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0.3 Pragmatism as a Theoretical Framework 
The theoretical framework develops from the philosophical pragmatism of 
Richard Rorty (1979,1989,1998b). Throughout the thesis pragmatism acts as 
both a 'background' method and a set of normative arguments regarding the 
potential for a reconstruction of cosmopolitanism. In this way, the theoretical 
framework can be understood as a pragmatic praxis. This section will briefly 
summarise the reading of Rorty developed before moving on to elaborate on the 
specific ways in which his arguments are deployed in the thesis. 
Rorty argues that knowledge, like all human activity, is both historically 
contingent and malleable. Rorty's concern with the contingency of knowledge 
leads him to the conclusion that there can be no transhistorical, transcultural 
'Truths' that guide us. He therefore argues that the ultimate end of philosophical 
discourse is to carry on the 'conversation of mankind' (1979: 394). But giving up 
on Truth does not mean succumbing to relativism. For Rorty, the contingency of 
liberal values - like sympathy for human suffering - does not mean that we 
cannot continue to advocate them (1989). They are simply the best thing we have 
so far come up with and we should value them as such. 
His version of pragmatism therefore works at the cusp of critical and reformist 
politics. Rorty continues to support 'public' attempts to build institutions that 
foster freedom and sympathy, while retaining sensitivity to the importance of 
ironist - or post-structural - thought in the private realm of the individual (1989). 
And it is this public-private split has been the target for some of the stronger 
critiques of Rorty's position. Many have argued that Rorty cuts off the critical 
thrust of his arguments by privatising irony (Cochran, 1999; Fraser, 1991). 
Against such critiques the thesis argues that Rorty's attempt to resolve the 
benefits of liberalism and post-structuralism by employing a public-private split 
actually contains far more flexibility and nuance than many of his critics would 
I allow. 
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0.3.1 Richard Rorty: post-modernist liberal conversation? 
Rorty adopts an anti -essential 1 st position regarding language. Essentialism is the 
view that there is some pure essence to reality that we can grasp, if only we get 
the correct epistemological approach. Rorty doesn't critique this image because 
he thinks epistemology has so far got it wrong. He simply doesn't understand ZýI 
what it could mean to get it 'right'. He doubts the very idea of "Truth" as the In 
correspondence between words and reality. For Rorty 'words' and 'sentences' 
are not more or less accurate representations of the essential reality of the world. 
Rather they are aspects of larger more or less coherent 'vocabularies' that have 
been developed to help us cope with the world. As he argues (I 998a: 1): 
"We think that there are many ways to talk about what is going on, 
and that none of them gets closer to the way things are in 
themselves than any other. We have no idea what "in itself' is 
supposed to mean in the phrase "reality as it is in itself. " So we 
suggest that the appearance -real I ty distinction is dropped in favour 
of a distinction between less useful and more useful ways of 
talking". 
By dropping epistemology Rorty argues that we should see the ultimate end of 
philosophy as a conversation between mankind. For him it is more useful to talk 
in terms of 'vocabularies' like liberalism, a vocabulary that sees 'cruelty as the 
worst thing we do', than to completely dispense with it because of the kinds of 
limitations that Ironists identify. These limitations are the potential violence of 
invok ing universal subjects like citizen, class, and human, which writers like 
Nietzsche, Foucault and Derrida identify. Instead, Rorty argues that hostility to 
particular forms of solidarity does not mean hostility to solidarity as such. He 
therefore seeks to play off vocabularies against one another, looking to how they 
can be improved via re-description. And the end of this conversation is 
straightforward, namely: moral progress. But moral progress is not seen as a 
movement towards some ultimate truth. Instead, moral progress is understood as 
a progress of sentiments, an increasing ability to see the differences between 
people as morally irrelevant. As Rorty argues, 
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... it is 
best to think of moral progress as a matter of increasing 
sensith, iý),, increasing responsiveness to the needs of a larger and 
laraer variety of people and things. Just as pragmatists see 
scientific progress not as the gradual attenuation of a veil of 
appearances which hides the intrinsic nature of reality from us, 
but as the increasing ability to respond to the concerns of every 
larger groups of people... so they see moral progress as a matter t5 1-n 
of being able to respond to the needs of ever more inclusive 
groups of people. (1999: 81). 
However, such a conversation has been argued to run the risk of moral 
relativism. What if by including more and more people in the conversation, we 
open ourselves to radical or anarchistic possibilities? If there are no philosophical 
foundations that can judge between vocabularies surely this would de-stabilise 
the liberal institutions that Rorty favours? 
On one level, Rorty simply refuses to take the charge of relativism seriously 
(1991b). He does not accept that there is anything that could or (importantly) 
should count as proof of humanity. When we value arguments for human rights, 
it is not because they have transcultural, transhistorical validity but because they 
chime with a particular set of historical sentiments that we have learnt to value 
(1998b). Cutting to the chase, Western liberals are more prone, given their 
awareness of events such as the Great Depression, the Holocaust, Hiroshima, and 
the Cold War to see cruelty and humiliation as morally wrong and to defend 
stories like human dignity as morally right than at any point previously. To tie 
such positive developments to something larger like 'Reason' or 'Truth' or 
'Essence' would itself be a relativist, or worse, an imperialist act. For Rorty, 
attempts to build a "Truthful" account of human rights can be no more than a 
summary of the sentiments Western liberals have developed in time and space 
(1991a, 1998b). While some may want to enter a discussion of whether this is 
philosophical relativism, Rorty argues that if we want to make a difference to the 
world around us, it is more useful to get on with the business of expanding these 
sentiments (1989,1998b). 
On another level though, Rorty concedes that the kinds of ironist theorising he 
celebrates could well pose a problem to the liberal institutions be supports. He 
tberefore invokes a public-private split. Wbile writers like Rawls and Habermas 
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appear as socially useful philosophers, philosophers who can do the job of 
anticipating fairer institutions, Rorty concedes that writers like Nietzsche and 
Derrida have been straightforward] hostile to liberal institutions. So he argues 4! ) y 
that the latter type of thinker should be understood as private ironists: useful for 
liberalism in so far as they expand the scope of, and possibilities for, individual 
perfection. For Rorty, a liberal ironist meets three basic requirements: 
(1) She has radical and continuing doubts about the final 
vocabulary she currently uses, because she has been impressed by 
other vocabularies, vocabularies taken as final by people or books 
she has encountered; (2) she realizes that argument phrased in her 
present vocabulary can neither underwrite nor dissolve these 
doubts, (3) insofar as she philosophizes about her situation, she 
does not think that her vocabulary is closer to reality than others, 
that it is in touch with a power not herself' (Rorty, 1989: 73). 
While these are no doubt important ethical qualities - certainly in terms of 
fostering a level of critical distance and reflexivity - Rorty argues that Irolly is 
best regarded as a private matter. It relates best to the question of what to do with 
one's aloneness, of how one weaves and re-weaves the cobwebs of meaning that 
make up a 'self identity'. The separation is simple and straightforwardly 
commonsensical. Habermas gives a good account of how to continue the shared 
social effort to make our institutions more just and less cruel. Derrida, who 
would be less useful for such projects, is more useful for retaining sensitivity 
towards the infinite possibilities for self-creation that may exist. It is not a 
question of either-or, but both-and. 
However, numerous criticisms have been levied at this perceived resolution. 
Feminist scholars have seen it as yet another reification of the hierarchical 
public/private split. For those like Nancy Fraser (1991: 261) who see the 
question of self-creation to be a fundamentally public political issue, Rorty's is 
little more than an apology for the status quo. In a similar way Molly Cochran 
(1999: 173-211) has problematised the dichotomy by arguing for a synthesis 
between Rorty's private Irony, which she sees as a powerful imaginative too], 
and Dewey's more transformative conception of the public sphere, as an arena of 
ethical growth for its own sake. 
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While sympathetic to these critiques, the thesis argues that too much has been 
read into the separation. For anyone who reads Rorty as offering a 'theory' of 
politics then the public-private split is deeply pernicious. However, if we read 
Rorty as offering suggestions for alternative ways of thinking, where attention is 
directed away from old philosophical problems, in order to open new 
possibilities, the split is banal. This point can be elaborated in two ways. 
On the one hand, Fraser may have missed the point? Rorty's notion of the private 
is an existential area that addresses the question of what to do with one's 
aloneness. It neither defines a space in the sense of a house or kitchen. Nor does 
it restrict from forming public grievances around private issues. On the other 
hand, and following on from this point, Rorty's public-private split is not fixed. 
Indeed, he explicitly leaves room open for moral progress to occur through the 
chance "coincidence of a private obsession with a public need" (Rorty, 1989: 
37). In one interview (1995: 62) he argued, "I don't think private beliefs can be 
fenced off [from the public sphere]; they leak through, so to speak, and influence 
the way one behaves toward other people. " And in another (2002: 62-63) he 
categorically retorts, 11_ý 
"My public/private distinction wasn't an explanation of what 
every human life is like. I was, instead, urging that there was 
nothing wrong with letting people divide their lives along the 
private/public line. We don't have a moral responsibility to bring 
the two together. It was a negative point, not a positive 
recommendation about how eveqbody should behave. - 
0.3.2. Cosmopolitan Ethics in Global Finance: A Praggmatic Praxis 
The important point that emerges from such recognition is that the tensions in 
Rorty's work - indeed the very tensions that pervade liberalism - actually 
become creative. By taking Rorty's public-private split as a negative warning, a 
point about what political theories/projects should not do, the dynamism and 
fluidity of cosmopolitan ethics can be explored. The space is cleared to continue 
a conversation that includes both public cosmopolitan and (more or less) private 
ironic approaches. 
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In concrete terms, while an ironic disposition may be ill suited to suggesting 
alternative institutional or theoretical 'frameworks', it can nevertheless provide a 
fruitful set of questions to public vocabularies. Going back to Rorty's idea of re- 
description, the thesis therefore proposes to animate Rorty's notion of philosophy 
as conversation, by playing off cosmopolitan vocabularies against Ironic 
critiques, re-describing terms in the vocabulary where possible/desirable. Thus it 
is in the very limits of this conversation that alternatives become thinkable. Such 
a pragmatic praxis has three key elements that draw together the discussion of 
cosmopolitan global finance via Tobin Tax. 
Firstly, it is important to develop an understanding of the different vocabularies 
involved. The thesis identifies three different but inter-related vocabularies of the 
Tobin Tax - economic, political and ethical (See Chapter Three). Initial accounts 
of the tax sought to prove or disprove its economic validity (Tobin, 1978). More 
recent arguments attempted to construct a political rationale for the tax. For 
instance, some authors have identified the radical possibilities of the tax to grant 
states the ability to resist capital markets (Patomaki, 2001; Singh, 2000). And 
finally, an emerging vocabulary of the Tobin Tax seeks to justify the proposal on 
ethical grounds (War on Want, 2002). Importantly, the pragmatic view of 'ethics 
as a conversation' does not require us to seek resolution on the 'true' depiction of 
the tax. Rather a pragmatic praxis would play them off against each other, 
seeking to open alternatives for cosmopolitan ethics in global finance. 
Secondly, building on the notion of Ethics as Conversation, Chapters 4-6 
introduce different cosmopolitan contributions to this conversation. It is argued 
that the vocabulary of cosmopolitan justice (Chapter Four) and the vocabulary of 
cosmopolitan democracy (Chapter Five) can be set in conversation with critical 
and post-structural critiques of the Tobin Tax proposal. As the next section 
suggests, this is not simply a removed scholastic exercise, it draws upon and is 
developed by the empirical activities of policy actors. Importantly, the same 
critiques of universalism that post-structural theorists levy against 
cosmopolitanism are often produced in civil society critiques of the Tobin Tax, 
by either grass roots or south-Ist articulations of financial reform (See Chapter 
Six). From a pragmatic perspective, such a conversation illustrates the limits and 
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indeterminacies of cosmopolitan global finance as well as suggesting alternatives 
within an emergent and expanding democratic space of global civil society. And ZI) 
thirdly, by recognising the constitutive ambiguities of the Tobin Tax campaign, 
we might identify some different and alternative ways to forward the discussion 
on cosmopolitan ethics in global finance (Chapter Six). Z7, 
At one level, and drawing on Rorty's (I 998b) notion of sentimental education, it 
is argued that the campaign for a Tobin Tax has actually done a great deal to 
illustrate the forms of suffering engendered by global finance. Discussions of Z: ) 4: 1 
global financial reform are no longer the preserve of IMF employees and the 
occasional well educated and well funded NGO activist. Thanks to the Tobin Tax 
campaign it is now also on the agenda of discussion for untouchables in Mumbai 
and factory workers across France. At another level, the campaign itself has born 
witness to a growing awareness of the ambiguities of universal categories 
contained within global Justice and democracy. Thus new forms of suffering can 
be illustrated in the campaign for a Tobin Tax proffering a glimpse of alternative 
and non-universal reforms that might be couched in terms of 'pragmatic 
cosmopolitanism' (See Chapter Six). 
In this way a specific case study of the Tobin Tax animates and develops broad 
theoretical ideas like cosmopolitanism and pragmatism in such a way that the 
findings of the thesis can be generalised and extended to broader subjects. 
Indeed, as Section 5 argues the central thesis is one that can be extended to other 
global justice campaigns like Trade Justice and various proposals to eradicate 
Agricultural subsidies. In particular, the next section will illustrate how the skills 
gained in the course of the research process are transferable within the range of 
subjects covered by global civil society. 
0.4 Research Process 
This section will surnmarise the research process. As the praxeological aspects of 
the theoretical framework have indicated the thesis aims to situate ethical theory 
in an empirical and political context. Tbus, as well as developing a strong 
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theoretical component, the research process has involved a large degree of 
empirical data gathering techniques. 
The period of the research ran from 2002-2006 and looked at the civil society 
campaign for the Tobin Tax. Two specific data gathering techniques were 
employed. Firstly, a significant amount of primary data - speeches, public Q& 
A's, campaign materials including videos, pamphlets and expert reports - was 1-n 
gathered during participant observation of NGO campaigns and public 
discussions at the European and World Social Forums. On a number of occasions 
this involved taking part in campaign meetings as a member of ATTAC and as 
an independent observer with declared linkages to the University of Warwick. 
And secondly, the research process involved a large degree of textual analysis of 
primary documents including civil society reports on the Tobin Tax. Both of 
these techniques were engaged over a the time period from 2002-2006 and were 
focused on three main points 1) the evolution of the War on Want Campaign for 
a Tobin Tax in terms of re-distributive justice 2) the Network Institute for Global 
Democratisation campaign for a Tobin Tax as part of broader structure of global 
democratisation, 3) the way in which the specific proposals of these campaigns 
are engaged in public discussions at the European and World Social Forums. 
A coincidence of using this time frame was that the British based War on Want 
campaign - led by David Hillman and Sony Kapoor - emerged as the major 
player in the Tobin Tax campaign (See Chapter Six). It re-Ignited interest from 
European NGO's like ATTAC that had been waning somewhat, and the research 
documents developed in this period have gone a long way towards changing the 
notion of the Tobin Tax from a global tax to a UK based stamp duty geared 
towards providing development funding. 
In this way, the politics of cosmopolitan ethics via a Tobin Tax could be gleaned 
first hand in the mix of institutional battles, funding possibilities and rival Z: ) 
campaigns. The aim of collecting such data is not to provide proof for or against 
cosmopolitan ethics. Rather it is to situate cosmopolitan ideas in the context of an 
actually existing campaign - the Tobin Tax - which makes strong arguments 
regarding the possibility of global justice and global democracy. Moreover, it 
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further animates a core proposition of many cosmopolitan arguments that global 
civil society can act as an ethical agent for cosmopolitan reason in the face of 
global economic and legal institutions. Whether these assumptions are sustained 
by the concrete political practice of the campaign is a critical question. 
My central research findings were twofold. Firstly, the contribution of civil 
society campaigns to the discussion of global justice and global democracy is 
large. Campai-aners extend ideas like global re-distributive justice in a practical 
and engaged way. Indeed one of the limitations with cosmopolitan arguments 
like Pogge's (2002) conception of global justice is that it deals with a largely 
hypothetical proposal - the Global Resources Dividend - whereas NGOs have to 
address the day-to-day issues of 'selling' an idea like the Tobin Tax. This brings 
an important strategic dimension to cosmopolitan ethics that is not always 
recognised. 
And secondly, the realm of civil society discussion is far more contested than 
many proponents allow for. On any one issue relating to the Tobin Tax there are 
countless positions. At one level, this undermines any straightforward celebration 
of global civil society as the ethical agent of a more cosmopolitan future. At 
another level, the conversation which emerges from the conflicts and tensions of 
civil society is actually far more diverse than the academic discussion of the 
Tobin Tax would suggest. In fact the content of this emerging conversation r. I- 
forms a central part of the thesis developed in the next section. 
0.5 Thesis 
My central thesis is that a cosmopolitan approach to global finance and the Tobin 
Tax faces a number of ethical ambiguities regarding financial, institutional and 
democratic universalism. However, the ethical possibilities which remain after 
the pretence to universality is dropped can be highlighted and developed. 
Drawing on Rorty, the 'sentimental' aspects of global finance and the potential 
alternatives to a monolithic image of financial reform are argued to be important 
elements in an evolving conversation about global finance that should be 
highlighted and supported. This argument can be outlined in detail. 
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Cosmopolitanism is, to be sure, an important addition to the lexicon of global 
governance scholarship in general and global finance in particular. Arriving on 
the back of widespread acknowledgement of the limitations of the Washington 
Consensus and bolstered by the newfound zeal for 'legitimacy' among policy 
actors in the global financial architecture, cosmopolitanism represents a 
promising avenue for introducing ethics to global finance (Higgott, 2000). 
Subject areas that were previously dominated by technical and economic 
expertise and which centred on fiscal rectitude and informational transparency 
have started to incorporate democratic inclusion and civil society participation 
into their list of concerns (Thirkell-White, 2004). This might be described as a 
'good in itself'. 
However, the analysis of cosmopolitan ethics in global finance via a Tobin Tax 
exposes some serious ethical limits. These limits are briefly summarlsed before 
offermg a pragmatic take on their implications for cosmopolitanism in general 
and the Tobin Tax in particular. 
1n terms of cosmopolitan justice via the Tobin Tax two key ambiguities are 
identified (See Chapter Four). Firstly, to operate correctly, the Tobin Tax 
requires a developed and integrated financial system in which to operate. 
Advocates in partially or non-developed financial systems are therefore faced 
with a curious aim: to push for capital account convertibility in order to then 
6rein it in'. This would seem like a paradoxical agenda for many states where the 
debt repayment schedule far outstrips the welfare budget in the first place. 
Adding further financial openness to these economies - even if tempered - is 
unlikely to deal with the lack of indigenous economic development or overall 
financial strength (See Rodrik, 1998). And secondly, regardless of whether or not 
the tax can be implemented unifon-nly or universally, it is clear from all estimates 
that the majority of the revenue will be levied in the North. Thus, if 'cash' is to 
be redistributed it will have to flow from the North (usually states) to the South 
(usually states). As Chapter Four argues, such a move could well reproduce the 
problems traditionally associated with ODA and risk reducing the subjectivity of 
developing states to being mere 'recipients' of cash (Doty, 1996; Edkins, 2000). 
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To qualify, this is not the common Marxist riposte that ethics is simply a 
rhetorical strategy to shore up specific ideological interests - although that 
critique of the Tobin Tax is regularly made in social forum meetings. Rather it is 
argued that the proposal - like Pogge's GRID (2002) - is silent on its most central ZI!, zn 
paradox: despite claims to critique the system of global capitalism, it ultimately 
reproduces the logic of that system and fails to explore the multiple alternatives 
to financial universalism that may be constructed. In this way, a clear limit is 
produced within the cosmopolitan construction of global justice as re- 
distribution: the limit of universal capitalism. 
In terms of cosmopolitan democracy via the Tobin Tax, the following 
ambiguities are identified (See Chapter Five). Firstly, the Tobin Tax is levied by 
states on a state-centric tender. For a cosmopolitan tradition bent on thinking 
outside the polls, this would surely represent a contradiction. The supposed re- 
articulation of citizenship is still dependent on the same logic of representation 
and accountability that defines the state-centric, inside/outside logic of political 
theory that many cosmopolitans seek to escape (Walker, 1996,2003). And 
secondly, the principle of consensus at the heart of cosmopolitan democracy via 
the Tobin Tax all too easily falls down on a universalist proposition: some form 
of world government. Even in Heikki Patomaki's (1999,2001) more 
sophisticated and dialogical model, his proposed Tobin Tax Organisation ('170) 
is still a world authority. The possibility of financial reform by de-linking or 
setting up local autonomous or regional authorities is either ignored or seen as a 
stepping stone on the way to full global co-ordination. 
Such a project (re)legitimises a system of financial universality that is based on 
speculation against currencies. Even though this approach sets out to be more 
democratic and dialogic in its pursuit of such goals, we should perhaps not 
ignore the important role of Euro-centric historical experiences in making this 
possible. As Winfried Thaa (2001: 504) argues, such agendas "tend to overlook 
that political deliberation, agency and practice presuppose commonalities such 
as historic experience, communication based on everyday language, and 
commonly accepted institutions. " Crucially, the trust in institutions that is 
required to support such a project is most clearly felt within the cultural history 
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of Keynesian welfare systems and ongoing attempts to re-construct them in a 
Post-Bretton Woods financial system. 
Drawing these arguments together, cosmopolitanism is a promising, but limited, Z_n zn 4: ) 
agenda to reform Olobal finance. Problems of historically contingent power 
structures and the multiple silences of financial knowledge raise questions as to 
whether any 'one agenda' of institutional reform could ever make finance more 
'ethical'. Using the Tobin Tax campaign to illustrate, it is argued that deep 
ambiguities pertain to cosmopolitan ethics in global finance. The institutional 
project of 'inclusion' and the practical solution to poverty proposed - throw 
money at it - fall shy of an appreciation of the complexity and context(s) of 
injustice. Further, it reifies the financial system as a single unitary whole which 
we must react to, failing to explore alternatives that may arise in the context of 
partially or non-developed financial systems. 
However, from a pragmatic perspective the conversation is of value per se. Just 
as cosmopolitans like Bohman (1999) celebrate campaigns that publicise 
6cosmopolitan reasons' to a larger audience including global institutions, a 
pragmatist is able to find value in a 'limited' agenda like a cosmopolitan Tobin 
Tax because it illustrates an imaginative way of organising global finance. 
Moreover it is precisely in the contests over the ambiguities of cosmopolitan 
ethics that imaginative new directions may be found. 
The central argument is that the Tobin Tax is best understood as a too] of 
sentimental education (See Chapter Six). It provides a simple heuristic metaphor 
for understanding globallsation and a way to change it. The power of this 
metaphor has led it to occupy centre stage in a burgeoning global civil society 
and it is repeatedly included in discussions at the World Social Forum. 
Importantly, the ambiguities of cosmopolitan global finance - entrenched 
financial universalism and poor attention to democratic initiatives that fall 
outside of gl obal/uni versa] mechanisms - are highlighted within the campaign 
itself. In discussions that continue in social forums, in public meetings of NGO's, 
and (even) the stylised narratives of charities, the opacity and technicality of 
finance can be de-naturallsed via a sentimental re-description. 
25 
Simply stated, it is a good thing that larger and more diverse audiences are 
involved in a conversation about the potential suffering caused by global 
financial crises and the apolitical nature of technocratic financial governance. 
Public education on such issues is severely lacking (Scholte, 2002a, b). From a 
pragmatic perspective the task is to engage with such debates in order to identify 
their constitutive ambiguities and internal contradictions. This is not done as an 
exercise in critique for its own sake, but as an opportunity to identify alternative 
possible futures for global finance. Working at the limit of current ethical 
reasoning creates the space to suggest alternatives. Such discussions can disturb 
the black box of global finance and open it up to the broad based democratic 
conversation that cosmopolitans seek. While there may be no guarantee of the 
outcome of such conversation the thesis highlights a number of ways in which it 
can act to expand our vocabulary, identifying limitations in the current 
vocabulary and proffering alternatives that might be developed. 
0.6 Chapter Outline 
The argument is made over six chapters. Chapter One introduces the broad 
subject matter of the thesis. In the wake of the debt and currency crises at the 
close of the 20th Century, global financial regulation became a popular subject 
amoncyst politicians, bureaucrats, the media and academic economists (Goldstein, 47) 
1999; Meltzer, 2000). Discussions over prudential financial management, 
transparency, accountability and (latterly) correct sequencing of capital 
liberalisation were increasingly couched in terms of the metaphor of a Global 
Financial Architecture (GFA) (e. g. Noble and Ravenhill 2000). Within IPE, 
certain scholars (Germain, 2004; Coleman & Porter, 2000; Scholte, 2002b) have 
introduced normative and ethical dimensions to this previously technical 
discussion. In particular, the question of the possibility of cosmopolitan reform 
of the GFA has been highlighted. Chapter One introduces the broad contours of 
the discussion. 
Liberal cosmopolitans (Coleman & Porter, 2000; Held, 1995) have sought to 
extend democratic values via the identification of legal rules to enhance 
accountability. Others, who might be termed 'deliberative' or 'republican' 
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cosmopolitans (Bohman, 1999; Germain, 2004), have sought to extend 
'inclusion' via a sophisticated theorisation of the 'global public sphere'. Both 
approaches suggest that the subject of cosmopolitan ethics in global finance is an Z: ): Iý 
important emerging area for theorists who wish to address normative and 
practical applications of the cosmopolitan paradigm. However, it is argued that 
there are ultimately a number of limitations in this emerging literature. 
Firstly, the debate rests on a 'one-eyed' view of cosmopolitanism as a 
democratic paradigm. While democracy is an important component of 
cosmopolitan approaches, there is an equally venerable and arguably more 
challenging tradition of cosmopolitan 'justice' or 'redistribution' (Beitz, 1979; 
Buchanan, 2000; Caney, 2005; Pogge, 2002). And secondly, the debate is 
currently operates at an abstract and theoretical level. The chapter therefore 
proposes to operationalise the discussion of cosmopolitan global finance via a 
case-study of the Tobin Tax. On one level, as was argued above, this move may 
take us beyond the current level of IPE critique that views cosmopolitanism as 
simply 'unlikely'. The development of a grounded ethical critique of 
cosmopolitan ethics in global finance is qualitatively different to knockdown 
discussions of viability. On another level, the chapter defers to those existing 
critiques of the metaphor of a global financial architecture itself. Writers like 
Jacqueline Best (2003), Marieke De Goede (2005) and Paul Langley (2004), 
have each questioned the universalism inherent in monolithic images like the 
GFA. They question whether the myth of the universal veracity of liberal 
markets is potentially smuggled into a broad signifier like the GFA. 
In response, the chapter draws on Jan Aart Scholte's (2005) argument 
for a 
socio-spatial conception of globalisation as a way to progress. It is argued that a 
spatial conception of the GFA - local, national, regional, global - that emphasises 
the multi -dimensional nature of global 
financial governance is capable of 
meeting those critics who see the GFA debates as inherently universalistic. 
Sensitivity to the complexity and multiplicity of actors, institutions, and practices 
within the GFA can open space for ethical reflection, beyond any uncritical 
celebration of financial universalism. 
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Chapter Two establishes the theoretical framework by building from critical IPE. zn 
IPE offers a range of theoretical tools relevant for the study of cosmopolitanism 1-n 
in -lobal finance and a case-study of the Tobin Tax. While ethics has waxed and 
waned as a concern for IPE theorists (See Tabb, 1999; Watson, 2005) certain 
strands of critical IPE - neo-Gramscian and post- structural ist - have placed 
ethics and the difficulty of ethics at the heart of their work. While sympathetic to 
such approaches this chapter introduces the philosophical pragmatism of Richard 
Rorty as a framework for research. Specifically the elaboration of a praginatic 
pra-vis becomes a central contribution of the thesis. 
Two trends in theoretical approaches to IPE have placed 'ethics' in the somewhat 
awkward position of valuable, but unlikely. The rationalisation of method during 
the neoclassical revolution and the empiricist tradition of positivist IPE - neo- 
realism and neo-liberalism - both served to exclude ethics (Higgott, 2002; 
Stranue, 1995: Tabb, 1999; Watson, 2005). On this logic 'ethics' is understood 
something that may, or may not be, 'added' to enquiry. This approach is 
criticised by critical IPE theorists who stress the social embeddedness of 
economic relations (Gill 1991; Watson, 2005). For them rationality is a socially 
constructed quality that must itself be the subject of scrutiny. And by stripping 
IPE of its rationalist pretensions critical IPE opens the space for ethical 
deliberation. For critical IPE ethics is always-already part of the core of IPE. As 
Matthew Watson (2005: 33-34) argues, 
We bear the imprints of our economic relations in all aspects of 
our social life. The socializing effects of those relations shape 
who we are, how we act, how we think before we act, and the 
broader truth regime within which we locate ourselves as 
meaningful actors. As such, the economic relations in which we 
are embedded are imbued with a fundamentally moral character. 
However, such constitutive approaches create their own indeterminacies. 
An 
impasse is identified between critical or neo-Gramscian IPE that seeks to identify 
and foster agendas that lead to a more ethical, or cosmopolitan 
future (Gill, 1991; 
Murphy, 1994) and post-structural approaches that question the desirability of 
'ethics' per se (Hutchings, 2006; Walker, 1993). The chapter illustrates this 
impasse by suggesting a post-structural critique of 
Stephen Gill's (1991) 
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argument for a more ethical version of IPE. It is argued that while theoretically 
provocative this impasse is ultimately unhelpful. The philosophical pragmatism 
of Richard Rorty is suggested as a route beyond the impasse 
The chapter introduces a reading of Richard Rorty's pragmatism that applies his 
arguments regarding contingency and experimentalism to the discourse of z: 1 : _n 
cosmopolitanism. Importantly, the thesis holds onto the dynamism inherent in 
Rorty's view of philosophy as a 'conversation between mankind' (1979). This is 
done via a re-reading of his public private-split invoked to harness the 
imaginative promise of post-structural thought without foregoing the practical Z__ 
advantages of liberalism (Rorty, 1989). In particular, the tensions between public Z__ 
vocabularies of cosmopolitan ethics - vocabularies which focus on institutional 
reform, re-distributive justice, and democratic inclusion - are set in play with 
pnvate and ironic attitudes that seek to de-construct the subject of cosmopolitan 
ethics in global finance. On this view the Tobin Tax campaign itself becomes the 
fulcrum of a debate over the ethical limits of alobal finance. Ideas recarding 
universal financial systems, global regulatory authorities and global justice 
require scrutiny as to their western, imperialist and limiting features. Subsequent 
chapters flesh out this conversation in greater detail. 
Chapter Three establishes a histoncal account of the campaign for a Tobin Tax. 
The Tobin Tax has been discussed across disciplines, political arenas and civil 
society campaigns. The idea for a small tax on foreign currency transactions was 
initially debated as a purely economic & technocratic reform (Tobin, 1978; 
Spahn, 1995). As such this chapter commences with a detailed presentation of 
key economic arguments for and against the Tobin Tax. Following the financial 
crises of the late 20th Century, the Tobin Tax has been picked up by civil society 
groups and politicians seeking to regulate the GFA according to principles of 
justice 'broadly understood' (Cassen, 2003; Porter, 2005). The chapter suggests 
that ethical arguments for a Tobin Tax are currently under-developed; prompting zn 
recourse to the cosmopolitan arguments identified in Chapter One. 
Section I looks at Tobin's original proposal and assesses some of the main 
rcII Many points focus on itiques of the idea which emanate from economic theory. 
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the efficiency and effectiveness of the Tax for deterring speculation. Indeed, a 
central critique is that, if imposed, the tax could actually increase instability by 
reducing the margins of effective trade; inferring that only larger trades can be Z: ý 
profitable. The section concludes by outlining the central augmentation of the 
Tobin Tax by Paul Bernard Spahn (1995). Spahn's idea of a two-tier tax, a low 
tier for normal tradincy/revenue collection +a high tier that acts as a 'circuit 4: ) 
breaker' in speculative attacks, is now the default position of many campaigners. 
Section 2 looks to the emerging 'political' and 'ethical' dimensions of the 
campaign. Civil society activists have put the Tobin Tax at the centre of 
campaigns to 'contest' or 'reform' globalisation and the GFA. Groups like 
ATTAC, War on Want and New Rules for Global Finance campaign for the 
Tobin Tax and extend the intellectual arguments for it. Many commentators have 
interpreted this emergence as a direct political challenge to the power and 
authority of markets (Hellemer, 2001; Patomaki, 2001). Interestingly, many of 
these groups deploy moral or ethical arguments for the Tobin Tax that are worthy 
of closer examination. 
Thus the chapter questions how ethical arguments for the Tobin Tax are made. 
Do moral arguments bolster the case? Are they deployed as part of a broader 
view of Global Ethics? Are there any problems with this 'ethical turn', e. g. that 
the Tobin Tax could be tied to a narrow discourse of Northern chanty? 
Addressing such questions necessarily draws us to the heart of what is at stake in 
cosmopolitan global finance: what are the proposals? What are the weaknesses? 
What are the contradictions? And what are concrete experiences of these 
ac tually -existing cosmopolitan publics? Theoretical debates are therefore 
animated. 
Chapter Four addresses the broad discourse of cosmopolitan justice and 
operationallses it via the Tobin Tax. Cosmopolitan arguments for global zn 
redistribution emerge from cntiques of John Rawls' account of social justice. 
Post-Rawlsian arguments critique the limitation of the scope of social justice to 
members of specific - basically Westphalian - communities. They look to 
interdependence and the potential of global capitalism to hann individuals as 
30 
important considerations for social justice. Such arguments tie neatly with the 
central arguments for a Tobin Tax. However, the chapter identifies a number of 
ethical ambiguities relating to financial and ethical universalism. Z: ) 
Section I introduces Rawls' account of social justice and identifies some of the 
most prominent critiques of it. Post-Rawlsians have been keen to get beyond the 
state-centric cartography and think about global, or cosmopolitan, social justice. 
In particular, Thomas Pogge (2002) is an important contemporary advocate of 
global re-distribution and his arguments lend support to the Tobin Tax. Pogge 
argues from an assumption of a negative duty 'not to harm' that the current 
situation of global capitalism and global poverty is unjust and 'easily' 
changeable. His 'Global Resources Dividend' rests on a critique of historical- 
institutional harms of the poor by the rich, and argues that a small levy of I% 
from the wealthiest people could end global poverty. As Section 2 argues, 
Pogge's GRD is very similar in scope to the Tobin Tax. His proposal is a modest 
reform-, it targets global wealth, not any particular state; and it stresses an 
approach based on justice not charity. 
However, Section 3 identifies a number of ethical ambiguities in the Tobin Tax 
proposal that infer upon cosmopolitan justice. A requirement for capital account 
convertibility, a cash-based approach to global justice and the ambiguities 
inherent with identifying groups like 'we' who owe something to 'them' living in 47) 
'poverty' is criticised. At the very least such ambiguities place cosmopolitan 
justice via the Tobin Tax in question and the chapter concludes by asking 
whether perhaps democratic practices might mediate some of these issues? 
Chapter Five therefore moves to the vocabulary of cosmopolitan democracy. 
Liberal cosmopolitans like David Held (1995) and deliberative democrats like 
James Bohman (1999) are increasingly influential. Liberal arguments for 
autonomy and deliberative arguments for non-domination offer a promising line 
of support for the Tobin Tax. Moreover, the account of global civil society 
provided by liberal cosmopolitans and Bohman's 'cosmopolitan public sphere' 
highlight the ethical value of the Tobin Tax 'campaign' itself. This leads to a 
discussion of the advocates such as ATTAC and War on Want in the next section 
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Held (1995) supports democratisation along a scale of institutional forms to 
ensure that autonomy is defended from the forces of globalisation. Held cites 
financial globalisation as a trend that creates new 'communities of fate'. He 
envisages that global cii, il societi, will subject the institutions of global zn - 
, governance to popular scrutiny. For his part, James Bohman (1999,2004) 
elaborates a deliberative conception of cosmopolitan democracy. He begins from 
a principle of freedom as 'non-domination' and the assumption that individuals 
should deliberate on any institution/policy that affects them. And he critiques the 
democratic deficits in global institutions. Most importantly, he argues for the 
development of a cosmopolitan 'public sphere'. These ideas can be tied to the 
campaign for a Tobin Tax. Arguments for 'autonomy' and 'freedom from V71 
domination' imply support for the Tobin Tax. If material capacity is one aspect 
of human autonomy then global re-distribution is required to ensure this. 
Likewise, 'non-domi nation' would require that individuals are protected from 
currency market speculation. 
However, despite the worth of cosmopolitan democratic arguments in support of 
the Tobin Tax some key ethical limits are identified. Firstly, the Tobin Tax is 
levied by states on a state-centric tender. It is questioned whether and how such 
a mechanism legitimates the system of currency speculation that cosmopolitans 
and Tobin Tax advocates might oppose. And secondly, the cultural contingency, 
or 'euro centrism' of the Tobin Tax means that ideas about democratic 
consensus are put in question. 
On the one hand, the trust required to build re-distributive systems on a global 
scale is most easily found in western states with a history of successful welfare 
states. On the other hand, proposals for global re-distributions often run the risk 
of producing some form of world government. Even in Heikki Patomaki's 
(1999,2001) more sophisticated and dialogical model, his proposed Tobin Tax 
Organisation (TTO) is still a world authority. The possibility of financial reform 
by de-linking or setting up local autonomous or regional authorities is either 
ignored or seen as a stepping stone on the way to full global co-ordination. 
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Finally Chapter Six develops a pragmatic cosmopolitan approach to these issues. 
It develops an account of the campaign for the Tobin Tax, arguing that the 
ongoing discussions in global civil society can be celebrated for illustrating the 
harm done by global finance. Moreover, the chapter identifies some of the 
sophisticated elements of this conversation. The ethical dilemmas of 
cosmopolitan justice are well illustrated in the fact that Northern, White, 
Bourgeois, NGO activists are leading the campaign. Moreover, the conversations Z-n 
that go on within social forums and the public meetings of ATTAC illustrate the 1-n 
widely held doubts over advocating only piecemeal reforms of global finance. 
However, from a pragmatic perspective increasing knowledge of such 
ambiguities can be seen as part of the 'sentimental education' required to zn 
understand and change global finance. 
The chapter argues that the Tobin Tax is best understood as a sentimental 
metaphor that disturbs the black box of global finance and opens up the 
possibility of popular discussion of global finance/ethics. A narrative of the 
campaign for the Tobin Tax is developed using pragmatism as a theoretical 
guide. It argues that idea of the Tobin Tax provides a simple heuristic device to 
understand the complex and arcane practices of global finance. The overnight 
growth of ATTAC in France on a mandate to tax financial markets for the aid of 
citizens is a testament to this quality. As ATTAC grew and its reach spread, its 
practices of public education - or sensibilisation - meant that the Tobin Tax was 
increasingly deployed as group discussion too] (Cassen, 2003; Birchfield and 
Annette Freyberg-1nan, 2005). And the involvement of ATTAC in the 
establishment of the World Social Forum has important implications for the 
development of cosmopolitan public spheres. 
In particular, the chapter focuses on the British Charity War on Want and its 
establishment of the Tobin Tax Campaign (www. tobintax. or, -. uk). The network 
of more than fifty charities has developed a European campaign for the Tobin 
Tax. On many levels, War on Want elaborate a piecemeal version of the tax. The 
tax is set at a very low rate (Kapoor, 2003; Spratt, 2005); ambitious reforms of 
global financial institutions are not advocated; and arguments for global re- 
distribution are only superficially about justice (in Pogge's sense) and rather tend 
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to (re)produce the charity discourse of International development aid. Despite 
this, it is argued that the involvement of such groups in the social forum 
movement presents the possibility of open public discussion of these issues. 
Sentimental education in global context involves the confrontation between 
conservative and radical conceptions of the tax (See Patomaki, 2005). It therefore 
provides an insight into the politics of actually existing cosmopolitan publics; 
showing how fluid, open to disagreement, and experimental the project is. 
Politicising and engaging the limit of cosmopolitan ethics in this way is a central 
contribution of a pragmatic approach to the Tobin Tax. z: 1 
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Cosmopolitan Ethics in Global Finance: 
Possibilities, Problems and Limits 
Introduction 
Global finance is commonly regarded as a technical, arcane and somewhat dry 
subject (Sinclair, 2005: 4). For these reasons it may not appear as a natural 
starting point for ethical discussion. However, in recent decades the governance 
of global finance has increasingly been the subject of political controversy and 
scrutiny. Major financial crises in the late 20th century have focused the attention 
of policy makers on the growing criticism of what might be termed the 
globalisation 'project' per se (Gill, 2000; Higgott, 1998,2000). In response, a 
new policy discourse has emerged that seeks to legitirmse a 'New International 
Financial Architecture' (NIFA) or 'Global Financial Architecture' (GFA) 
(Eicheng-reen, 1999; Goldstein, 1999; Kenen, 2001; Meltzer, 2000). Discussions 
over the reform of the global financial architecture are further developed in IPE. 
(Armlio, 2002; Best, 2003,2003a; Noble and Ravenhill, 2000; Underhill and 
Zhang, 2003; Woods, 2001). And certain scholars have addressed the debate over 
the reform of the GFA by outlining normative arguments and objectives that are 
either similar to, or explicitly cosmopolitan (Coleman and Porter, 2000; 
Germain, 2001,2002,2004; Porter, 2001; Porter and Wood, 2002; Scholte, 
2002b; Thirkell-White, 2004). 
As the Introduction has already argued, cosmopolitanism is hard to define. While 
numerous interpretations and extensions of the paradigm exist it is perhaps better 
to think about cosmopolitans as motivated by a basic desire to expand the scope 
of ethical concern in order to reduce suffering (Linklater, 2006; Rorty, 1991c). 
This can be via different avenues like the extension of human rights laws 
(Bohman, 2004) democracy (Held, 1995; Bohman, 2005) and conventions 
against harm (Linklater, 2001) or, it may result from political activism by 
advocacy groups (Bohman, 1999). Existing cosmopolitan approaches to global 
finance have highlighted the need to build principles of fairness and 
accountability into the I institutions' of global financial governance (Coleman and 
Porter, 2000; Porter and Woods, 2002). Others go further to address the 
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possibility of building international public spheres around financial issues 
(Germain, 2001,2002,2004; See also Scholte, 2002c). By fostering an ethic of 
participation, it is argued that NGOs can generate sufficient publicity to open up C, 
-ý, Iobal finance to a broader audience, thus making it susceptible to reform. And 
IPE scholars have made studies on specific issues like debt (George, 1988,1992) 
and taxation (Palan, 2002) which arguably have a bearing on cosmopolitan 
approaches to global finance. 
However, the idea of developing ethical approaches to global finance and the 
possibility of legitimising the GFA have been subject to scepticism and critique 
in IPE. A sceptical view (Best, 2003; Underhill and Zhang, 2003; Sinclair, 2001) 
would argue that the interests of major powers and/or private interests will tend 
to over-ride ethical concerns in the governance of global finance. Sophisticated 
versions of this thesis argue that the increasing prevalence of privatised 
govemance via industry self-monitoring means that no amount of public 
involvement will get close to the actual substance of global finance (Coleman 
and Porter, 2000; Sinclair, 2001). But while these arguments pose serious 
challenges to the feasibility of cosmopolitan approaches to global finance, the 
chapter argues that they are not ethical critiques. Each leaves unquestioned the 
normative ideal of cosmopolitanism as a framework for global finance, i. e. theY 
agree it is a good idea but think it ultiniatelY unlikelY. 
Meanwhile, a more pressing critique hails from post-structuralism. For post- 
structural authors (De Goede, 2005: 147-149; Langley, 2004) there is a totallsing 
universality in the metaphor of the GFA that both imposes an ethical limit and 
silences alternative ethical/financial futures. By thinking in terms of a single 
unitary image of global finance reformist accounts may lose sight of the 
contingency and contestability of financial arrangements. Extending this point it 
can be argued that when cosmopolitan ethical approaches attach themselves to 
policy debates like GFA reform they may re-produce that which they question. 
This relates to the self limiting aspects of cosmopolitanism described by Rob 
Walker (2003: 268), who argues that: 
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In some very important respects cosmopolitanism must be read as 
a constitutive aspect of the problems that many of those attracted 
to cosmopolitanism seek to address. In its most familiar forms 
especially, cosmopolitanism works well, within the permissible 
discourses of the modem sovereign state, and works precisely so 
as to entrench the statist accounts of political possibility and 
impossibility. 
A potential self-limiting aspect of cosmopolitan approaches to global finance 
may therefore be the entrenchment of not only statist, but market-centric 
accounts of political possibility (See De Goede, 2005). The chapter responds to 
these points in turn. First, the dominance of power politics and private 
governance arrangements does not mean that ethics should be written off in Cý L_ 
global finance. If anything such obstacles only increase the need for ethical 
theonsing to combat these problems. And second, it is agreed that universalism is 
a serious issue. An unquestioned financial universality can blind reform to the 
contingency and ambiguity of lived experiences. It can reduce the ethical reform 
of global finance to a straightforward 'program' that fails to question what 
finance 'is', i. e. are open financial systems (even if regulated) natural or 
desirable in every context? 
However, the chapter argues there is no reason why a cosmopolitan approach to 
global finance must reify financial universality. By unpacking cosmopolitan 
approaches to global finance we can suggest some alternatives. At one level, It is 
argued that cosmopolitanism should be operationalised via a practical case study. 
Currently nascent articulations of cosmopolitan ethics in global finance draw on 
predominantly democratic arguments. In this way, the tradition of cosmopolitan 
justice, including Charles Beitz (1979) and Thomas Pogge (2002), is left under 
represented. Therefore it is argued that by developing a case study of the Tobin 
Tax (Tobin, 1978) we can explore both the re-distributive and democratic aspects 
of cosmopolitan ethics (See Chapters 3-6). At another level, the question of 
'what is global? ' in global finance needs to be unpacked. Current articulations 
tend to equate 'global finance' with International Institutions + Finance 
(Germain, 2004: 232) thus confirming the critique of financial universalism. But, 
drawing on the work of Jan Art Scholte (2005), it is argued that globalisation is 
better understood as a multi -dimensional (economic, social, political, discursive) 
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and multi-level (individual, local, national, regional, global) process that re- 
spatialises life in transplanetary and supra-territorial terms. On this view, global 
finance is not some universal monolith. Rather it is understood as a socio-spatial 
context in which to critically think through cosmopolitan ethical proposals for 
financial reform. 
The chapter is in four sections. Section I introduces global finance and outlines 
certain key political and ethical challenges. Section 2 introduces prominent 
cosmopolitan responses. Section 3 surveys the existing critical literature on the 
possibility of ethics in global finance. And Section 4 will set out the parameters 
of a practical and theoretical response. To this end, the Tobin Tax is suggested as 
a suitable case study of cosmopolitan global finance. And the idea of 
cosmopolitanism in global finance is plurallsed via recognition of the complexity 
and dynamism of global finance across multiple levels of social life. 
1.1 Global Finance, Policy Reform and Ethical Challenges 
This section is in three parts. Part I provides a basic introduction to global 
finance. It defines finance in general terms and highlights some of the relevant 
changes in its operation and governance. Most significantly, finance in the 21" 
Century has attained a significantly global character that will be further 
addressed in Section 4. Part 2 discusses some of the themes of the global policy 
debate over reforming the GFA. A prime interest in 'crisis prevention' has 
focused the GFA reform debate on a rather limited mandate of stability and 
transparency. And finally, Part 3 outlines some of the key ethical challenges 
pertaining to global finance. While the ethical dimensions of global finance have 
been less prevalent in the mainstream policy debate, they are nonetheless 
important for it. 
1. LI Global Finance: a basic introduction 
At the outset it is useful to give a general introduction to global finance. Finance 
is the part of the economy that mediates between savings and investment. This is 
usually done via the creation of credit. Indeed, Stopford and Strange (1991: 35) 
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define the financial system as the "the system under which credit is created, 
allocated and put to use". An effective financial system, so the economic logic 
runs, is able to provide a pool of (liquid) capital for investors while maintaining 
levels of return for savers. And a plethora of instruments exist to provide for - 
and profit from - these operations. As Jan Aart Scholte (2002a: 4) details: 
A host of mechanisms have developed to connect savings and 
investments. Many take the form of deposits in and loans from 
banks. Others are securities: that is, stocks and debt instruments 
like bonds, notes and money market tools. Then there are 
financial derivatives: that is, forwards, options, swaps and other 
such contracts that relate to future levels of foreign exchange 
rates, interest charges, securities prices, stock market indices, and 
other financial indicators. Insurance arrangements constitute still 
another large field of financial activity, where people pay in today 
to cover possible needs for payouts tomorrow. 
For this complex set of financial instruments there is a long list of important 
variables: interest rates, exchange rates, political stability, etc. And these 
variables are interdependent. For example, a high interest rate/low inflation 
policy in one country can induce liquid capital from overseas which would in 
turn put upward pressure on the exchange rate, increasing the cost/reducing the 
saleability of exports, threatening low growth, low employment and potential 
instability. 
In this interconnected model, profit signals for financial market participants can 
sometimes be removed from trends in the 'real economy' of production and trade 
(Soederburg, 2002: 6). This is partly due to the size and speed of financial 
markets that allow for - and encourage - quick speculative trades in derivative 
products, without getting bogged down in long-term investments, occasionally 
with negative consequences (Goldstein 1993: 4). For example, strong faith in 
risk-models mean that hedge funds are encouraged to bet large on very small 
margins. (De Goede, 2001). 
While somehow detached from the 'real' economy then, the size of finance 
ensures it s social and economic importance. Finance Is huge. Numerically it Is 
much larger than world production and trade put together. As the Bank for 
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International Settlements (BIS, 2004: 4) details, the value is still growing in areas 
like foreign exchange: "The 2004 survey shows a large increase in activity in C) Z: ) 
traditional foreign exchange markets as compared to 2001. Average daily zn 
turnover rose to $1.9 trillion in April 2004, up by 57% at current exchange rates 
and by 36% at constant exchange rates. " At such levels it would take foreign Z7) 
exchanae markets less than a month to trade the value of annual world GDP. zn 
Such size is facilitated in part by the global structure of the market. A 
combination of rapid technological innovation and progressive liberalisation of 
financial sectors across the world have meant that banks, hedge-funds, stock 
traders, and even individuals can now operate in global markets in continuous 
time 24 hours a day, 7 days a week (See Cohen, 1996). In the late 20th century, 
the ideology of open markets was synonymous with a global financial sector that 
promised growth and prosperity in limitless proportions (Germain, 1997; 
Strange, 1986). And, in response, financial firms have gone global to meet such 
promised opportunities. For instance, in the case of derivatives markets William 
Coleman (2001: 2) notes: 
... these markets are truly global in that they transcend borders; in fact, derivatives are financial instruments whose very purpose is 
to take some of the financial risks out of investing across borders. 
[ ... ] these markets are dominated and controlled by a relatively 
small number of complex, global financial services firms that are 
active in most of the principal financial centres of the developed 
and developing world. 
Technology, profit seeking, ideology and political policy have therefore 
combined to allow finance to globalise rapidly. In this context one of the key 
areas of debate on global finance in 20th Century concerned the question 
goveming global finance (Ruggie, 1982; Underhill, 1997). While the concept of 
governance is contested terrain - some argue that states are now less powerful, 
while others note their increasing power vis-ý-vis labour with the effective de- 
politicisation of financial issues (Burnham, 2001) - it is clear that the size, trans- 
border scope, and speed of financial markets mean that a national or, territorially 
demarcated cartography is not of itself sufficient to regulate them. As Scholte 
(2002a: 9) affirms, 
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-localities, countries and regions are by no means irrelevant in 
today's banking, securities, derivatives, and insurance industries: 
twenty-first century finance has not become purely global and 
nonterritorial. However, many financial activities are now 
considerably plobal, including in ways that largely transcend CD territorial geography. As such, they also transcend the traditional 
scope of the territorial state and pose considerable challenges for 
effective governance. 
1.1.2 Reformim! the Global Financial Architecture? 
The question of governance is further underlined by the history of frequent and 
intense instabilities in global finance. In the last decades of the 20, h Century a 
number of financial crises caused severe damage in developing and developed 
economies alike. The Asian financial crisis in particular prompted a major re- 
think of alobal financial governance, not least because it occurred in a set of 
countries that were generally seen to be model students of IMF policy (Bruce 
Hall, 2003; Higgott, 1998; Wade, 1998). As Leslie Gelb, then President of the 
Council on Foreign Relations, remarked: "No event of the past 50 years has 
generated more calls for a re-examination of the institutions, structures, and 
policies aimed at crisis prevention and resolution than the Asian/global financial 
crisis that began in Thailand in July 1997. " (Goldstein, 1999: 3). And, as a result, 
a number of policy reform proposals were put together in a series of debates over 
the reform of the global financial architecture (Eichengreen, 1999; Goldstein, 
1999; Kenen, 22001, Meltzer, 2000). 
Part 2 now identifies the broad themes of the GFA reform debates. It is argued 
that the reformist moves to encourage stability and transparency may indeed help 
the declared policy objective of 'crisis prevention'. However, the broader 
political and ethical dimensions of GFA reform regarding accountability and 
legitimacy were less developed. As Leslie Elliott Armijo (2002a: 3) argues, "a 
debate over the future financial architecture that continues to be overwhelmingly 
dominated by the preferences of interests located within the United States may 
not produce a reform blueprint that can last. [... ]Unfortunately, the most 
influential positions in the contemporary debate largely ignore the questions of 
international political feasibility and long-term political sustainability... " A 
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space is therefore opened for cosmopolitan approaches to global finance 
concerned with democratic legitimacy that will be addressed in Section 2. 
Within IPE the debate on GFA reform has been criticised extensively for 
working within a limited mandate that produced only minor reforms while re- 
enforcing orthodoxies regarding capital convertibility (Best, 2003a; Bruce Hall, zn zn 
2003-, Langley, 2004; Sinclair, 2001; Soederburg, 2002). This is due to the fact Z-- 
that for policy actors and policy relevant economists concerned with the GFA 
reform, the solutions to financial instability depended in large part of the 
problems identified. Thus, because GFA reform was instigated as a reaction to a 
series of financial crises then, crisis prevention became the central goal. In this 
vein, a number of discursive moves were made which marked out the crises as a 
deeply abnormal and chaotic episode. As Morris Goldstein (1999: 6) recounted 
in one of the key GFA documents published by the Council on Foreign 
Relations: 
... financial crises swept through the developing world like a hurricane. Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Hong Kong, Russia, and Brazil were among the hardest hit, but C7 C) 
few developing countries emerged unscathed. In the crisis 
countries, currencies and equity prices plummeted, economic 
growth turned into recession, wealth evaporated, jobs were 
destroYed, and poverty and school dropout rates soared. 
While a laudable reflex, this move to identify the nefarious nature of financial 
crises is at the same time concerned with justifying specific and particular 
courses of action. By marking out financial crises as something 'other', 
abnormal and foreign, it therefore became easier to regard the reform objective 
as one of straightforward prevention. For its part the IMF reproduced this 
discourse: "Improving the prevention and management of crises means 
tackling sources of vulnerability, increasing transparency, and promoting 
adherence to international standards of good economic citizenship. " (IMF, 2001) 
According to this view, global finance has faltered because (developing) states 
have failed to adhere to neo-liberal reforms. Thus the appropriate response must 
involve certain conditional i ties for developing states and market actors. As 
Goldstein (lbid. 7) asserts, 
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If we are to make real headwaýy in improving crisis prevention 
and management in the developing world, we must put the 
pritnaiý, responsibilh), back where it belongs: on emerging 
econotnies themselves and on their private creditors, which 
dominate toda 
' 
i, 's international capital markets. If the behaviour 
of debtors and creditors does not change, the poor track record on 
financial crises will continue. 
The effect of such logic is 1) to construct non-crisis periods as normal, thus re- 
legitimising olobal finance (De Goede, 2005: 147-149), and 2) to reduce GFA 
reform objectives to a set of technical adjustments. As Paul Langley (2004: 70) 
argues, "Demands for governance reform follow from economic rationalist 
assumptions about the benefits of liberalized capital markets, viewed as 
necessary if these perceived benefits are to be reaped by developing and 
developed state-societies alike. " Thus the G7 finance ministers issued statements 
about strengthening global financial institutions (Group of 7,1998). The G-22 
produced three statements on strengthening the GFA that were intended to 
consult more openly, if technically, with developing states (Group of 22,1998, 
1998, a, 1998, b). And the Council on Foreign Relations (1999: 83) produced the 
findings of its own task force which argued that, 
Information and data shared openly and rapidly are the best 
devices to curb excesses, to limit exposures, and to cause 
corrective actions before impending crises become actual crises. 
[ ... ]Rapid and reliable information, greater transparency, and 
more aggressive IMF whistle-blowing in turn provide a 
foundation for the development of a much more effective early 
warning and early action system. 
While there were some informal institutional innovation in the G22 and the 
Financial Stability Forum (FSF), and a set of standards and codes on best 
practices, the real output has been viewed by many within IPE as an exercise in 
consolidation, not reform. As Jacqueline Best argues, "Unlike neoliberalism, this 
new financial architecture recognises the limits of a disembedded global 
economy. Yet, rather than seeking to reign in the forces of liberalisation by re- 
embedding international finance in the norms and practices of particular states, 
advocates of this new regime seek to embed a new universal set of financial 
norms and institutions" (Best 2003a, 378-9). The point is that even if the GFA 
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reform objectives make sound economic sense, they risk their own democratic 
and political legitimacy by proceeding in a technical and economistic fashion. As zn 
Armijo (2002a: 53) forcefully concludes, 
The current minimalist and hegemonic post-Bretton Woods 
international financial architecture makes it difficult for elected 
leaders in poor countries to maintain both domestic mass 
democracy and external economic integration, because the PBW 
financial architecture requires developing publics to endure 
precisely those extremes of economic volatility that Western 
democracies made clear to their leaders in the 1930s they would 
no longer tolerate. I 
1.1.3 What's missing? Political and Ethical Challenges 
The point of this brief overview of the GFA reform debates is to give a flavour 
of the technical and managerial logics that pervade the governing circles of 
global finance. Part 3 will now argue that what is missing from such discussions 
is in many ways, what most important politically and ethically speaking. As 
Higgott (1998,2000) has argued, the understanding of governance as a technical z! ) 
issue of institutional policy management, which lies at the heart of the global 
financial institutions, negates a potentially more expansive understanding of 
global governance as politically contested and contestable. In the field of global 
finance, for instance, the ethical dimensions of GFA reform have been poorly 
recognised yet hold massive implications for the legitimacy of GFA reform. As 
Underhill and Zhang (2003: 79) argue, Z: ) 
... the 
international financial order derives its legitimacy not only 
from its potent] a] contribution to improved investment 
opportunities and economic efficiency but, more fundamentally, 
from its ability to ensure redistributive justice, social fairness and 
democratic accountability on a global scale. The key issues in the 
international financial architecture go beyond Policy 
transparency, regulatory adequacy and risk management, and 
concern broader questions about the ends of public policy in the 
domain of global money and finance. 
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Some major political and ethical challenges can be identified that build from and 
extend the mainstream concerns with crisis prevention highlighted above. 
Specific concerns include the way that financial instabilities and debt foster 
radical material and democratic inequality and underpin a largely undemocratic 
financial system. Thus, in opposition to the mainstream view of GFA reform, if 
'normal finance' is wrought with ethical concerns then what is the attraction of a 
reform agenda that identifies and targets only abnormal episodes? All that can be 4n 4: ) 
provided here is a broad summary of the ethical challenges facing the governance 
of global finance, paving the way for consideration of key cosmopolitan 4: ) 
arguments in Section 2. 
Instabilities in global markets for debt, currencies, equities and their derivatives 
have direct and material consequences for populations on the receiving end. As 
Susan Strange (1986: 2) observed some twenty years ago, "A currency change 
can halve the value of a farmer's crop before he harvests it, or drive an exporter 
out of business. A rise in interest rates can fatally inflate the cost of holding 
stocks for the shop-keeper. A takeover dictated by financial considerations can 
rob the factory worker of his job. " Such instability is not then just an economic 
problem. It poses a serious threat to human welfare and the capacity of states to 
ensure social justice and brings into question norms of state-centric welfare 
provision (Devetak and Higgott, 1999). 
The fallout from many financial crises involves job losses, poverty and major 
social adjustments including mass migration to cities, a potential fire-sale of 
domestic owned capital at knockdown prices and the threat of long term low 
inflation and high unemployment. As the British NGO War on Want (2002: 3) 
attests, 
The poor have been affected by unemployment, cuts in wages, 
rising prices of essential commodities, and reductions in social 
services. Children were taken out of school, food has been in 
short supply, and levels of violence and prostitution have risen. 
Unemployment and the increased competition for survival have 
led to community breakdown. There has been a rise in political 
instability, with food riots and ethnic tensions in Indonesia, 
farmers protesting in Thailand and worker discontent in Korea. 
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In the context of large profits in the banking sector such social impacts mean that 4: ) zn 
the global financial system has acted to foster large levels of inequality. This is 
nowhere more evident than in the case of debt. In the global south, debt as a 
proportion of GDP has spiralled in the 20th Century. A major escalation occurred 
during the oil price hikes of the 70's. The huge sums that oil-producing countries 
pocketed during the shocks were deposited in US banks and, as interest rates 
plummeted, the banks recycled these 'petro-dollars' to the South. These loans 
were made with scant attention to the recipient's ability to repay and - more 
nefariously - with little account of the human rights record of particular leaders 
(Geor, (. Y, e, 1988,1992). As interest rates increased again, the phenomenon of 4n 
compound interest meant that many southern states began to pay back in interest 
more than they had actually borrowed in the first place. Indeed Jubilee 2000 
estimates that African countries currently spend more than four times on Debt as 
healthcare. 
In this way, financial instabilities and debt create material inequalities between 
creditors and debtors. However, a further ethical challenge arises when we 
consider political inequality. The ethical challenges of global finance are 
compounded by the lack of participatory democratic avenues for reform. To date 
the governance of global finance has been dominated by the interested actors of 
the northern, white, male. bourgeois, educated elites (Armijo, 2002a; Scholte, 
2002b). Decision making has been the job of state leaders acting on the advice of 
their treasury ministers working in close co-ordination with the major investment 
banks, hedge-funds and market players (Underhill, 1997). The list of people, 
communities, faiths, frameworks of knowledge, modes of existence and 
environmental interests excluded from the decision-making level of the GFA is 
enormous. Gender issues including the differential access to credit between men 
and women are rarely (and then only problematically) recognised in mainstream 
financial policy (Weber, 2002). In terms of class, the upper levels are far more 
likely to have their interests recognised. For example, Western nations have 
successfully operated a differential approach to tax collection between labour and 
capital in recent decades. And in terms of state representation, southern states 
listen while the G8 speak. As Scholte (2002a: 17) affirms, 
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... most states have been excluded from the G7, the G 10, the G20, 
the OECD, and transstate networks of national officials. At the 
same time weighted votes have in effect given a handful of states 
a collective veto in the Bretton Woods institutions. Most of the 
world's people have therefore been only marginally, if at all, 
represented by their states in the governance of global finance. Z: I 
The ethical challenaes facino alobal finance are therefore huge at a time when C) zn tn 
the effective de-politicisation of decision making has meant that opportunities for 
reform appear to be minimal. What is clear is the mainstream view that stability, 
informational transparency and better policing of developing states are 
insufficient to address these challenues. It is in this context that the thesis now t) 
introduces the possibility of cosmopolitan ethics in global finance. 
1.2 Cosmopolitan Approaches to Global Finance? 
Cosmopolitan approaches to global finance are nascent. Sustained attempts to 
scrutinise global finance according to cosmopolitan principles have only 
emerged in recent years (Coleman and Porter, 2000-, Germain, 2001,2002,2004; zn 
Porter, 2001; Porter and Wood, 2002; Scholte, 2002b; Thirkell-White, 2004). 
So far the work has addressed the problems of 1) finding and applying 
cosmopolitan democratic standards to finance, and 2) exploring the contours of 
an evolving public sphere and its capacity to foster political equality. It is argued 
that while neither approach comprehensively meets all the ethical challenges 
posed by contemporary global finance the development and extension of such 
approaches represents an interesting and worthwhile first cut. Thinking through 
the problems and possibilities of cosmopolitan ethics in global finance is an 
important ethical move in a domain marked out by instrumental and technocratic 
closure. 
1.2.1 Extending Democratic Principles to Global finance 
The principle intellectual spur for cosmopolitan approaches to global 
finance can 
be found in the work of David Held (1995,1997). Although his ideas will be 
analysed in more detail in Chapter Five, it is useful to 
briefly introduce the logic 
of his argument here. 
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Held argues that globalisation presents a number of economic, social and 
political challenges that require cosmopolitan responses - understood as the 
preservation of individual autonomy, via legal reforms and maximal democratic 
accountability (1995). For Held, processes of g0obalisation blur the association 
between national policy and national electorate, challenging the principle of self 
determination and prompting a need to re-construct systems of political 
governance. 'Indeed, globalisation has become an important issue for 
cosmopolitans in the post-Cold War order. As Andrew Linklater (1999: 474-475) 
argues, "Globalization increases the opportunities for, and incidence of, t_n 
transnational harm (injury to individuals or groups which is caused by other 
societies or trasnational corporations, and injury which is spread across frontiers 
by market forces and by global trends which harm the environment). " Ile 
response of cosmopolitan democrats is to argue that, if lives are strongly 
influenced by a number of cross cutting 'communities of fate' (e. g. financial, 
environmental. etc. ) that are not controllable by national governments alone, then 
the task is to re-construct democracy at levels above, below and regional to the 
state. 
Such arguments are intuitively extendable to global finance. On one level the 
impact of global financial activity on the affairs of states is an important questi Z-- I ion 
(Andrews and Willett, 1997). As the previous section argued, financial crises and 
debt can manifest a serious threat to national economies and welfare systems, 
even within developed states. There is therefore perhaps a need to re-construct 
conceptions of democratic self-determination to take account of the negative 
effects of financial interdependence? 
On another level the institutions of global financial governance already exist and 
make policy that has a direct consequence for everybody's lives. Making such 
institutions democratically accountable is a pressing avenue of enquiry (Woods, 
2001). These ideas are developed critically and comprehensively by William 
Coleman and Tony Porter. In their article, International Institutions, 
Globalisation and Democracy, they argue that, while laudable, Held's 
cosmopolitan democracy exhibits too little sensitivity to functional differences 
across different sites of supranational authority (2000: 378). In particular they 
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note some specific challenges in global finance that are fundamental to the tý 
development of cosmopolitan democracy. As they contend (2000: 378), 
"... this variation is due not only to differences in the pace of 
globalisation across issue areas. It derives as well from variations in 
the relative importance of three related, but sometimes 
underestimated challenges to democracy: the increased 
international importance ofprivate authorit , y, of 
technical authority 
and the unequal distribution of power among states. It is important, 
therefore to develop criteria for democracy that can be practically 
applied to the very different institutions, which we are likely to 
continue to see across supranational sites of authority. " (Emphasis 
added. ). 
Coleman and Porter concur with Held that the migration of authority from state 
to supranational organisations has fostered deep questions of legitimacy in 
modem political systems: "[a]s the institutions created by states in this way 
increase in strength and autonomy, they can further erode citizens' input into 
policy processes. "(Ibid: 380). But they question whether there can be easy 
resolution of such questions in global finance, where regulation has come to rely 
heavily on expert exclusionary knowledge like risk analysis (See also Underhill, 
1997). They argue that this "reliance on technical knowledge in supranational Z-- 
policy making is, in turn, a contributor to a third challenge to democracy: the 
growing importance of private authority. " (lbid: 381). Such authority challenges 
basic norms of political legitimacy and accountability because citizens have very 
little direct channels through which to hold such de facto policy makers to 
account. 
On this view, the reform of the GFA according to democratic principles may 
require a re-thinking of the very concepts of democracy and accountability? 
Principles of autonomy and (legalistic) democracy may have trouble cutting into 
the privatised authority and asymmetrical power relations that pervade the 
already existing regimes of global finance? 
In response Coleman and Porter (Ibid. 388-390) identify six underlying 
principles of democracy that can be applied more effectively to global finance: 
1) Transparency Can all interested observers inform themselves fully on the core 
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questions and tradeoffs under consideration? 2) Openness to direct participation; 
3) Qualio, Qf discourse [to what extent is legislative debate legitimised through 
evidence of ethical reflection and contested practice as well as administrative 
norms'? ], 4) Representation; 5) gffectiveness, and 6) Fairness. Applied to finance 
- and in line with much of what has been argued - these criteria render the 
followin,, results: Zý 
TransparencY traditionally has been low due to traditions of 
secrecy and the highly technical character of the issue area. Z-) 
This tradition has been changing significantly in recent years, 
due to the emergence of private sector transparency in 4: ý 
prudential regulation. Cý 
On openness to participation and representation, power 
asymmetries are evident with the dominance of GIO officials. 
In recent years, there have been a number of steps taken to 
integrate emerging market regulators, for example through L- zn 
various regional committees and the G20, but in almost all 
cases this involvement is much more informal and peripheral 
than the G 10 involvement, and is at the pleasure of the latter. 
On qualily of discourse, the institutional fragmentation of the 
issue area reduces significantly the opportunities for raising 
important political issues such as the desired choice of 
systemic nsk/regulatory cost tradeoff, the distribution of risks 
and post-crisis costs, and the feasibility of certain policies... 
On effectiveness, despite considerable strengthening over Z- 
recent decades, the informal nature of the prudential regimes 
has reduced its capacity to promote compliance with strong 
detailed rules. 
Discourses of jaimess are virtually absent from this issue 
area... ... Some moves 
have been made to address 
asymmetries of power by including emerging market ZD 
reaulators. These and other institutional initiatives are not Z: ) 
accompanied, however, by reflective discussion of principles 
of fairness that could govern them - rather they are ad hoc, 
technically driven, or done behind closed doors. (Ibid. 392- 
393). 
Thus the findings of this approach with respect to the reforms of the global 
financial architecture discussed are similarly negative. As well as the poor 
reflection of social costs of financial instability in the official debate, Coleman 
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and Porter point to the inadequacy of attempts to improve democracy in the 
global financial architecture via the inclusion of emerging states. When 
organisations like the G7, the G22 or the FSF did make an effort to include 
developing states, it could only be done within a technical discourse and with the 
backino (leadership? ) of the US, even - or especiallY - when translated through 
the more global body of the IMF (See Momani, 2004). 1 
To surnmarise, Coleman and Porter persuasively develop the utility of 
cosmopolitan critique in the context of global finance. Developing an ethical 
consideration of the broad flaws in the GFA reform debate identified in 1.1.2 is 
an interesting application for cosmopolitanism in global finance. However, if this 
is a useful extension of cosmopolitan critique, there is another approach - not 
exclusive to this one - that looks at the normative possibilities within the 
emerging public sphere. This argument is arguably more normative than 
Coleman and Porter and suggests the positive futures of global finance that may 
be envisaged. 
1.2.2 Building a Global Public Sphere for Finance? 
Randall Germain (2004) takes a more sociological view of the emerging debates 
on reforming the GFA to argue that accountability can best be improved via an 
ethic of participation within an emergent globalfinancial public sphere. Germain 
defines this public sphere as, 
"... that arena of public deliberation concerning financial issues 
bounded by four key globally institutional] sed configurations of 
power. These are a government-led (or inter-state) institutional 
framework at the global level, the set of globally integrated 
financial markets, a global media increasingly interested in financial 
issues, and those associations within civil society that advance and 
debate issues broadly associated with finance. " (2004: 232). 
Germain is interested in the evolution of norms of communication between 
regulatory institutions, markets, the media and civil society. It is argued that such 
norms provide a sphere in which courses of action although not legitirnised in a 
traditional political sense of consensus and oversight, are at least debated and 
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scrutinised in informal ways. In this way, he argues that "... the basis for 
rethinking accountability at the global level already exists": ID 
The governance structure of finance is now more globalised and 
inclusive than at any time prior to 1999, with emerging market 
economies and their public authorities increasingly involved in a 
genuine manner across a broad range of norm building activities. 
These activities and their consequences are more widely 
communicated both to the authorities involved and to a larger and 
more financially literate cross-section of the population. Such 
extended communication facilitates a wider and deeper debate 
about the core principles upon which financial systems and their 
key incentives are built. (Ibid: 242). 
But if such a normative aroument seems unduly positive - particularly in light of 
Coleman and Porters critique - it should be stressed that the public sphere is to 
be seen as an unfinished project. It is a way of conceiving of the global financial 
architecture that renders it malleable: open to critique and improvement along 
ethical lines. It is therefore an avowedly reformist and politically engaged 
agenda. As Germain (2004a: 28) states, Z: ' 
It is not a transformative space of its own accord; rather it must be 
itself transformed from a 'weak' into a 'strong' public if it is to 
provide an enabling environment that can be used in particular 
ways, whether to protect, preserve or unseat established privileges. 
Mapping the global financial public sphere, in other words, only 
provides us with a first cut at some of the mechanisms of 
governance in the 21 st century. But at least it directs attention to the 
actual way in which the ensemble of governance operates today, 
thereby establishing the limits of the possible in terms of financial 
governance. 
On this view, the related projects to build a 'strong public', to foster an ethic of 
participation and to establish new lines of accountability, are to be seen as 
examples of political praxis. Likewise, the cosmopolitan criteria of democracy 
that might be applied to global finance are open and contestable. Each approach 
points to new possibilities for global finance that envision democratic legitimacy 
and political equality as normative objectives. 
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In comparison to the unreflective, technical, closed procedures and discourses of 
existing global financial governance arrangements, the cosmopolitan project is Z71 In 
undoubtedly a step towards building the normative dimension(s) of global Z!, 
finance. However, as the next section argues cosmopolitan global finance is not 
without its critics. 
1.3 Problems for Building ethics into GFA Reform 
There is then an emergent set of approaches that seek to subject the practices and 
, governance of global finance to broadly cosmopolitan principles. However, 
cosmopolitan proposals are thus far nascent and somewhat limited. And, as 
Coleman and Porter themselves argue, there is good reason to be sceptical that 
cosmopolitan ideals can be realised within the GFA due to structures of technical 
knowledge and private interest. This section outlines some of the central 
problems for building ethics into global finance that have been levied in IPE, 
before outlining practical and theoretical responses in Section 4. Part I addresses 
what might be described as the sceptical view of ethics in global finance. For 
sceptics, the possibility of ethics in global finance must be seen as remote due to 
the prevalence of power politics and private interests. And Part 2 addresses those 
post-structural critics who argue that the very terminology of global financial 
reform is silent on the contingency and plurality of financial know] edge/hi story. 
1.3.1 Scepticism towards ethical reform in global finance 
A common critique of ethics in global financial governance, indeed in 
international politics more broadly, is to point to a perceived idealism. For some 
the idea of realising cosmopolitan ideals regarding standards of human rights, 
democracy and justice within the global finance is simply nalve and unlikely 
(See Higgott, 2004: 19). Traditional IR concerns with state self-interest mean 
that there is a significant structural imbalance between power and ethics, and 
between the interests of states and the interests of individuals (Carr, 1964). More 
sophisticated versions of this argument posit that those reforms which 
cosmopolitans can point to - like the development of the G22 or the inclusion of 
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emerging states in the Financial Stability Forum - act to increase the hegemony 
of particular states (Sinclair, 2001). 
A broad range of IPE theorists have pointed out that GFA reforms act to zn 
privilege private interests, particular states, or the ideology of neo-liberalism. 
These criticisms repay analysis because they have a direct correlation with 
cosmopolitan agendas that develop upon such reforms. For instance, Underhill 
and Zhang (2003: 379-380) argue: 
While the formation of the G-20 and the Financial Stability 
Forum (FSF) might have rendered the international decisi tn Ii ion- 
making process more inclusive, the membership and structural 
hierarchy of these forums have left no doubt that the global 
financial system will continue to be run by the leading industrial 
nations. The G-20 and the FSF still excludes the majority of 
developing countries. Even the emerging markets that are 
included realise that they have different interests from and lack of 
collective bargaining power vis-ý-vis the dominant members. [ ... ] 
at the epicentre of global financial governance remains the G-7. 
This view meets the idea of GFA reform with the question: what reforrn? As 
Underhill and Zhang forcefully (Underhill and Zhang, 2003: 380) attest: "The 
marginalisation of the normative dimensions of the global financial governance C, 
has reflected the narrowness of the institutional processes by which the agenda 
has been formulated. " 
Critical IPE approaches extend this argument about the institutional narrowness 
of GFA reform by addressing the role of private interests in global financial 
governance (Underhill, 1997). For his part Tim Sinclair (2001) has highlighted 
the importance of the enduring private financial architecture. On this view, no 
amount of institutional reform to draw in - or include - developing states will get 
over the fact that the policies that are being tinkered with are market inspired 
policies that work according to logics which favour private accumulation. In the 
case of banking regulation he argues, 
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In a sense there has already been a "private reform" of the IFA 
whether this is endorsed in Base] 11 or not. Lack of real 
substantive progress on the architecture proposals could be said to 
have been sidelined by the development of a new quasi -regulatory 
structure. Even if Randall D. Germain is correct and the politics 
of inclusion are now characteristic of some features of the IFA, it 
is not clear that the official IFA is where the substance of 
regulation now lies. (2001: 442). 
This is a difficult critique for cosmopolitanism to consider. If financial market 
actors increasingly regulate their own activities then what is the likelihood that In zn 
the 'inclusion' of a few more states/people in the debate will actually change 
anything? Cý I 
A final sceptical tradition in IPE has its routes in Marxism. On this view ethics 
and morality is simply an ideological smoke-screen for the existing hierarchy 
(See Jahn, 2005). In this vein, Jacqueline Best has forthrightly argued that the 
only moral that can be gleaned from the GFA reform debate is the moral of neo- 
liberal universalism. In a review of three of the major reports on the reform of 
the global financial architecture - Eicbengreen (1999), Goldstein (1999), and 
Kenen (2001) - she argues that despite a general recognition of the limits of the 
market, all three reports seek to make the market the final arbiter: 
Each is ultimately only able to resolve these tensions on a 
normative level by developing a moral argument for the universal 
value of the market. They thus stave off the threat of a wider 
political debate about financial reform by appealing to a universal 
conception of economic good - framed either in terms of moral 
judgment, moral development, or the virtue of prudence. (2003: 
581) 
On this view ethics and morality is deployed as rhetoric to cover the continued 
dominance of the market. While it is unclear if this critique can be extended to 
cosmopolitan approaches to global finance, it does provide a central question to 
cosmopolitans that will be developed in Part 2: How critical is cosmopolitan 
globalfinance? 
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In summary, the sceptical position on ethics in global finance offers an 
interesting and important challenge to the possibility of building cosmopolitan 
ethics into clobal finance. State power, private self interest and the ideology of 
market fundamentalism mean that cosmopolitans should be wary of optimism. 
However, it should be noted that the sceptical position does not actually criticise 
cosmopolitanism as the appropriate normative framework for GFA reform. For 
the most part sceptics emphasise the difficulty of implementing ethics in the 
context of powerful states, privatised governance and technocratic knowledge 
frameworks. If anything the sceptical position is actually a spur to develop an 
ethical agenda to combat the problems identified: powerful states, entrenched Z-- 
neo-liberal logic, the manipulation of moral argument to further economic 
universalism. All it infers is that, to be convincing, an ethical framework must 
also provide some idea of how it would be realised in practice, how it would 
differ from current practices. It does not undermine ethics per se. Thus Part 2 
moves on to address a critique of GFA reform that may hold important 
implications for cosmopolitan ethics in global finance, namely: post- 
structuralism. 
1.3.2 Post-structural Critiques of Cosmopolitanism and Global Finance 
Jacqueline Best's scepticism towards moral argument raises an interesting 
problem for any ethical approach to global finance: how critical is it? To what 
extent does it undermine the dominant image of global finance it seeks to 
reform? Best retains the hope that by exposing the 'rhetoric' of morality we can 
go beneath the surface and undermine the universal logic of the market. 
However, post-structural authors do not share this optimism. On one level, post- 
structural authors have attacked cosmopolitanism itself. On another level, post- 
structural writers have problematised the very signifier 'global finance' in 
debates about GFA reform. Part 2 now identifies the relevance of each critique 
for the question of building cosmopolitan ethics in global finance. 
For post-structuralists, ethics is not something that is 'added' to world politics. 
Rather, as Walker argues (2003: 68) cosmopolitanism should be read as a 
constitutive element of the problems it seeks to address. Simply put, by defining 
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'what the problem is' and suggesting 'ways to solve it' any ethical framework Z: ) 
must thereby identify the boundaries of possible futures. For instance, in a 
critique of what he calls the "cosmopolitan ideal", Nick Vaughan-Williams 
'1006, forthcoming) draws out three points of weakness. First, he identifies the In 
problem of an implicit, and often explicit, teleology in cosmopolitan thought that 
poses a linear progression from polis to cosmopolis. Second, and relatedly, he 
critiques the Euro-centricity of the cosmopolitan ideal, whose "narrative of the 
unfolding of nature leading to the victory of reason that in turn leads to the 
emergence of a society of nations cannot be read outside the context of 
modernity and European colonialism". And finally, he argues that 
cosmopolitanism actually re-produces the state-centric political narrative it seeks 
to overcome. 
Taking the example of cosmopolitan hospitality towards foreigners -a key tenet Z7 
of many attempts to increase the scope of ethical concern - he argues that this 
hospitality is always-already limited, conditional upon and policed by the laws of 
the state. While hospitality would at first sight appear to increase the rights of a Z: ) 
&citizen of the world' over and above the state, in fact, the limited hospitality of 
the 'cosmopolitan ideal' simply reprises the centrality of the state in our thinking 
of the ethics in world politics. Cosmopolitanism actively produces the ethico- 
political problems it apparently seeks to resolve. Again, although Held 
recognises and responds to these problems through increasing universal 
hospitality in a context of global Cosmo political governance, the state still 
remains at the heart of his ideal. And "[t]his is problematic since it is precisely 
the state that produces the foreigner, immigrant, exiled, deported, or stateless 
person in need of greater levels of hospitality in the first place. " 
The implication of this kind of thinking is that cosmopolitan ethics in global 
finance may actually reify the world it seeks to reform? For instance, post- 
structural authors have criticised the 'totalising' qualities of the global financial 
architecture debate. From a post-structural perspective, such signifiers reify 
global finance as a homogeneous system that requires technical solutions. The 
historically contingent, plural and discursive contests that produce (global) 
finance are the central political concern for such authors. 
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For instance, Marieke De Goede (2005: 147) argues, the "assumption that re- 
regulation of financial markets on a global scale and through state co-operation is 
the onlY viable response to liberalized finance is flawed, for three reasons. " First, 
such regulation has the effect of de-politicising financial practices by marking 
out a realm of 'normal finance' beyond politics. This is evident in the daily use 
of unquestioned financial statistics in the media. Second, in a related point, 
attempts to regulate global finance typically seek to avoid crisis thus constructing Zý ZD 
non-crisis periods as 'normal'. And thirdly, she identifies a "degree of defeatism" 
in attempts to re-construct the Golden Age of Bretton Woods. An all or nothing 
logic seems to re-strict the scope of possible solutions: "the representation of 
finance as a homogenous and clearly bounded system attributes to the power of Z_n 
financial institutions a degree of effectiveness and autonomy it seems impossible 
to refuse". (Ibid: 149). This view is echoed by Paul Langley (2004: 71) who 
araues that the GFA reform debate Z: ) 
constitutes [ ... ] another particular instance in the contested, 
contingent and fragmentary development of contemporary global 
financial governance, whereby shifting networks of discursively 
formed coalitions have forged identities and alliances and 
marshalled change based upon more or less fundamentalist 
visions of neo-liberalism. 
The relevance of this argument for cosmopolitan ethics in global finance is the 
sugoestion that by entering GFA reform debates, cosmopolitans like Gen-nain tý Z__ 
may give up the possibility of a critical ontology of global finance. Indeed, as 
was illustrated in Section 2, Germain (2004: 232) speaks of the global financial 
public sphere as a combination of "a government-led (or inter-state) institutional 
framework at the global level, the set of globally integrated financial markets, a 
global media increasingly interested in financial issues, and those associations 
within civil society that advance and debate issues broadly associated with 
finance. " There is therefore little attempt to articulate the contested status of 
modem finance or seek alternative possibilities. 
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The final section will map out a response to these questions by operational i sing 
the question of cosmopolitan ethics in global finance via a case study of the Z: ) 
Tobin Tax. 
1.4 Unpacking Cosmopolitan Global Finance, Identifying Routes 
Forward 
... money, capita, and finance are not unmediated economic 
realities that can be taken as a starting point to academic inquiry 
but have been made possible through contested historical 
articulations and practices of valuation. (De Goede, 2005: xv). 
Drawinc- the strands of this chapter together, there are two principal problems 
facing the idea of cosmopolitan ethics in global finance. First, as has been 
remarked, cosmopolitan approaches to global finance are currently few in 
number and fairly nascent. This is due in part to a general scepticism towards 
ethics and the ethical in IPE. But, this section argues, it is also a fault of 
cosmopolitan theorists who have stopped short of an explicit engagement with 
the ethical challenges of global finance. And secondly, as the post-structural 
critique infers, there is a fundamental question about the ontological rendering 
given to global finance. Ambiguities over the historical evolution and mutability 
of accepted financial practices are often effaced by the signifier globalfinance. 
The very possibility of cosmopolitan global finance may therefore contain a 
universal violence that is hard to accept. This final section proposes a twofold 
response to these issues that will form the basis of an elaboration and 
development of cosmopolitan ethics in global finance in subsequent chapters. 
Part I argues that many of the problems with the idea of cosmopolitan ethics in 
global finance herald from its level of theoretical generality. Simply put, there a 
numerous forms of cosmopolitan theorising that have not been applied to global 
financial issues and those which have been suffer from a lack of practical 
specificity. In this sense, it is perhaps understandable that IPE theorists display 
some scepticism towards ethics in global finance. However, if we instead 
develop a grounded ethical critique there may be routes forward? As such the 
thesis therefore develops a case study of cosmopolitan ethics in global finance 
via a discussion of the Tobin Tax. 
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Part 2 addresses the question of ontology. While the problem of universality is 
indeed a serious ethical issue, it is argued that this should not restrict us from 
imagining non-universal renderings of global finance. There is no reason to Z! ) 
suggest that the 'global' and the 'universal' must be conflated as post- Z: D t: ) 
structuralism perhaps suggests. By drawing on the work of Jan Art Scholte 
'1005), it is argued that -Jobalisation is better understood as a multi -dimensional 
economic, social, political, discursive - and multi-level - individual, local, 
national, regional, global - process that re-spatialises life in transplanetary and 
supra-territonal terms. On this view, global finance is not some universal 
monolith. Rather it is understood as a socio-spatial context in which to consider 
ethics. 
1.4.1 A Tum to Practice: Cosmopolitanism(s) and the Tobin Tax 
Current articulations of cosmopolitanism and cosmopolitan ethics in global 
finance have operated at a level of generality that mean it is difficult to think 
through and engage with their limitations in a concrete political context. Two 
problems follow. First, there seems to be an undue emphasis on cosmopolitan 
democracy. This overlooks a long tradition of cosmopolitan 'justice' and re- 
distribution that could hold important implications for the study and practice of 
global finance. As Held and McGrew (2002: 14) argue this bifurcation is 
symptomatic of broader trends in the normative literature on global governance: 
This literature embodies two distinct (and largely discrete) 
discourses: one concerned with the democratization of global 
governance, and the other with the problems of global justice. The 
first seeks to specify the principles and institutional arrangements 
for making accountable those global sites and forms of power 
which presently operate beyond the scope of national democratic 
control. [ ... ] By contrast, the 
discourse of global social justice is 
concerned primarily with the elaboration of justificatory 
arguments and normative principles. In particular the emphasis is 
on elaborating the moral reasoning behind the pursuit of global 
re-distributive justice. 
Secondly, by employing a theoretical scope that intimates what accountability 
might mean, or what a global financial public sphere might look like, the 
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concrete and situated implications of cosmopolitanism can sometimes be lost. 
Thus it is easy for sceptics to inveigh that the idea of cosmopolitan global finance 
is simply unlikely. An approach which is rather grounded in practice might 
permit the development of cosmopolitanism as an embedded of way of thinking 
about the world and thus contribute to the paradigm itself. 
As currently developed, the arguments and propositions contained within the 
civil society campaign for a Tobin Tax highlight a number of issues that are 
central to cosmopolitan ethics in global finance. First, advocates now stress the 
idea of global re-distribution (War on Want, 2002a). While initial incarnations of 
the tax saw it as a simple technical reform aimed at dampening incentives to 
speculate on currency transactions, recent discussion has turned fully to the 
revenue raising potential of the tax (Spahn, 1995). In this way, the idea can 
connect with discourses of cosmopolitan justice. A long line of theorists 
including John Rawls (1999), Charles Beitz (1979) and Thomas Pogge (2002) 
have attempted to justify frameworks of global re-distribution. However, their 
work has remained primarily a concern for analytical political theorists. The 
chance to operationalise cosmopolitan justice - to think through its possibilities 
and lirMtations in an empirical context - is an interesting extension of the 
paradigm. 
Tobin tax advocates now attach a large group of democratic and emancipatory 
ideals to the proposal (Patomaki, 2001). On one level, the tax is held to be a 
direct political response to global finance and its perceived negative impacts for 
democracy (Helleiner, 2001). This marks out some clear similarities with David 
Held's model of cosmopolitan democracy as a response to globalisation. On 
another level, the fact that the tax would have to be co-ordinated amongst many 
organisations, states, central banks, regional governance groupings and financial 
market organisations - means that questions of democratising the global financial 
public sphere are readily attached to the Tobin tax. And thirdly, more reflexively, 
the development and practices of the Tobin tax campaign itself means that it 
provides an example of an actually existing cosmopolitan public or global civil 
society. By following the campaign, observing how the discourse of the tax is 
shaped and augmented by different actors for different purposes, insight can be 
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gained into the concrete political realities of global civil society. General I 
cosmopolitan ideas that global civil society can foster the development of 
cosmopolitan reason (Bohman, 1999) can be animated and critically assessed by 
appeal to the actual politics of a single campaign. Z: ) 
1.4.2 Engwzing Universality: What is Global about Global Finance? 
Having identified the Tobin Tax campaign as a suitable case study of 
cosmopolitan ethics in global finance, it is necessary to engage with the second 
major question identified: the problem of reifying a (potentially violent) 
universal ontology. One way to engage this problem to ask the question: what is 
global about global finance? 
This section elaborates a conception of global finance that includes local, 
national, regional, and global level processes and reflects upon the plurality of 
potential experiences and futures that it permits. On this view, there is no sense 
in which global is conflated with universal finance. Rather global is a socio- 
spatial context in which different forms of finance exist 
Globalisation is an often-used yet radically under-specified term. It has variously 
been understood as economic liberalisation, Americanisation, International] sation 
or relative de-territorialisation (Brassett and Higgott, 2003). While causal 
dynamics differ between each perspective there is commonly some notion of 
heightened economic, communicative, and political interconnection. However, 
much debate over globalisation has turned on a 'states vs. markets' dichotomy 
(Hirst and Thomspson, 2000; Ohmae, 1995). This zero-sum contest belies a 
capacity of the state to secure a gradual transfon-nation in state-market relations; 
or, a positive-sum diffusion of power amongst non-state actors operating in 
multiple sites of authority (Higgott and Ougaard, 2002). 
Instead, a spatial conception of globalisation may take us beyond this dichotomy 
to emphasise the multi-level nature of global finance. This is most evident 
if we 
address the question of global financial governance. In global 
finance there is an 
increasingly important politics of governance that 
focuses on technical issues of 
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reoulation (Underhill, 1997). Such regulatory governance does not fit into any 
neat dichotomy like global or national. Rather, the governance of global finance 
increasingly exhibits a multi-level, multi-actor, public-private mix of regulatory Z: I 
activity. To look at 'governance', as opposed to 'governments', allows a more 
expansive view of politics that appeals to the spatial complexity of the GFA. As 
Jan Aart Scholte affirms, this view does not give up on the state: 
The end of statism in no way entails the end of the state itself. 
However, governance now also involves suprastate (regional and L, 
transworld) regimes that operate with some autonomy from the 
state. In addition, many substate (municipal and provincial) 
governments today engage directly with spheres beyond their 
state. (2004: 3-4). 
On this view, global finance includes individuals, local communities, national, 4: 1 
regional and global levels (Baker, Woodward and Hudson, 2005). Importantly 
this is a complex of social relations. Finance does not happen in a vacuum: free 
from human interaction. Instead historical, cultural and intellectual structures 
pervade the GFA such that there is a reciprocal interdependence across levels and 
between actors both public and private. For instance, the use of a micro-credit 
arrangement by local women's group in Kerala may have been set up by a World 
Bank initiative, based on a financial model developed in MIT and secured with 
funds from an investment bank in Switzerland. Governance involves a 
disciplining of the women according to structures of knowledge and institutional 
power that cut across levels. 
Many financial arrangements are carried out on a local level, often involving 
face-to-face interactions and contact. This human interaction - sometimes missed 
in depictions of global finance - is most obvious in the endurance of local "high 
street" banks and building societies despite the possibility of banking via the 
telephone or Internet. It can also be seen in the success of co-operative banks. 
And Local Exchange Trading Schemes (LETS) can be held up as examples of 
successful localised financial arrangements/systems. As De Goede (2005: 166-7) 
comments: "LETS are local currencies that enable the exchange of services and 
products within a community of members without the intervention of "real 
money", and they are usually based on a standard of value in terms of labour 
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time, such as the successful Ithaca Hours Scheme in upstate New York. " In 
addition, local states like Porto Alegre in Brazil have pursued ambitious forms of 
public involvement like the 'participatory budget' in order to embed economic 
policy in local communities. 
National financial processes and governance arrangements persist and indeed 
thrive in a globalising context (Burnham, 2000). Much saving and investment is 
carried out in the country of residence. And central banks maintain a level of 
governance within their state borders well beyond anything, which global 
institutions can claim. More obviously, the denomination of legal tender is via 
national currencies. However, as many have argued, changes in the structure of 
global finance have been accompanied by a shift in the capacity - or the 
willingness - of national financial authorities to underwrite the 'public good' 
(Cemy. 1994; Garret, 1995). Some have interpreted this as leading to a 
diminution of national level finance. However, it is perhaps better to think in 
terms of a pluralisation of actors - both public and private - and positive sum 
diffusion of power to regional and global levels (Scholte, 2002b). In this way, 
and ethically speaking, the public good can be ensured in multiple ways and in 
different contexts. 
This might be done -pace cosmopolitan theory - via democratic representation 
and the limitation of private actors in financial regulatory decision-making 
(Coleman and Porter, 2000). Alternatively, an interconnected and regionally 
focused network of banks could supplement Central Banks. Indeed, the 
governance and organisation of financial markets has increasingly occurred on a 
regional level (Baines, 2002). In a European context the European Central Bank 
has been established to administer monetary policy within the Euro-zone. In 
addition, mergers and acquisitions have led to an increased incidence of 
European financial services providers and the evolution of regulatory practices in 
their wake. Outside of Europe there have been further and successful initiatives 
within ASEAN and NAFI`A to bring greater regional co-ordination to 
financial 
governance, albeit via trade oriented bodies (Deiter and Higgott, 2003). 
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Finally, global level financial activities by banks and governance by bodies like Z: ) 
the IMF, the World Bank and the BIS have increased. Global level financial 
governance does not simply mean the opposite of national finance. Nor does it 
mean that private interests dominate as some might suppose. Indeed as Susan 
Strange (1986) emphasised, the expansion of the 'euro-dollar market' and the re- 
establishment of the City of London as a financial hub were entwined with the 
policy activities of states. However, it is fair to say that private interests enjoy a 
role in decision making over aspects of regulation that is relatively greater than 
in previous periods. Independent Central Banks operate according to monetarist 
principles of low inflation and a concomitant promotion of fiscal rectitude by 
treasuries that has seen increasingly homogeneous regional and global policy 
trends (Sinclair, 2000). And where regulation is required, such as with capital 
adequacy, it is often left to the expert knowledge frameworks and internal 
monitoring systems of private banks (Sinclair, 2001). 
Indeed, it is partly for these reasons that cosmopolitanism can be an important 
addition to the discussion of global finance. The project to think through the 
problems and potentials for ethical reform of the global financial architecture is 
important and pressing. A spatial conception unlocks the multiplicity of actors 
and structures within global finance. It recognises the important and creative 
realm of local financial arrangements. And it notes the persistence of national 
systems of (public) financial governance. The financial crises of the late 201h 
century prompted discussion and - in the case of Chile and Malaysia - the 
implementation of capital controls (See Rodrik, 1998). However, there are 
significant instances of decentrallsed financial markets combined with private- 
global mechanisms of control and supervision (Germain, 1997). Such 
developments provoke a clear ethical question of how to re-embed finance and 
develop alternative ethical futures within global finance. 
Importantly, this multi-level understanding does not rehearse the universal 
fallacy - how do we respond to global finance? Instead, it permits multiple 
questions concerned with the project to build alternative and more ethical 
financial futures. 
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Conclusion 
The chapter has reviewed the subject of global finance with attention to its key 
ethical challenges and chances for resolution. It was argued that 
cosmopolitanism represents an important intervention in GFA reform debates 
which requires development. Notwithstanding a general level of scepticism 
towards ethics in IPE the parameters for thinking through cosmopolitan ethics in 
global finance were outlined. At one level, a turn to practice in the form of the 
campaign for a Tobin Tax allows both a way to operationalise cosmopolitan 
global finance as well as to incorporate other facets of the cosmopolitan 
1-1 paradigm like global justice into the discussion. At another level, it was argued ZZ) 
that a more critical ontology of 'the global' is required. Problems involved with 
any universal ontology of alobal finance include the reification of a dominant C) zn 
neo-liberal model of GFA reform and a concomitant marginalisation of 
alternative possible futures. It was argued that cosmopolitanism can adapt to 
such issues by adopting a spatially sophisticated and multi -dimensional social 
ontology of global finance. 
Having mapped the central questions and problems that this thesis will address, 
the next chapter will go on to outline the theoretical frame work that will 
underpin discussion. This will then be used to begin a case study of the Tobin 
Tax in Chapters 3-6. 
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2. Ethics and IPE: Towards a Pragmatic Praxis 
Introduction 
Chapter One identified the central concern of this thesis: to criticalli, analyse the 
possibilities and limits of cosinopolitan ethics in global , 
finance via a case study 
of the Tobin Tax. Chapter Two will now develop the theoretical framework of the 
thesis by addressing the question of ethics in IPE in general, and Richard Rorty's 
(1979,1989) philosophical pragmatism, in particular. The chapter presents a 
critique of the way in which previous IPE approaches have considered ethics and 
ethical concerns, before suggesting the ways in which Rorty's thought can 
contribute. After outlining the main themes of Rorty's work and addressing some 
of the central criticisms of it, the chapter points to the praxeological elements of 
his Oakeshottian view of philosophy as a voice in the "conversation of mankind" 
(1979: 264), as a means to operationalise cosmopolitan ethics in global finance. 
By treating articulations of global justice and democracy as contributions to a 
conversation about global ethics - articulations that have a clear resonance in the 
Tobin Tax campaign - we can productively converse by critiquing and extending 
such contributions. 
The Chapter is in four sections. Section I addresses limitations with current 
framings of ethics in IPE. As Chapter One noted there is a tendency within IPE to 
be sceptical about the possibility of cosmopolitanism in global finance. Such 
scepticism is an example of a broader and more fundamental set of mis- 
conceptions regarding ethics in IPE. Three main theoretical cul-de-sacs are 
identified. First, ethics is sometimes marginallsed via a separation between 
positive and normative theory. This trend is especially evident in Economics 
(Friedman, 1966) but is also found to be common in the positivist paradigms of 
IPE - Realism, Liberalism and Marxism. Second, ethical considerations are 
sometimes introduced as an inherently 'good thing' that can be 'added-on' to 
research once the stuff of world politics is understood (Strange, 1991). While 
more optimistic regarding the possibility of ethics in IPE this approach maintains 
a problematic distinction between ethics and politics. Third, the arguments of 
neo-Gramscian and post-structural IPE theorists are considered. For such 
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theorists, theory is itself constitutive of social reality and thus carries intrinsic 
ethical dimensions. However, an impasse is identified between neo-Gramscians 
who celebrate the emancipatory potential of constitutive theory (Gill, 1991) and 
post-structuralists who find the recognition of contingency potentially debilitating 
(Brassett and Merke, 2005). Rather than choosing between each position, the 
thesis argues that we should instead explore the philosophical pragmatism of 
Richard Rorty. Pragmatism drops the idea of a theory as a way out of contingency CD 
and uses it as one (fallible) too] for engaging problematic social situations 
(Brassett and Higgott, 2003). 
Section 2 provides a sympathetic summary of Richard Rorty's version of 
pragmatism. Rorty argues that the recognition of the contingency of 
knowled(), e/ethics is neither emancipatory nor debilitating. Rather, it infers a z1- 
radical responsibility to find imaginative ways to reduce cruelty and increase t=1 
sensitivities towards suffering (Rorty, 1989). The view is neither optimistic nor 
pessimistic in terms of outcome. Instead it is concerned with finding new and 
imaginative ways to construct solidarity against suffering (Rorty, 1998b). A key 
outcome of Rorty's philosophy is to view the ultimate end of philosophy as a 
contribution to the "conversation of mankind" (1979: 264). It is argued that this 
metaphor of conversation, combined with Rorty's arguments regarding re- 
description, offers some interesting ways to engage the question of cosmopolitan 
ethics in global finance. 
Section 3 engages some of the principal critiques of Rorty, namely: relativism, 
ethnocentrism and methodological critiques of his public/private split. This is 
done via a consideration of how 'sentimental education' (1998b) can contribute 
towards the contingent construction of cosmopolitan ethics in global finance. His 
argument (I 998b: 172) that the growth of the 'human rights culture' owes little to 
"increased moral knowledge" and everything to hearing "sad and sentimental 
stories" offers important suggestions of how to engage global reform in uncertain 
and ambiguous circumstances. For instance, from a pragmatic perspective, the 
idea that a rational and truthful account of global justice is required is flawed on 
two grounds. First, as post-structural theorists would contend, any such 'truthful' 
account can retain a totalising universality that is silent, indeed potentially 
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violent, towards a plurality of alternative possible futures (Vaughan-Williams, 
2005). And second, as Rorty would contend, it is not epistemic validity, but 
emotional attachments that do the hard work of constructing the solidarity to 
reduce suffering in diverse contexts (I 998b: 172). This view is not a panacea for 
the ills of olobal politics - if such a thing could exist. Rather it is an engaged and 
reformist ethic that recognises that "we have to start from where we are" (1989: 
198). 
And finally, Section 4 outlines the contours of a pragmatic praxis that will 
underpin Chapters 3-6. It reprises the basic themes drawn from pragmatism that 
are useful for engaging the campaign for a Tobin Tax as a case study of z: 1 
cosmopolitan ethics in global finance. In particular, Rorty's notion of philosophy 
as a contribution to the 'conversation of mankind' is developed as the background 
method of the thesis. By dropping crude distinctions between positive and 47> 
normative theory and between politics and ethics, a pragmatic praxis can engage 
in a grounded ethical critique which takes cosmopolitan proposals seriously but 
also works them through in terms of their constitutive limits and ethical 
ambiguities (Parker and Brassett, 2005). Such a pragmatic praxis does not Z: ) 
propose a solution. It suggests ongoing experiments to foster solidarity against 
suffering and protect freedoms for individual self-creation. 
2.1 Ethics and IIPE: some theoretical cul-de-sacs 
This section sets the context of the chapter by identifying certain limitations with 
the framing of ethics in IPE. Part I briefly addresses the problematic separation 
between positive and normative theory and between politics and ethics in many 
theoretical traditions within IPE. And Part 2 looks to the more promising 
constitutive theories of critical IPE. However an impasse is identified between 
neo-Gramscians who celebrate the emancipatory (cosmopolitan? ) potential of 
constitutive theory and post-structural scholars who find it debilitating (Brassett 
and Merke, 2005). Rather than choose between 'camps', it is argued in Part 3 that 
we should explore the American tradition of pragmatism. 
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For pragmatists there is unlikely to be any resolution of such debates, just a 
responsibility to think through the problems and possibilities of ethics/politics. As 
Richard Bernstein (1991: 9) argues, 
Although we can distinguish ethics and politics, they are 
inseparable. For we cannot understand ethics without thinking 
through our political commitments and responsibilities. And there 
is no understanding of politics that does not bring us back to 
ethics. Ethics and politics as disciplines concerned with praxis are 
aspects of a unified practical philosophy. 
11.1 Dichotomies between Positive and Normative, and Politics and Ethics 
The first theoretical cul-de-sac for the question of ethics in IPE is a common 
desire to distinguish between positive and normative theory. Within economics 
for instance, positive theory is held up as correct scientific method while 
normative theory is portrayed as a laudable but scientifically unhelpful reflex. As 
Milton Friedman (1966: 4) highlights, 
"Positive economics is in principle independent of any particular 
ethical position or normative judgements. As Keynes says, it deals 
with "what is", not with "what ought to be". its task is to provide 
a system of generalizations that can be used to make correct 
predictions about the consequences of any change in 
circumstances. Its performance is to be judged by the precision, 
scope, and conformity with experience of the predictions it 
yields. " 
Such positive theory is celebrated for its scientific qualities. With the correct 
specialisation, abstract signifiers like 'land', 'labour', and the 'rational economic 
actor' can be rendered as quantifiable variables in complex formulae. As the 
historian of economic ideas, William Tabb (1992: 92) comments, "The ability to 
calculate rates of change using calculus lent a new exactness to economic 
analysis and started the profession down the road to 
its obsession with 
mathematics as the language of its science. " Indeed, key texts 
in Economics still 
see positivism as a defining feature of the discipline (Lipsey and 
Crystal, 1995). 
While such scientific aspirations are common amongst economists, they are also 
evident within the positivist paradigms of 
IPE - Realism Liberalism and 
Marxism. During the evolution of IPE as a discipline, positivism became the 
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dominant epistemology and was bolstered by the methodologies of behaviourism 
and empiricism (Higgott, 2002; Strange, 1991). For those in what might be 
termed the American wing of the discipline, what is required is verifiable data 
based on material observation (See Katzenstein, Keohane, and Krasner, 1998). It 
is not hard to see why this approach is problematic for the question of ethics in 
IPE. Rendering IPE as a predictive or explanatory science that derives legitimacy 
from objectivity, means that 'softer' issues like ethics simply fall outside the 
scope of the discipline. 
A second theoretical cul-de-sac is altogether more optimistic about ethics in IPE. 
This attitude begins from a critique of rationalism to argue that many of the L_ 
disciplinary separations we take as non-nal should be overcome. Susan Strange, a 
key proponent in the formation of IPE as a discipline, was explicit that ethics 
should be re-integrated into the study of political economy. In a critique of the 
dominant paradigms (1991: 17 1) she argued, 
" ... both realism and neo-realism in the study of international 
relations, and liberalism and neo-classical notions of equilibrium in 
the study of economics, will prove to be blind alleys and should be 
abandoned. They are both culs-de-sac, strade senza uscita, no 
through roads - for IPE. Sooner or later, It will be necessary to go 
back and start at the beginning if we are to achieve a genuine 
synthesis of political and economic activity. 
[ ... I Going back to the beginning, for me, means starting with what used 
to be called moral philosophy. As I understand it, moral 
philosophers were concerned with fundamental values - how they 
could be reflected in the ordering of human society and how 
conflicts between them could be resolved. They were - some still 
are - interested in analysing both the mix of values 
in any society 
and their distribution. The only difference now is that we have, in 
some sense at least, a global society and, sustaining it, a virtually 
worldwide political economy. The horizons of moral philosophy, as 
of the social sciences no longer end at the frontiers of the state. " 
This integrationist view has proved influential. Indeed, many now regard IPE's 
(inter-disciplinary) concern with political and normative reflection as a key 
reason for its success (Higgott, 2002; Langley, 2002; Underhill, 
2000). In 
addition, a recent revisionist school of political economy 
(Tabb, 1999; Watson, 
2005) has sought to return to the writings of classical political economists like 
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Adam Smith to recover the moral component of their work. As Smith wrote, 
"Justice [ ... ] is the main pillar that upholds the whole edifice. If it is removed, 
the great, the immense fabric of human society [ ... ] must in a moment crumble 
into atoms. " (Cit. Tabb, 1999). Thus there is a general feeling from different 
streams of IIPE that ethics can, indeed must, be considered a key element of a 
reconstructed discipline. 
However, we must be careful not to produce a further dichotomy between 
politics and ethics. There is danger in portraying ethics as an inherently 'good 
thing' that can be added-on to the study of IPE once we have worked out the L_ 
-stuff' of world politics. As Rob Walker (1993: 50) argues for the case of ethics 
and IR: "Ethics comes to be understood as an achieved body of principles, norms 
and rules already codified in texts and traditions. " And he continues, 
This image is especially troubling because it is sustained by a 
series of additional dichotomies that are regularly denounced as 
implausible guides to the subtleties and complexities of human 
affairs. An opposition between utopianism and realist power 
politics, the Cartesian divide between matter and consciousness 
and the positivist injunction to separate the normative from the 
ethical... (Ibid. 50-5 1 ). 
On this view, the dichotomy between ethics and politics may be re-enforced by 
the separation between positive and normative theory. Thus the task becomes one 
of undermining any such dichotomy. As Chris Brown (2002: 148) argues in the 
case of IR, "The idea that there is, or could be, a clear divide between normative 
and positive theory is profoundly misleading; all theories of international 
relations are, simultaneously, both positive and normative theories. " The 
corollary of this view is that all theories of ethics are at the same time theories of 
power. Caution is therefore required. 
2.1.2 Undermining the Posit] ve-Normati ve Distinction 
Extending from the weaknesses identified above critical theorists of IPE 
undermine the central assumptions of positivism - the separation of fact and 
value, observer and observed, and appearance and reality. In the process they 
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have undermined the positive-normative dichotomy and presented new 
possibilities for developing ethics in IPE. However, this section suggests that the 
implications of such constitutive theory are not as clear cut as may be supposed. 
Instead it suaaests that a clear impasse can be identified between neo-Gramscian Z: )L- 
and post-structural approaches over the status of ethics in IPE 
Neo-Gramscians critique positivism for taking the world as it is found, without 
first questioning how it was constituted in that way. For instance, Robert Cox 
(1986: 208) proposes a theory of IPE that "... does not take institutions and social 
and power relations for granted but calls them into question by concerning itself 
with their origins and how and whether they might be in the process of 
changing... " A key theme in critical IPE is the connection between knowledge 
and interest. As Cox (1986: 207) affirms, "theory is always for someone and for 
some purpose. " Subjects are not separated from objects producing value-free 
knowledge. Every theory has, implicitly or explicitly, a set of values and norms 
that tell us which facts are to be analysed. Thus one of the central propositions of 
critical IPE is to undermine the possibility of a value-free problem-solving 
theory. In particular, critical I]PE has attacked simple dichotomies like 'states' 
and 'markets' when the two have a complex historical inter-relation (Langley, 
2002; Underhill, 2000). Values are implicitly part of theory. 
In a similar vein post-structural approaches emphasise the relation between 
knowledge and power. As Michel Foucault suggests, "There is no power relation 
without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge 
that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations. " (Cit. 
Edkins, 1999: 53). For post-structuralists, language is more than a verbal 
representation of reality. It constructs social reality. The positivistic separation 
between observer and observed is therefore undermined since language - the 
means for academic communication - is found to be a part of the 'problem' we 
seek to solve. 
If ideas like the 'market' are communicated through language, then the resultant 
discourse will help to construct the 'market' In certain ways. As Cameron and 
Palan (2004: 45) suggest, "... the terms and concepts we use - national, state, 
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olobal, included, excluded, rich, poor, and so on - are in themselves forms of 
institutionalization that require considerable energy to maintain even a 
semblance of continuity. " On this view theory becomes a constitutive element of 
social reality and infers the possibility for a more sophisticated thinking of its 
ethics/pol 1 tics. 
However, an impasse arises between neo-Gramscian and post-structural 
arauments over the status of ethics. While neo-Gramscians and other critical L_ 
theorists celebrate the 'progressive potential' of constitutive theory (Linklater, 
1992; Neufeld, 1995; Gill, 1991) post-structural authors challenge the possibility 
for failing to reflect on the constitutive ambiguities of ethical theory itself (See ZýI 
Walker, 1993). The point can be illustrated via a close critique of the neo- 
Gramscian writer Stephen Gill. Optimistically, Gill's approach "Insists upon an 
ethical dimension to analysis, so that questions of justice, legitimacy, and moral 
credibility are integrated sociologically into the whole and into many of its key 
concepts. "( 1991: 57). As he states, 
... the normative goal of the 
Gramscian approach is to move toward 
the solution to the fundamental problem of political philosophy - 
the nature of the good society and thus, politically, the construction 
of an ethical state and a unitary society in which personal 
development, rational reflection, open debate, democratic 
empowerment, and economic and social liberation can become 
more widely available. (1991: 57). 
Broadly speaking this recognition of an ethical content to theory and the desire to 
integrate "justice, legitimacy, and moral credibility" into the sociology of IPE is 
promising. Gill's "normative goal" to integrate reflection on the philosophical 
problem of the "good society" with the political question of how to reallse it in 
practice is also promising. However, there are questions that can be raised about 
the content of these ethical tropes. Justice can be economic or cultural; 
legitimacy can be rational or ethnocentric, legal or symbolic. At best it might be 
considered that this proposed ethical turn is poorly developed. At worst, and 
from a post-structural perspective, it might be argued that culturally specific 
western assumptions are allowed to masquerade as universal reason? 
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A "unitary society", "personal development", "rational reflection", "open 
debate". "democratic empowerment", and "economic and social liberation" are 
historically contingent social democratic ideals. They are not a priori universals. 4n 
Perhaps for these reasons Gill is quick to qualify, 
it is important to emphasize here that this is a rather negative 
definition, concerning minimum conditions, of the "good society, " 
and it offers no promises nor prescriptions for the form that such a 
society might take: historical structures can be changed by 
collective action in a "war of position" but there is no historical 
inevitability. The key contrast here would be with teleological 
Marxism, with its promise of possible utopia(s), or Francis 
Fukuyama's much-publicized dystopia of the "end of history": the 
eventual unfolding of the logic and the spirit of liberal democratic 
capitalism. In Gramscian terrns, telos is "myth: 
And he includes a note from Robert Cox, 
It is a normative force but not a normative plan or set of normative 
criteria. It can generate movement but not predict outcome. Thus 
the normative element is crucial but not as normative teleology. 
(Ibid: 57). 
But this qualification is a hedge. Ethics is downgraded to a minimal venture -a 
quest for basic conditions where people can realise their own sense of the good. 
Gill (and by inclusion Cox) is comfortable talking about what ethics is not. It is 
not teleology. It is "not a plan" or "criteria". It can "generate movement" but 
doesn't "predict outcome 55 . "It" IS Crucial but definitely not as "teleology". Such 
qualifications question whether this is ethics or a spiritual underpinning for 
hi stori Cal -material ism? A post-structural critic could well be forgiven for feeling 
that Gill expresses rather than overcomes the limitations of constructing an ethical 
theory of IPE. While the move is promising then, there is more that needs to be 
questioned about the content of ethics and how this content then infers upon the 
world we seek to observe/construct. 
2.1.3 Towards a Pragmatic Approach 
Critical theory undermines the scientific pretensions of IPE by demonstrating the 4: 1 
intrinsic relationship between certain types of 'technical knowledge' and the 
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contingent socio-historical power relations that underpin them. Neo-Gramscians 
use this understanding to extract the emancipatory potential of theory via a re- 
construction of method that emphasises the ethical possibilities of IPE. Indeed 
this 'next stage' of theory bares many similarities with the cosmopolitan desire to 
realise principles of democracy, liberty, and equality (Linklater, 1992). However, 
from a post-structural perspective, this attitude - while laudable - should be 
treated with suspicion. For post-structural writers the awareness of contingency 
should be extended to ethical theory itself and the ambiguities that pervade terms 
like 'good society'. From a post-structural perspective such ambiguities restrict 
or undermine the very possibility of "ethics" (Campbell and Shapiro, 1999: xxi). 
The unproblematic usage of highly complex and sometimes badly-thought tn z:: ) 
through terms like 'ethics', 'cosmopolitan', and 'justice' makes post-structural 
writers uncomfortable. Indeed, on some readings, they turn against ethical theory 
as such in favour of critique. Indeed, as David Campbell surmises: 
What is urgently required is not the construction of a theory, much 
less a theory of international relations, or perhaps even less a 
theory of ethics for international relations... What is required is an 
ethos of political criticism that is concerned with assumptions, 
limits, their historical production, social and political effects, and 
the possibility of going beyond them in thought and action. 
(Campbell, 2005: 133). 
How should we respond? Do we construct a theory of IPE in the hope of 
developing an ethical IPE? Or do we maintain a suspicion towards the very idea 
of theory, opting instead for 'ethos of political criticism'? The next section 
advocates the development of a pragmatic approach based on the philosophical 
pragmatism of Richard Rorty (1979,1989). Pragmatism treats knowledge as a 
practical resource. For pragmatists the task is not to find final answers, better 
arguments that somehow cut beneath the surface of reality to the Truth beneath. 
Instead, different ways of thinking can suggest different ways to progress and the 
impasse in critical theory is less interesting/useful than the creative tensions 
which it highlights (George, 1994). 
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2.1 Rorty's Pragmatism: From Philosophy to Politics? 
Richard Rorty attempts to rescue philosophy from itself. He suggests that the 
Igood' elements of western philosophy -a respect for individuality, reason, II 
freedom, and fairness - have been overtaken by the 'bad' elements: scientific 
method, and disciplinary arrogance. He first seeks to strip philosophy of all the 
'bad' parts before trying to rescue the 'good' parts by dispensing with Z: ) t: 5 
epistemology, embracing hermeneutics, and reconstructing liberalism as "an 
endless, proliferating realization of Freedom" (Rorty, 1989: xvi). 
This section addresses Rorty's critique of philosophy before engaging his re- 
description of pragmatism as ethical -pol tical reformism. The argument suggests 
that Rorty has intimated, but not sufficiently developed, a pragmatic move from 
philosophy (understood as a Kantian 'tribunal of pure reason') to politics 
(understood as the contingent, fallible and experimental interplay between 
alternative standards of the good). 
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979) is a root and branch attack on the 
epistemological basis of modern, Anglo-American, philosophy. Rorty's prime 
target is the idea that there could be firm foundations for philosophical enquiry 
and he attacks both the 'truth' of this idea and the special place that philosophers 
have adopted for themselves on its back. 
Philosophy as a discipline [ ... ] sees 
itself as the attempt to 
underwrite or debunk claims to knowledge made by science, 
morality, art, or religion. It purports to do this on the basis of its 
special understanding of the nature of knowledge and of mind. 
Philosophy can be foundational in respect to the rest of culture 
because culture is the assemblage of claims to knowledge, and 
philosophy adjudicates such claims. It can do so because it 
understands the foundations of knowledge, and it finds these 
foundations in a study of man-as-knower, of the "mental 
processes" or the "activity of representation" which make 
knowledge possible. ( Rorty, 1979: 3). 
For Rorty (1979: 3-4), this view of philosophy runs through Locke who 
developed an understanding of "mental processes", Descartes who worked with a 
notion of "the mind" as a separate/separable entity, and finally Kant to whom, 
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"We owe the notion of philosophy as a tribunal of pure reason, upholding or 
denying the claims of the rest of culture... " When mixed with the scientific rigour 
of writers like Russell and HLISserl "Philosophy" (with a capital V) "became for 
the intellectuals, a substitute for religion" (Ibid: 2). But, Rorty argues, in the 
twentieth century this self-image has become increasingly difficult to sustain. The 
more scientific and rigorous that philosophy became "the less it had to do with 
the rest of culture and the more absurd its traditional pretensions became. " (Ibid: 
5). 
Instead, Rorty draws on the work of Wittgenstein, Heidegger and Dewey who he 
describes as the "three most important philosophers of our century" (Ibid: 5). 
Each of these philosophers began by trying to continue the "foundational" version 
of philosophy. Each ended by discarding the Kantian conception of philosophy 
and warning others against it. "Thus their later work is therapeutic rather than 
constructive, edifying rather than systemic, designed to make the reader question 
his own motives for philosophizing rather than to supply him with a new 
philosophical program. " (Ibid: 5-6). These philosophers it is argued give us "new 
maps of the terrain" which ignore the concerns of previous thinkers. On the one 
hand, Rorty goes to the heart of all that is 'sacred' in modem philosophy; taking 
down the idols because they fail on their own terms. On the other hand, he points 
toward a new way of 'doing philosophy'. At the end of Philosophy and the 
Mirror of Nature (1979: 389-390), he exhorts us to retain what is best in the 
"conversation of mankind": 
If we see knowing not as having an essence, to be described by 
scientists or philosophers, but rather as a right, by current 
standards, to believe, then we are well on the way to seeing 
conversation as the ultimate context within which knowledge is 
to be understood. Our focus shifts from the relation between 
human beings and the objects of their inquiry to the relation 
between alternative standards of justification, and from there to 
the actual changes in those standards which make up intellectual 
history. 
The emphasis comes full circle to human practices. If we drop the relation 
between 'appearance' and 'reality' in favour of the relation between 'reasoning 
human beings' as the basis of knowledge and ethics, then we can start to view 
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justice as a quality that is constructed by us andfor us. The practical implications 
of such a view are twofold. First, we should judge moral frameworks in terms of 
their outcomes as much as on their internal consistency or 'universal veracity' i. e. 
what are the outcomes of putting Rawlsian ideas into practice? Second, and more 
interestingly, any divide between ethics and politics is broken. Ethics is political: 
negotiated as a relational human construct. And politics is ethical: a process of 
contest that has direct ethical outcomes. Rorty argues that such an attitudinal 
switch prompts us to see philosophy as a 'voice' in the conversation of mankind - 
not a subject. This voice is open to chance, instability, discontinuity and change. 
There is no foundation - outside of space and time - that can serve as a privileged 
vantage from which to judge human affairs. Ethics/politics is always-already I-, ) i 
relational. But dropping foundations does not mean dropping values, or the notion 
of progress altogether. As he concludes: 1: ) 4n 
The only point on which I would insist is that philosophers' moral 
concern should be with continuing the conversation of the West, 
rather than with insisting upon a place for the traditional problems 
of modem philosophy within that conversation. (1979: 394). 
This passage is an intensely problematic resolution to the argument. Rorty argues 
that the Western voice in the conversation of mankind is (self-evident] y) the best 
thing we have achieved and we should continue to develop it, even in light of 
growing doubt over its central foundations. And this is the crux of the problem. If 
justice is relational then how can a sense of right and wrong be retained? If there 
are so many problems with the discourse of modern philosophy then how can we 
continue to support its Western home? What of the suspicion of many post- 
structural theorists that it is actually Western imperialism at the root of many 
global problems? And practically speaking: if we drop the 'traditional problems' 
of modern philosophy, what replaces them? If it is hope - as Rorty (1999) has 
implied - then how is such hope created? 
We should not understate the precariousness of Rorty's position. At the same time 
as he lambastes the canon assumptions of western philosophy, he celebrates the 
Western 'voice' in the conversation of mankind as the likely saviour. At the same 
time as he draws on writers like Heidegger, Gadamer, Nietzsche, and Foucault, he Z: ) 
79 
turns away from their sometimes anarchistic implications to assert the worth of 
liberal values like individualism, liberty, and justice. The position draws attack 
from both sides: analytical liberal theorists charge him with relativism and 
dis0runtled post-structuralists chide him for not following through on the 
implications of his argument. On any reckoning, Rorty's resolution of such 
opposite tendencies must be either one of the cleverest pieces of philosophical 
argument in the 20th Century, or, as many believe, a piece of sophistry. The thesis 
makes a qualified argument in favour of the former. Qualified in so much as, 
Rorty's philosophical position should be valued - as he values others - on bow it 
translates to politics. 
The adoption of an agnostic attitude towards Truth (capital - T) implies a sense 
of self-doubt about ultimate ends. But rather than dispensing with all political 
projects, Rorty heralds that such self-doubt - such Irony - Is itself a valuable spur 
to realise liberal goals to reduce suffering and increase welfare. For Rorty, 
'liberal irony' mediates the extremes of PlatorUsm and post-structuralism by 
refusing to accept that the public and private should be fused in theory. Rorty 
(1989: Vii) posits, 
Skeptics like Nietzsche have urged that metaphysics and theology 
are transparent attempts to make altrusim look more reasonable 
than it is. Yet such sceptics typically have their own theories of 
human nature. They, too, claim that there is something common 
to all human beings - for example, the will to power, or libidinal 
impulses. Their point is that at the "deepest" level of the self 
there is no sense of human solidarity, that this sense is a "mere" 
artefact of human socialization. So such skeptics become 
antisocial. They turn their backs on the very idea of a community 
larger than a tiny circle of initiates. 
For Rorty, the opposition between these two strands of thinkers is unnecessary. 
One type seeks to explore what private perfection might be like. The other - 
people like Rawls and Habermas - is engaged in a shared social effort: "the effort 
to make our institutions and practices more just and less cruel. " (Ibid. xiv) Of 
course, along the way the two types of writer have ruffled each other's collar. 
Each side has done a good job of setting their project in terms of an opposition 
towards the other. But Rorty argues that to conclude from these frictions that we 
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must choose between camps would be to make a theoretical problem out of a 
dispute between personalities. Instead he argues, "We shall only think of these 
two kinds of writers as opposed if we think that a more comprehensive 
philosophical outlook would let us hold self-creation and justice, private 
perfection and human solidarity, in a single vision. " (Ibid. xiv). For Rorty "[t]he Z! D 
vocabulary of self-creation is necessarily private, unshared, unsuited to argument. 
The vocabulary of justice is necessarily public and shared, a medium for 
argumentative exchange. - (Ibid. xiv). 
If we accept Rorty's position that nothing will synthesise the public and private 
at the level of theory, then we could start to use writers like Marx or Heidegger, 
Habermas or Foucault rather like "tools" which are "as little in need of synthesis 
as paintbrushes and crowbars" (Ibid. xiv). Rorty sketches a figure of the liberal 
ironist for whom "cruelty is the worst thing we do" and seeks to show how they 
can face up to the contingency of their own beliefs and desires. The desires of 
the liberal ironist are "ungroundable" in the same ways as philosophy has no 
firm foundations for making claims to knowledge. All that they can do is to 
distinguish between "less useful and more useful ways of talking" (I 998a: 1). 
Rorty concedes that his argument that knowledge and justice are contingent 
social constructs is often viewed as "intrinsically hostile not only to democracy 
but to human solidarity" (Ibid. xi, ). But he argues, "Hostility to a particular 
historically conditioned and possibly transient form of solidarity is not hostility 
to solidarity as such. "(Ibid. xi). There is nothing to suggest that post- 
metaphysical forms of solidarity could not exist. There is nothing to suggest that 
solidarity cannot be "imagined" in alternative ways. 
For liberal ironists, justice is an (infinitely) ongoing project of contest and 
deliberation not afinal destination. As he suggests, "Ironists who are inclined to 
philosophize see the choice between vocabularies as made neither within a 
neutral and universal metavocabulary nor by an attempt to fight ones way past 
appearances to the real, but simply by playing the new off against the old. " (Ibid: 
73). 
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This act of playing the old off against the new infers a (plural) process of re- 
description. It therefore retains the experimentalism of Dewey but allows the 
space for ways of thinking the political which do not subsume 'every' individual 
into the public sphere. If other vocabularies come along that match up, or improve 
on current ones - as did feminism and environmentalism - then liberals can re- 
describe their own vocabulary. Re-description is a reform minded experimental 
approach to achieving solidarity; a solidarity that ".. Js to be achieved not by 
inquiry, but imagination, the imaginative ability to see strange people as fellow 
sufferers. Solidarity is not discovered by reflection, but created. ... [It] is a matter 
of detailed description of what unfamiliar people are like and of redescription of 
what we ourselves are like. " (Ibid: xvi). 
2.3 Engaging Criticism, Constructing Cosmopolitanism 6 
By stripping philosophy of its foundations Rorty suggests an imaginative and 
engaged approach to political reform that focuses on the alleviation of 
cruelty/suffering. This is to be pursued via the creation of post-metaphysical 
forms of solidarity, the construction of 'we-feeling' and a sentimental education 
highlighting that the differences between people are not morally relevant. In this 
sense, and as he suggests, ethics becomes an engaged and fallible conversation 
rather than an abstract set of principles to be applied: 
The view that I am offering says that there is such a thing as moral 
progress, and that this progress is indeed in the direction of Oreater 
human solidarity. But this solidarity is not thought of as 
recognition of a core self, the human essence, in all human beings. 
Rather, it is thought of as the ability to see more and more 
traditional differences (of tribe. race, customs, and the like) as 
unimportant when compared with similarities with respect to pain 
and humiliation - the ability to think of people wildly different 
from ourselves as included in the range of 'us. (Rorty, 1991b: 
214). 
In this sense pragmatism regards ethics as a quality to be constructed. Moving 
back to the broad subject of the thesis, cosmopolitanism can be seen as a project 
to be pursued, rather than a fact to be deduced from universal traits. The 
approach certainly offers some interesting possibilities for engaging with the 
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question of cosmopolitan ethics in global finance. A pragmatic approach would 
get beyond the current mood of scepticism towards to cosmopolitanism by 
viewing it as a contingent voice in a conversation. As Rorty argues, "Pragmatists 
are entirely at home with the idea that political theory should view itself as 
suggestions for future action emerging out of recent historical experience, rather 
than attempting to legitimate the outcome of that experience by reference to 
something ahistorical. "(1999a: 272). 
Furthermore, Rorty's conception of IronY -a sense of doubt about our final 
vocabulary - provides a mechanism for remaining attuned to the areas where 
cosmopolitanism gets it wrong. It is a simple and alluring proposition that once 
truth is dropped as a goal of enquiry the task of the ethical theorist becomes one 
of engaging in the trial and error dialectic of suggesting possibilities while 
remaining sensitive to their limitations. Again as Rorty argues: 
We remain profoundly grateful to philosophers like Plato and 
Kant, not because they discovered truths but because they 
prophesized cosmopolitan utopias - utopias most of whose 
details they have gotten wrong, but utopias we might never 
have struggled to reach had we not heard their prophecies. ID 
(1998b: 175). 
However, before proceeding to map out a framework to operationalise a 
pragmatic approach to cosmopolitan ethics in global finance, the following 
section engages some of the principle critiques of pragmatism. These include the 
question of relativism/ethnocentrism, the question of political content posed by 
Richard Bernstein, and the (common) methodological question of the 
utility/violence of Rorty's public/private split. After responding to each of these 
critiques it is argued that a key contribution of pragmatism to development of 
cosmopolitan ethics can be read in Rorty's depiction of 'sentimental education'. 
2.3.1 Engaging Criticism 
There are three lines of critique that are commonly levied at Rorty. First, critics 
have been concerned by whether Rorty turns out to be a relativist, or if the 
ethnocentric position he adopts is in fact far more pernicious. Second, numerous 
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4n arguments have been deployed to critique his public/private split. Feminists have 
seen it as another liberal attempt by liberals to close down of the political 
whereas post-structuralists have chided Rorty for not following through on the 
implications of his own critique. And finally, Richard Bernstein has asked 
important questions about the actual political content of Rorty's liberalism. 
Firstly, Rorty's neat definition of liberalism as the community of people who 
agree with Judith Shklar that "cruelty is the worst thing we do" leaves under- 
represented a long tradition of reason-giving liberal argument (1999: xv). His 
extension that such work is little more than the summation of a particular set of 
liberal sentiments arrived at through historical chance has prompted many to ask Z: ) 
what, if anything, we can say to people who are not part of that historical 
community (Geras, 1995). T'his point brings us to the question of moral 
relativism. If all knowledge is a product of contingency then surely all claims 
about ethics are equal? Crudely, what would Rorty say to a Nazi? Why is 
liberalism better? What does better mean? 
On this question of first impulse Rorty has somewhat burnt his bridges with 
regard to entering any debate about human essence, or, rational criteria of 
persuasive argument. He simply refuses to accept that there is anything that 
could or (importantly) should count as a proof of humanity. When we value 
arguments for human rights it is not because they have trans-cultural, trans- 
historical validity but because they chime with a particular set of historical 
sentiments that we have learnt to value. Western liberals after the Great 
Depression, Holocaust, Hiroshima and Cold War are more prone to see cruelty 
and humiliation as morally wrong and to defend stories like human dignity as 
morally right, than at any point previously. For Rorty, attempts to build a 
"Truthful" account of human rights can be no more than a summary of the 
sentiments western liberals have developed in time and space. The charge of 
ethno-centrism is fully appreciated by Rorty who characterises his position as 
"anti -anti -ethnocentn sm" (Rorty, 1991: 204). His argument is simply that there 
are good reasons to believe that liberal societies of the secure west are morally 
superior to what they were 50 or 100 years previously. 
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Secondiv, a number of critics have undermined is public-private split. For Rorty, 
the separation is simple and straightforwardly commonsensical. Habermas gives 
a good account of how to continue the shared social effort to make our 
institutions more just and less cruel. Derrida, who would be less useful for such 
projects, is more useful for retaining sensitivity towards the infinite possibilities 
for self-creation that may exist. It is not a question of either-or, but both-and. 
However, numerous criticisms have been levelled at this 'perceived' resolution. 
Feminist scholars have seen it as yet another reification of public politics over 
private politics. For those like Nancy Fraser (199 1) who sees the question of self- 
creation to be a fundamentally public political issue, Rorty's is little more than an 
apology for the status quo. In a similar way Molly Cochran (1991) has 
problematised the dichotomy by arguing for a synthesis between Rorty's private 
Iron y, which she sees as a powerful imaginative too], and Dewey's more 
transformative conception of the public sphere, as an arena of ethical growth for 
its own sake. Such critiques repay analysis because they hail from the pragmatic 
tradition itself. 
While sympathetic to these critiques, it is arguable that too much has been read 
into the argument. For anyone who reads Rorty as offering a 'theory' of politics 
then the public-private split is deeply pernicious. However, if we read Rorty as 
offering suggestions for alternative ways of thinking, where attention is directed 
away from old philosophical problems, in order to open new possibilities, the 
split is banal. On the one hand, Fraser has missed the point. Rorty's notion of the 
private becomes an existential area, where we can ask the question of what to do 
with one's aloneness? It neither defines a space in the sense of a house or kitchen 
as Fraser supposes. Nor does it restrict us from forming public grievances around 
private issues. On the other hand, and following on from this point, Rorty's 
public-private split is not fixed. Indeed, he explicitly leaves room open for moral 
progress to occur through the chance coincidence of a "private fantasy with a 
public problem. " In one interview (1995: 62) he argued, "I don't think private 
beliefs can be fenced off [from the public sphere]; they leak through, so to speak, 
and influence the way one behaves toward other people. " And in another (2002: 
62-63) he categorically retorts, 
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I didn't say everybody had a public/private split, but some people 
do. There is a spectrum here. Some people have no public 
consciousness. This is the case of the sociopath; he simply 
doesn't think there are any moral subjects out there. There are a 
lot of other solitaries: hermetic poets who don't care if they have 
an audience. At the other extreme, there are people who have an 
entirely minimal inner life. Their happiness consists entirely of 
being the soccer coach or being the pater familias, or being chair 
of the Rotary club. My public/private distinction wasn't an 
explanation of what every human life is like. I was, instead, 
urging that there was nothin wrong with letting people divide L- C, 9 
their lives along the private/public line. We don't have a moral 
responsibility to brincy the two together. It was a negative point, 
not a positive recommendation about how everybody should 
behave. 
Thirdly, the concrete political agenda of pragmatism has been criticised as 
empty. In a review of ContingencY Ironly and Solidarity, Richard Bernstein 
argues that, "For all Rorty's manifest concern with liberal democracy, public 
responsibilities, and utopian politics, it is curious how little politics one finds in 
this book. " (Bernstein 1991: 283). And he continues, "Even if one shares Rorty's 
liberal biases, there is little agreement about what counts as cruelty in liberal 
societies or what is to be done to diminish cruelty. " (Ibid. 284). And he neatly 
surmises the point in a later piece: 
Inspirational liberalism may be a healthy antidote to legalistic rights- 
based liberalism and to the abuses of the infatuation with theorizing 
by postmodern cultural critics. But without pragmatic toughness and a 
concrete programme for reform, [Rorty's] liberalism too easily 
degenerates into an empty rhetorical hand waving. (Bernstein, 2003: 
138). 
According to Bernstein there is thus a requirement to pick up and extend the 
praxeological aspects of pragmatism. While Rorty does not readily identify the 
concrete political agenda that Bernstein seeks, he nevertheless provides the tools 
to critically analyse such an agenda. By breaking down the artificial separations 
between theory and practice, ethics and politics, Rorty encourages us to examine 
how the co-constitution of theory/practice might be engaged to increase 
sensitivity to suffering and reduce levels of cruelty (where cruelty and suffering 
are understood as continuously changing qualities). 
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In this sense, a task for a pragmatic praxis is to operationalise the conversation 
that Rorty proposes by developing the praxeological content of pragmatism. In 
the final section it is argued that there is much in Rorty that can animate a 
conversation about cosmopolitan ethics in global finance. Firstly, by regarding 
the possibility of cosmopolitan ethics in global finance via a Tobin Tax as a 
conversation, it is possible to suggest vocabularies like cosmopolitanism and 
then subject them to Ironist critique. As this section has argued, there is a large 
degree of creative tension in Rorty's public-private split that is ripe to be 
exploited. And secondly, as the next section will argue, there is much in Rorty's 
account of sentimental education that re-focuses the debate over the Tobin Tax. 
Thus pragmatism acts as both a background method and a set of normative I Z: l 
propositions. 
". 3.2 Constructing Cosmopolitanism 
Revisiting Rorty's account of human rights can show how pragmatism might 
contribute to the construction of cosmopolitan ethics. In Human Rights, 
Rationality and Sentimentality Rorty qualifies the broad interest in human rights 
discourse by arguing that it should be seen as a culture: a culture that we should 
fully support and seek to expand. In this way he undermines the universalism of 
human rights discourse. And he argues that after dropping epistemology "[tlhere 
is a growing willingness to neglect the question "What is our nature? " and to 
substitute the question "What can we make of ourselves? " (Rorty, 1998: 168). 
Adding: "We are much less inclined to pose the ontological question "what are 
we? " because we have come to see that the main lesson of both human history 
and anthropology is our extraordinary malleability. " (I 998b: 168-169). 
Rorty takes the contingent, ironic but still creative and constructive position that 
a "human rights culture" exists and should be expanded. 
Against those who 
would argue that we need a deeper sense of moral knowledge, a truth that can 
answer problematic questions in any set of circumstances, 
Rorty emphasises the 
contingency of politics and retorts: "... on the pragmatist view 
I favour, it is a 
question of efficiency: a question about 
how best to grab hold of history - how 
best to bring about the utopia sketched by the Enlightenment" (I 998b: 
172). 
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And he continues: 
We pragmatists argue from the fact that the emergence of a human rights culture seems to owe nothing to increased moral 
knowledge, and everything to hearing sad and sentimental stories, 
to the conclusion that there is probably no knowledge of the sort 
Plato envisa, -ed. 
In short, my doubts about the effectiveness of appeals to moral 
knowledge are doubts about causal efficacy, not about epistemic 
status. " (1998b: 172). 
In this way, pragmatism might start to see cosmopolitan ethics more in the role C, 
of 'narrative', as an embedded way of thinking about the world that connects the 
past with the future. Thus cosmopolitanism does not need to confront common 
post-structural critiques of an exclusive universalism. It can be seen as an 
&attempt', an approach to global ethics that is contingent, fallible and open to t: 1 
cntical reconstruction. 
Rorty argues that we should drop the supposition that people who do not fit 
within the 'human rights culture' are necessarily less knowledgeable. Instead, it 
would be better to see such people as deprived of "security" and "sympathy" - 
where security means "conditions of life sufficiently risk-free as to make one's 
difference from others inessential to one's self respect, one's sense of worth. " 
And where sympathy refers to the kind of reactions that people have to books 
like Uncle Toms Cabin; "the sort that we have more of after watching television 
programs about the genocide in Bosnia. " (1998b: 180). Although he 
acknowledges that that many people consider sentiment to be too weak a 
motivation, Rorty argues that this is more from insecurity: 
This idea that reason is "stronger" than sentiment, that only 
insistence on the unconditionality of moral obligation has the 
power to change human beings for the better, is very persistent. I 
think that this persistence is due mainly to a semiconscious 
realization that if we hand our hopes for moral progress over to 
sentiment, we are in effect handing them over to condescension. 
For we shall be relying on those who have the power to change 
things - people like the rich New England abolitionists or rich 
bleeding hearts like Robert Owen and Friedrich Engels - rather 
than something that has power over them. (I 998b: 18 1). 
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The implications of sentimental education are important and as yet barely 
articulated in either the scholarly or policy community concerned with the reform 
and maintenance of globalisation. A pragmatic praxis would promote the 
experimental interplay of different actors working at multiple levels - both public 
and private - to achieve this end. It is not that there is one rightful outcome or, as 
many neo-Marxists argue, one rightful agent. Rather, the process itself could be 
of ethical value in its ability to foster a change in sentiments over time. A key 
argument therefore is that, from a pragmatic perspective, cosmopolitan ethics in 
global finance becomes a quality - or set of qualities - to be constructed. In line 
ý, vith the development of a grounded ethical critique this process of construction is 
entirely open to the constitutive ambiguities and limits of ethics. Indeed, the Cn 
public-private split in Rorty's work is in large part a recognition that such 
tensions exist within liberal discourse. Taking them to the level of global finance 
is therefore a suitable extension of Rorty's pragmatism. 
2.4 Ethics as Conversation? 
"Philosophy" is not a name for a discipline which confronts 
permanent issues, and unfortunately keeps misstating them, or 
attacking them with clumsy dialectical instruments. Rather it is a 
cultural genre, a "voice in the conversation of mankind" (to use 
Michael Oakeshott's phrase) which centres on one topic rather than 
another at some given time not by dialectical necessity, but as a 
result of various things happening elsewhere in the conversation. 
(1979: 264). 
It is important to be clear that what is being established is not a 'Method'. Rorty 
would be highly cautious of any 'system' of thought that attributed any power to 
logic itself. Instead what is developed here is but one way of applying a global 
praginatic praxis to the subject of cosmopolitan global finance. The idea of 
'Ethics as Conversation' is a basic methodological 'prop' which Rorty provides, 
that can be useful for couching the discussion. Rorty argues that once we give up 
on the idea of Truth as correspondence to reality then we can start to see 
conversation as the ultimate context of know] edge/eth i cs. In this way 
descriptions of reality are not to be considered more or less true. Rather they 
construct reality. And the responsibility of the philosopher - or in this case the 
IPE theorist - is to play off different vocabularies and where possible re-describe 
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aspects of particular vocabularies. This act of playing off and/or re-describing 
vocabularies is not desiOned to get us closer to truth. All we can do is attempt to 
reduce cruelty and increase sensitivities to suffering via experimental 
constructions of solidarity. As Rorty surmises in Philosophy and Social Hope, 
... it is best to think of moral progress as a matter of increasing 
sensitivin,, increasing responsiveness to the needs of a larger and 
larger variety of people and things. Just as pragmatists see 
sc entific progress not as the gradual attenuation of a veil of 
appearances which hides the intrinsic nature of reality from us, 
but as the increasing ability to respond to the concerns of ever 
larger groups of people ... so they see moral progress as a matter of being able to respond to the needs of ever more inclusive groups 
of people. (Rorty, 1999: 81). 
Such a view can be adapted to the discussion of the Tobin Tax as a case study of 
cosmopolitan global finance in the following ways. Firstly, the thesis Identifies 
three different but inter-related vocabularies of the Tobin Tax - economic, 
political and ethical (See Chapter Three). Initial accounts of the tax sought to 
prove or disprove its economic validity. More recent arguments attempted to 
construct a political rationale for the tax. For instance, some authors have 
identified the radical aspects of the tax for proffering states the ability to resist 
capital markets. And finally, an emerging vocabulary of the Tobin Tax seeks to 
justify the proposal on ethical grounds. Importantly, the pragmatic view of Ethics 
as conversation means that we do not need to seek resolution as to which is the 
'true' depiction of the tax. Rather a pragmatic praxis would seek to play them off 
against each other, seeking to open alternatives for likely reform. 
Secondly, building on the notion of Ethics as Conversation, Chapter 4-6 
introduce different cosmopolitan voices to this conversation. It is argued that the 
vocabulary of cosmopolitan justice (Chapter Four) and the vocabulary of 
cosmopolitan democracy (Chapter Five) can be set on conversation with critical 
and post-structural critiques of the Tobin Tax proposal. Such a conversation not 
only illustrates the limits and indeterminacies of cosmopolitan global finance. It 
also presents the possibility of moving beyond existing constructions of 
cosmopolitan global finance via a Tobin Tax. And thirdly, by recognising the 
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constitutive ambiguities of the Tobin Tax campaign, we might draw out different 
ways to forward the discussion of cosmopolitan global finance (Chapter Six). 
At one level, and drawing on Rorty's notion of sentimental education, it is 
araued that the campaign for a Tobin Tax has actually done a lot to illustrate the Z__ z: 1 
forms of sufferinE! engendered by global finance. At another level, the campaign 
itself has born witness to a growing awareness of the ambiguities of universal 
categories contained within global justice and democracy. Thus new forms of 
suffering can illustrated in the campaign for a Tobin Tax proffering a glimpse of 
alternative and non-universal reforms that might be couched in terms of 
Pragmatic Cosmopolitanism. Z_n 
Conclusion 
The chapter presented the philosophical pragmatism of Richard Rorty as the 
theoretical framework of the thesis. Section I identified certain limitations with 
the current framing of ethics in IPE. It was argued that dichotomies between 
positive and normative theory, on the one hand, and politics and ethics, on the 
other, are unhelpful for developing a grounded ethical critique. While critical 
theories of IPE including neo-Gramscian and post-structural approaches were 
argued to undermine such dichotomies, they too produce their own question- 
mark over ethics. 
Briefly, should we follow the critical emancipatory ethics proposed by neo- 
Gramscians or the more questioning, uncertain critique of post-structural 
theorists? It was suggested that this impasse is as unhelpful as previous 
dichotomies and so the chapter turned to the philosophical pragmatism of 
Richard Rorty to find a route beyond such problems. Section 2 presented a 
sympathetic summary of Rorty's thought. Themes in Rorty's work such as such 
as contingency, conversation and the expansion of solidarity against suffering 
were introduced and celebrated. It was argued that many of the ambiguities 
regarding ethics and IPE are re-fashioned if we start to regard them - as Rorty 
does - as political rather than philosophical questions. 
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Section 3 dealt with some of the prominent critiques of Rorty. It argued that 
enduring tensions in his work between the public and the private in particular are 
actually very creative elements in an evolving conversation about global ethics. 
This image breaks with the search for foundational knowledge entirely and zn 
embraces the politics of global ethics in a reformist way. As Rorty argues, 
To keep the conversation going is a sufficient aim of philosophy, to 
see wisdom as consisting in the ability to sustain a conversation, is 
seeing human beings as generators of new descriptions rather than 4n ltý beings one hopes to be able to describe accurately. (Rorty, 1979: zn 378). 
And finally Section 4 drew the points of the chapter together by outlining the 
central 'methodological' and normative implications of using Richard Rorty's 
pragmatism as a theoretical framework for a study of cosmopolitan ethics in 
global finance via a Tobin Tax. By using Rorty's notion of conversation as 
background 'method', or organising metaphor, playing on the tensions between 
public and private, and developing his arguments regarding sentimental 
education, the study of cosmopolitan ethics in global finance can be animated in 
a grounded, engaged and reformist way. This will be the task of chapters 3-6. 
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3. Vocabularies of the Tobin Tax: 
From Economics to Politics and Ethics 
Introduction 
Chapter One identified the central concern of the thesis: to criticall 
,Y 
analyse the 
possibilities and limits of cosmopolitan ethics in globalfinance via a case study 
of the Tobin Tax. Chapter Two established the theoretical approach that will 
underpin the case study, a praginatic praxis, and identified a background method 
in Rorty's notion of 'Ethics as Conversation'. Employing this method, 
'descriptions' of the Tobin Tax are not regarded as valuable because of a 
correspondence with reality. Rather they are rendered as alternative voices in an 
ethical/political conversation. To that end, Chapter Three will extend this 
argument by presenting a historical narrative of the Tobin Tax in terms of three zn 
separate though inter-related vocabularies - economic, political and ethical. This 
history will clear the ground for engaging a conversation on cosmopolitan ethics 
in global finance via the Tobin Tax in subsequent chapters. Briefly, it is argued 
that a new vocabulary of democracy and justice has started to dominate 
discussions of the Tobin Tax and that these require scrutiny insofar as they 
extend the cosmopolitan project. 
Chapter Three proceeds in three sections. Section I will briefly outline Rorty's 
understanding of language and show how it can be applied to the Tobin Tax. By 
giving up on essentialism - the idea that the written word corresponds to some 
non-linguistic essence - Rorty allows us to view different vocabularies as 'more 
or less useful' for achieving socially agreed objectives (Rorty, 1998a: 1). While 
the identification of such objectives is a matter of ethical conversation (see 
Chapters 4-6), this chapter lays the groundwork by identifying the development 
of three separate though inter-related vocabularies of the Tobin Tax - economic, 
political and ethical. An effect of this move to vocabulary is to bypass the 
common (and somewhat over-worked) question: is the Tobin Tax feasible 
(Kapoor, 2003; Kenen, 1996; Garber and Taylor, 1995; Schmidt, 1999)? Instead 
a pragmatic approach asks: How do different ways of talking about the Tobin Tax 
instantiate different ethical possibilities/limits? And how might they be engaged? 
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Section 2 surveys the economic arguments for and against the Tobin tax. 
Economic approaches have tended to focus on the rationales and feasibility of the 
Tobin Tax. Key debates include the potential for capital market stability after 
Bretton Woods (Tobin, 1978) and the technical feasibility of foreign currency 
market intervention (Kenen, 1996; Mende and Menkhoff, 2003; Schmidt, 1999). 
The section traces a line through these debates that culminates in Paul Berrid 
Spahn's (1995) argument for a two-tier version of the tax. It is argued that, 
certain refinements notwithstanding, Spahn's essential model serves as a 
blueprint for many contemporary advocates (e. g. Kapoor, 2003; Patomaki, 2001). 
Using Rorty, it is argued that disagreements over the feasibility of the tax can tl 
only be maintained by employing an essentialist theory of knowledge. Instead, 
this thesis prefers to remain agnostic about a policy proposal that has never been zn 
implemented. This is not just a philosophical point. It is also a straightforward 
g recognition of the political contingency pertaining to economic theory and policy 
practice (Higgott, 1999). If activated the Tobin Tax would cease to be a technical 
question alone and would require sophisticated governance systems and the 
factor of political opposition or support cannot be predicted (Patomaki, 2000). 
Therefore the work of groups like the Network Institute for Global 
Democratisation (NIGD) and War on Want is particularly relevant. These groups 
concentrate on the period before and after any possible implementation. How 
would the tax be administered? How would the funds be distributed? Such 
thinking takes economic arguments seriously, but sets them in broader context of 
govemance and justifiability. 
Thus, finally, Section 3 considers the various political and ethical vocabularies 
that are emerging around the Tobin Tax campaign. A collection of advocates 
ranging from within global institutions like the UN through to NGO's, civil 
society networks and critical academics have emerged to present arguments that 
go beyond the technical economic vocabulary (Porter, 2005: 145-147). Some 
advocates stress the potential autonomy of states to set monetary policy 
(ATTAQ and the democratic possibilities of global co-ordination (Kau] and 
Langmore, 1996; Patomaki, 2001). There is also increased discussion of the 
global re-distnbutive qualities of the tax (War on Want, 2002a, Kapoor, 2003). 
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Indeed, a discursive shift from technical economic considerations to the political 
and ethical 'possibilities' contained within alternative framings of the tax can be 
discerned. As Heikki Patomaki (2000: 79) argues, 
A currency transactions tax would defend and develop the 
autonomy of states, and, in particular give more room for 
manoeuvre of their economic policies. However, whereas a Tobin 
Tax regime can be seen as defending some aspects of state 
sovereignty, it also opens up new, path breaking global ethico- 
political problems of governance. Suddenly, the politics of 
globalization seems to be also about authority, democracy, social 
responsibility and justice. 
However, the Chapter argues that it is precisely this ethical vocabulary that is 
currently under-scrutimsed by advocates. Too often the Tobin tax is portrayed as 
an unquestionable moral imperative (War on Want, 2002a). And it is presented 
by some as the (mythical) single answer to all the problems of globalisation and 
global finance. Such an approach arguably (re)produces the dichotomy between 
ethics and politics addressed in Chapters One and Two by constructing global 
finance as 'bad', and the Tobin Tax as 'good'. Instead, the requirement is to 
assess the ways in which an ethical goal like the Tobin Tax acts to constitute the 
political world it seeks to reform. Straightforward assertions of the normative 
value of the Tobin Tax require scrutiny. Thus the chapter concludes by 
identifying how thinking about the Tobin Tax can be developed via a 
conversation about cosmopolitan ethics in global finance. 
At one level, recent arguments for the Tobin Tax rest on a conception of global 
justice as fairness, or doing the right thing by the victims of financial crises 
(Caney, 2006: 126-7; Kapoor, 2003; Patomaki, 2001: xix). These ideas follow in 
the tradition of Rawlsian justice. The chance to operationalise this tradition via 
an appeal to the experiences of the Tobin Tax campaign may be an important 
contribution to the development of cosmopolitan ethics in global finance (See 
Chapter Four). At another level, arguments for a Tobin Tax and the political 
activities of civil society advocates both hold important implications for global 
democracy. Firstly, the democratic potentials of the Tax are celebrated by 
advocates in a way that echoes cosmopolitan democracy (Patomaki, 2001) (See 
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Chapter Five). And the act of contesting global finance in the public sphere, C) 
suggests a reflexive question of the democratic impact of the civil soci Z: ) I iety groups 
themselves (Chapter Six). In this way, cosmopolitan ethics are embedded in the 
concrete experiences of a political and economic campaign. 
3.1 Vocabularies of the Tobin Tax 
This section briefly reprises Rorty's anti -essential Ism and then relates it to the 
Tobin Tax. The purpose is to establish how and why subsequent sections develop 
a historical narrative of the Tobin Tax via three separate though inter-related 
'vocabularies' - economics, politics, and ethics. This is done in order to explore 
how different vocabularies of the Tobin Tax instantiate alternative ethical 
possibilities and limits. Thus, instead of rehearsing the common concern of 
previous debates with the technical feasibility of the tax, the pragmatic approach 
developed in subsequent chapters is concerned with finding new and imaginative 
ethical possibilities within the campaign/conversation itself. 
Rorty adopts an anti -essenti all st position regarding language. Essentialism is the 
view that there is some pure essence to reality that we can grasp if only we get 
the correct epistemological approach. Rorty doesn't critique this image because t::, 
he thinks epistemology has so far got it wrong. He simply doesn't understand 
what it could mean to get it 'right'. He doubts the very idea of "Truth" as the 
correspondence between words and reality. For Rorty 'words' and 'sentences' 
are not more or less accurate representations of the essential reality of the world. 
Rather they are aspects of larger more or less coherent 'vocabularies' that have 
been developed to help us cope with the world. And the choice between 
vocabularies or, more accurately, the contingent and experimental interplay 
berween, and re-description of, different vocabularies is motivated by the 
pragmatic desire to reducing cruelty and increase sensitivity to suffering. Thus, 
despite regular accusations and attributions of moral relativism, for anti- 
essentialists there remains a lot at stake in the choice of vocabularies. As Rorty 
(I 998a: ])comments: 
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We think that there are many ways to talk about what is going on, 
and that none of them gets closer to the way things are in 
themselves than any other. We have no idea what "in itself' is 
supposed to mean in the phrase "reality as it is in itself. " So we 
sucycrest that the appearance -real i ty distinction is dropped in favour Z: )Zn 
of a distinction between less useful and more useful ways of 
talking. 
As Chapter Two identified, over time different vocabularies can rise and fall. In 
addition they can change over time by being played off against each other, or, by 
being re-described. Often this change is haphazard and dependent on chance or, t_n 
perhaps, "the accidental coincidence of a private obsession with a public need" 
(Rorty, 1989: 37). And sometimes it is the result of a long-term, trial and error 
approach by committed reformers. 
From a pragmatic perspective, the choice between vocabularies is not one made 
between truth and falsity, but rather between their relative utility at achieving 
certain (moral) purposes. Indeed, Chapter Two inferred that playing vocabularies 
off against each other, and the related idea of re-description, can become 
important routes for intellectual and moral development. However, before the 
possibility of such moral development can be considered, it is first necessary to 
re-describe the history of the Tobin Tax debate as the evolution of, and 
conversation between, three separate, though inter-related vocabularies - 
economics, politics and ethics. Again, any choice between these vocabularies 
should not be made in terms of which one gets the 'nature' of contemporary 
global finance 'right'. Rather, it should be made in terms of which one allows for 
the imagination of alternative futures for contemporary global finance. As Rorty 
(1989: 48-49) argues, 
Once we realize that progress, for the community as for the 
individual, is a matter of using new words as well as arguing from 
premises phrased in old words, we realize that a critical vocabulary 
which revolves around notions like "rational", "criteria", 
"argument" and "foundation and "absolute" is badly suited to 
describe the relation between the old and the new. 
On this view, the worth of the Tobin Tax proposal may not be in its ability to 
rationally diagnose the true nature of global financial and political problems. 
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Rather, it may be its ability to suggest ethical alternatives that link the past and 
the future? A basic premise of this chapter is that while economics has generated 
remarkable knowledge and insight into the technical feasibility of the Tobin Tax, 
it may be that political and ethical vocabularies of the Tobin Tax are 'more 
useful' for moving the conversation onto the question of cosmopolitan ethics in 
alobal finance. 
The following sections will now explore some of the key arguments for and zn 
against the tax phrased in each vocabulary. And it can be noted that the 
vocabularies fall in a rough chronological order. Briefly, the Tobin Tax emerged 
in the discipline of economics in the 1970s. While the debates were heated and 
diverse they quickly slowed down by the 1980s. The proposal then experienced a 
resurE! ence of interest after the financial crises in the 1990s. Debates over the 
reform of global finance saw global bodies, like the UN, and NGO's, like the 
Halifax initiative and ATTAC, begin to advocate the Tobin tax for reasons of 
political reform, or, as an ethical challenge to the dominant neo-liberal 
construction of globalisation. In the present it occupies a relatively stable 
position at the heart of civil society discourses against globalisation. 
3.2 The Economic Vocabulary of the Tobin Tax 
This section introduces the Tobin Tax and discusses the way it has been debated 
within economics. Part I considers the economic arguments for the tax: its 
potential to provide financial stability and reduce downward pressure on interest 
rates. Part 2 will then consider economic arguments against the Tobin Tax. 
Critics have questioned various aspects of the Tobin Tax proposal including the 
feasibility of a 'universal' levy; the possibility of evasion by traders moving 
offshore; the difficulty of taxing derivatives; and the Tobin Tax's potential to de- 
stabilise foreign exchange markets by reducing liquidity. And finally, Part 3 
notes how these critiques have provoked technical augmentations to the proposal, 
most famously exemplified in the argument made by Paul Bemd Spahn (1995) 
for a two tier rate of taxation: the Spahn tax. The Spahn tax has been adopted by 
many Tobin tax advocates as the dominant articulation of the proposal and they 
have built their arguments around it. 
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3.2.1 Economic ai-ý2uments for the Tobin Tax 
James Tobin first made a proposal for a small tax on foreign exchange 
transactions in a 1972 lecture series at Princeton. By his own admission the "idea 
fell like a stone in a deep well". But, he re-made the proposal several times 
throughout his life stating that: "If I cast it in the water again, it is because events 11 C) 
since my first try have strengthened my belief that something of the sort needs to C, 
be done. " (Tobin, 1978: 155). These events were the steady decline of the dollar, 
the difficulty of co-operating between the 'Big-3' economies and the painful Z: ) 
process of monetary co-ordination in Europe. 
Tobin was concerned that the promises of monetarism had not materialised. He 
proposed a moderate reforin, "to throw some sand in the well greased wheels" of 
global currency markets (Ibid: 158). As he summarised: "The proposal is an 
internationally uniform tax on all spot conversions of one currency into another, 
proportional to the size of the transaction. ne tax would particularly deter short- 
term financial round-trip excursions into another currency. " (Op Cit. ). 
Tobin argued that a proportional tax - as little as I% - could only be overcome 
with an 8 point differential in the annual yields of Treasury bills or other deposits 
denominated in dollars or Deutschmarks. The corresponding differential for one- 
year maturities would be 2 points. It is important to emphasise that Tobin was 
less concerned with capital mobility in general - in fact he saw it as potentially 
beneficial. Echoing Keynes, he was concerned with excessive short-term 
speculation divorced from the real economy: 
The impact of the tax would be less for permanent currency shifts or 
for longer maturities. Because of exchange risks, capital value risks, 
and market imperfections, interest arbitrage and exchange 
speculation are less troublesome. Moreover, it is desirable to 
obstruct as little as possible international movements of capital 
responsive to long-run portfolio preferences and profit 
opportunities. (Ibid: 158). 
Thus, for Tobin, the tax represented an attempt to moderate and improve the 
quality of global capital mobility. In this he was chiefly intent on undermining 
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the prevailing mood of monetarism in the academic and policy making elites. 
Against monetarist orthodoxy he identified 4 reasons why floating exchange 
rates were not, of themselves, sufficient to stabilise the system. 
"... in a world of international capital mobility flexibility of 
exchanae rates does not assure autonomy of national 
macroeconomic policy. The Mundell-Flemming models of the 
early 1960s showed how capital mobility inhibits domestic 
monetary policy under fixed parities and domestic fiscal policy 
under flexible rates. Moreover the availability of the remaining 
instrument of macroeconomic policy in either regime is small 
consolation. " (Ibid: 155). 
2. "... the liberation of domestic monetary policy under flexible rates 
is in large degree illusory. One reason is the attachment of central C) 1-n bankers to monetarist targets irrespective of exchange rate 
regimes and the openness of financial markets. More 
fundamentally, monetary policy becomes, under floating rates, 
exchange rate policy. The stimulus of expansionary monetary 
policy to domestic demand is limited by the competition of 
foreign interest rates for mobile funds. 'nus much - in the limit, 
all - of the stimulus depends on exchange depreciation and its 
effects on the trade balance... " (Ibid: 155-156). 
3. "... governments are not and cannot be indifferent to changes in 
the value of their currencies in exchange markets, any more than 
they did or could ignore changes in their international reserves 
under a fixed-parity regime. [ ... ] the uncoordinated interventions 
that make floating dirty are the governments' natural mechanisms 
of defence against shocks transmitted to their economies by 
foreign exchange markets. (Ibid: 156). Z: ý 
4. "... another optimistic hope belied by events was the belief that 
floating rates would insulate economies from shocks to export and 
import demand. The same Mundell-Hemming type model that 
told us the relative impotence of fiscal polices and non-monetary 
demand shocks under floating rates also implied that trade balance 
shocks would be absorbed completely in exchange rates without 
adjustment of domestic output or prices. This will, of course, not 
be the case if the trade balance moves the wrong way [ ... ] or if, 
for any of the other understandable reasons enumerated above, 
governments intervene to prevent full exchange rate adjustment. It 
will not be the case anyway if exchange rate movements have 
consequences for asset demands and supplies, as they will, either 
via the capital gains or losses they produce for agents with long or 
short positions in foreign currency or via the expectations of 
future exchange rate movements which they generate. " (Ibid: 
156). 
100 
Against monetarist arguments that floating exchange rates would act as a Z-- C) 4: 1 
dispassionate 'signal' to market participants, allowing for a continuous and 
efficient adjustment to relative interest rates, Tobin asserted the deflationary 
pressures of the system. 1) Macroeconomic autonomy is reduced because of the 
*Unholy Trinity. 2) In such circumstances, an ideological adoption of monetarist 
targets combined with competition for mobile funds has meant that governments Z1- 
compete for mobile capital by increasing interest rates. 3) As a result 
governments are forced to intervene in various ways to defend their 
monetary/exchange rate policy - (a free float is virtually always 'dirty'), and 4) 
The size of the forei,, n exchanae market means that its behaviour and impact is, 1=7 1-n 
in part, autonomous of the real economy of production and trade. 
It is important to recognise that Tobin's critique and proposal were both Z-- 
relatively moderate. As Tobin (Ibid: 157) cautioned: "My message is not, I 
emphasize again, that floating is the inferior regime. It is that floating does not 
satisfactorily solve all the problems. One big reason why it does not is that 
foreign exchange markets are necessarily adrift without anchors. " And he 1-n L- 
continued, 
What we have is an incredibly efficient set of financial markets in 
which various obligations, mostly short-term, expressed in various 
currencies are traded. I mean the word "efficient" only in a 
mechanical sense: transactions costs are low, communications are 
speedy, prices are instantaneously kept in line all over the world, 
and credit enables participants to take large long or short positions 
at will or whim. Whether the market is efficient in the deeper 
economic-informational sense is very dubious. In these markets, as 
in other markets for financial instruments, speculation on filture 
prices is the dominating preoccupation of the participants. (Ibid: 
157). 
In such a context, Tobin argues, it is simply very unlikely that exchange rates 
will act as an effective price signal that can allow global markets to "adjust" 
savings and investments to the "rational equilibrium" where the true comparative 
advantage of nations is reflected. Capital is unlikely to allocate efficiently when 
there are substantial incentives to speculate on future prices. And governments 
are less able to use macro-economic policy to shape their economic fortunes 
given the logic of the 'Unholy Trinity' and the ideological preference for 
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monetarism. So his tax is proposed as a middle way between Bretton Woods- 
style capital controls and monetarism. 
It would be an internationally agreed uniform tax, administered by 
each government over its own jurisdiction. Britain for example, 
would be responsible for taxing all inter-currency transactions in 
Eurocurrency banks and brokers located in London, even when 
sterling was not involved. The tax proceeds could appropriately be 
paid into the IMF or World Bank. The tax would apply to all 
purchases of financial instruments denominated in another currency 
- from currency and coin to equity and securities. (Ibid: 158-159). 
Although Tobin concedes that the uniformity of the tax would mean a regrettable 
cost to trade, since he would tax currency used to pay for goods in another 
country, it would be negligible and difficult avoid since financial transactions 1-n C7 
could be easily disguised as trade. And he maintains that the tax is a moderate 
reform: "The purpose is to moderate swings in major exchange rates, not to break 
links between closely related economies. " (Ibid: 159). While he concedes that the 
tax may be imperfect, he supports it nonetheless because of its ability to deter - 
or dampen - speculation: "At least the bank facilities which are so responsible 
for the current troublesome perfection of these markets would be taxed, as would 
the multinational corporations. " (Ibid: 159). 
3.2.2 Economic ArLyuments aizainst the Tobin Tax 
It should be noted that Tobin did not spend long developing or advocating his 
idea for a levy on foreign exchange trading. It arises in two lectures and a few 
later papers where he was asked to comment on the idea. It should also be noted 
that he did not actually support every interpretation of the tax and was reticent 
about the adoption of his name, noting that supporters "often seemed to expect 
more from the Tobin Tax than it could deliver" (Tobin, 1996: x). However, 
despite this reticence, the idea has caught on and we should address the principal 
economic arguments that have been used against the initial proposal. These 
demonstrate the primary technical concerns of economists and it was such 
arguments that paved the way for the development of the Spahn Tax that is now 
the default choice of many within the Tobin tax campaign. 
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Economic arguments against the tax can be divided into three general themes: 1) 
Liquidity & Effectiveness 2) Enforceability, and 3) most problematically, Co- 
ordination Problems. 
Liquidity and Effectiveness 
Common critiques of the Tobin Tax turn on a restatement of monetarist 
orthodoxy about non-interference in markets. As Barry Eichengreen and Charles 
Wyplosz (1996: 15) remark, 
Most economists are instinctively skeptical about taxing 
international financial transactions as a way to enhance the 
operation of the international monetary system. Holders of the 
union card are taught to prize the efficiency of the market and to 
regard intervention through taxation and controls as welfare 
reducing. They are trained to anticipate the incentive of market 
participants to evade taxes and circumvent administrative 
restrictions. 
The normative content of much economic theory after the neo-classical 
revolution is that free-markets are 'best' able to ensure the 'efficient' allocation 
of capital, thus ensuring the optimum spread of productive resources across the 
global economy. A ready pool of liquid capital will give a global economy speed 
of adjustment in relation to dips in productiveness. Thus the Tobin Tax seems 
particularly susceptible to monetarist critiques. And, even if the tax could deter 
speculation and hedging activities around moderate currency price differentials, 
the knock-on effect could be to move such actors to speculate on larger 
differentials. In effect, currency crisis could become the goal of market actors 
instead of an unhappy side effect of their activities: 
Tobin's idea was to guide decision making in the [foreign 
exchange] market in such a way that the overwhelming amount of 
short-term transactions would be restricted in favour of longer-term 
oriented transactions. Although this guidance objective could be 
adequately addressed by a proportional tax on all [foreign 
exchange] transactions, the academic discussion has revealed a non- 
trivial price: the reduction in short-term transactions can markedly 
reduce market liquidity which will, in turn, most probably increase 
volatility. (Mende and Menkhoff, 2003: 228). 
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Since Tobin's primary objective was to smooth fluctuations in the foreign 
exchange market, the potential for the tax to generate greater volati Ity by li 
distortino trader objectives is a major challenge for protagonists of the Tobin 
Tax. By reducing the margin of effective trade the Tobin Tax could effectively 
increase the amounts speculated on larger differentials. 
Enforceability 
A second - and related - critique of the Tobin Tax is that it may be easy to evade 
(See Garber, 1996). At one level, it has been argued that should a country try to 
implement the tax individually then traders would simply migrate offshore. 
Rodney Schmidt (2000: 215) cites Frankel (1996: 156) on this point: 
"... enforcement is a big problem. Certainly if some countries adopted the Tobin 
tax but others did not, the foreign exchange trading would move to where it was 
not taxed. " (See discussion of Spahn below 3.1.3). At another level, while Tobin 
intended his tax to be limited to spot transactions, it has been argued that he has 
underestimated the substitutability of spots for derivatives like forwards and put- 
options (Kenen, 1996). As Schmidt (2000: 215) states, 
In today's 24-hour global marketplace foreign exchange traders 
can hide positions by shifting them between branches in different 
time zones and so always remain within working hours, or they can 
use derivative financial instruments that do not show on balance 
sheets. Finally traders can avoid the foreign exchange market 
altogether by buying and exchanging securities, such as bonds or 
treasury bills, denominated in different currencies. 
Indeed, despite a general enthusiasm for the Tobin Tax, Joseph Stiglitz remarks: 
"My main reservations are that there are some very difficult problems with 
implementation particularly associated with derivatives and options. ' 
2 These 
critiques highlight a fundamental issue for discussions of the Tobin Tax: the 
complexity and changing makeup of global financial markets. 
2 Interview with Joseph Stiglitz for German television (ARD. Monitor), broadcast on the 13th of 
May 2002. Interview by Sonia Mikich 
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Co-Ordination Problems 
Finally, and leadino on from questions of enforceability, a major problem with 
the original formulation of the tax is the difficulty of co-ordination on a universal 
scale. If, as Tobin argues, all states need to sign up to the tax, then one state - 
like the US or UK - could veto the whole agreement. Indeed, the United States 
has proved a major critic of olobal taxation and used the Tobin Tax specifically 
as a reason for not paying UN dues. On this reading, the availability of just one 
junsdiction where the tax did not apply would prompt foreign exchange traders 
to relocate there. Thus, the general impact of the tax would be reduced since the 
market would bifurcate and currency speculation could continue un-checked. 
Further aspects of such co-ordination problems - only partially addressed in the 
economic vocabulary - are therefore the problem of political will, and the 
question of how the revenues from such a tax should be assigned, i. e. one aspect 
of co-ordination must rely upon the potential incentive of revenue distribution. 
3.2.3 Towards a Spahn Tax? 
In response to these fundamental critiques of the Tobin tax Paul Bern Spahn 
(1995) articulated an augmented version the tax in a working paper for the IMF. 
In International Financial Flows and Transactions Taxes: Suri, ey and Options, 
Spahn outlined a two-tier tax, which has become the model that many Tobin Tax 
advocates use. It pits a low level transactions tax, whose key function would be 
to raise revenue, and a high level surcharge that would act to break trading in the 
event of a speculative attack. Spahn (1995: 4) agrees with many of the critiques 
of the Tobin tax outlined above, "Analysis has shown that the Tobin tax as 
originally proposed is not viable and should be laid aside for good. " And he 
argues that this results from a number of basic problems associated with the 
proposal: 
... 
it is virtually impossible to distinguish between normal liquidity 
and speculative "noise" trading. If the tax is generally applied at 
high rates, it will severely impair financial operations and create 
international liquidity problems, especially if derivatives are taxed 
as well. 
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2. 
... because of the high substitutability of financial products, it Zn 
would be vain to tax only spot transactions. This would create tax 
loopholes and reduce the effectiveness of the tax as an anti- 
speculation device. However, the inclusion of derivatives, in 
particular of forward transactions, poses substantial conceptual 
problems as no fixed relationship between cash and derivative 
transactions can be established readily. 
3. ... even with a very low rate, the tax would raise substantial 
revenue given the high and increasing volume of trading. The high 
level of revenue generated eventually by a low-rate-tax may 
constitute a considerable problem for tax assignment. 
He thus concurs with much of the criticism of Tobin's original proposal. And his 
last point notes the question that runs throughout the thesis, of how we decide 4: 1 
about ultimate ends of the tax revenues? However, although Spahn opens the 
door for such questions his basic proposal is technical and economic. His simple 
suggestion is that since a high rate tax may deter speculation but would de- 
stabilise the markets, and a low rate tax would have no effect on speculation, 
"One possible solution would be to consider both a low rate transactions tax plus 
a surcharge as an anti -specul ati on device, whereby the latter would be triggered 
only during phases of exchange rate turbulence and based on we] ]-established 
criteria. "(1995: 30-31). In this way a tax on currency transactions could act as 
both a revenue raising device and a circuit breaker that would close the market 
down should a speculative attack begin. Like Tobin, market control is therefore a 
key aim for Spabn (1995: 30-3 1): 
The former would function on a recurrent basis and raise substantial 
and stable revenue without necessarily impairing the normal 
liquidity function of world financial markets. It would also serve as 
a monitoring and controlling device for the exchange surcharge, 
which would be administratively attached to it. 
Spahn envisaged a low rate currency transactions tax of one basis point - 0.0 1% 
- that would raise the cost of capital only slightly and would have a neutral 
impact on the volume of currency transacted. He agued that the tax could be 
extended to derivative trades at around half the standard rate to allow them to 
function, but deter the easy substitution of foreign exchange for derivatives by 
traders for speculation purposes. On the one hand, he envisaged revenue on the 
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then $1 trillion a day market of around $25 billion. On the other hand, the 
exchanae surcharae would have a different -perhaps sýymbolic - objective: Z: ' r: ý 
The exchange surcharge would be administered in conjunction with 
the underlying transactions tax, but it would pursue a different 
objective and function. The objective would be to tax negative 
externalities associated with excessive volatility per se. For normal 
operations, the tax would be zero, which would secure the liquidity 
of the markets and allow efficient trading. Only during phases of 
speculative trading would the tax be levied, yet it would bite rather 
hard under these circumstances. [ ... ] Ideally, revenue from the 
exchange surcharge would be nil, if it is to achieve its objective. 
(Ibid: 32). 
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, Spahn responds to the difficulty posed 
by the requirement for a universal levy in Tobin's original proposal. While he 
agrees that a global or multilateral system would be preferable, he argues that his 
own two-tier tax could be adopted on a unilateral basis: 
Provided the underlying transactions tax has a very low (or zero) 
rate, the exchange surcharge itself is unlikely to deter normal 
financial business because it is evoked only occasionally or, 
perhaps, never. 
Moreover, all transactions in highly liquid home currency would 
have to be settled on an account with the central bank. This would 
give the bank the option to administer the surcharge unilaterally and 
to discount the tax from the total amount settled, even on an 
asymmetrical basis. (Ibid: 35). 
Despite complications then the basic point is that "While not ideal, the unilateral 
adoption of the scheme seems to be feasible. " In this way, it seems that the 
economic debates surrounding the Tobin Tax have somewhat run their course. 
While questions can be raised and re-raised alone, the spectrum outlined here, 
significant and fundamental critiques of the tax have been made and met. 
Practical questions about the feasibility of implementation have also received a 
boost from the work Rodney Schmidt (2000), who argues that the existence of 
new bodies like the Continuous Linked Settlement (CLS) bank means that if the 
tax is levied on payments made between banks, rather than the trade itself, there 
is almost no scope for evasion. 
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It is now possible to automatically, electronically and seamlessly 
match gross payments to the originating individual foreign 
exchange transactions, and tax them both onshore and offshore, 
regardless of the financial instrument used to define the terms of the 
transaction or the location of the parties to the transaction. 
(Schmidt, 2000: 230). 
It can therefore be argued that important questions now concern the 
implementation stages of the Tobin Tax - building the political support and t-n 
constructing the organisational infrastructure. And such questions necessarily 
carry us into broader debates about politics and ethics. As Kavaljit Singh (2000: 
200) argues, "The issues raised by the Tobin Tax are more political than 
technical or administrative. " And a key campaigner for War on Want, Sony 
Kapoor, concurs; now the case for economic feasibility has been made, what "is 
required is the political will to implement currency transactions taxation and 
provide the necessary legal enforcement to ensure payment and penallse 
evasion. " (2003: 40). As the next section will argue, such questions have helped 
to construct new vocabularies of the Tobin Tax which move beyond questions of 
economic logic and technical feasibility and address issues of a political and 
ethical nature. 
3.3 Political and Ethical Vocabularies of the Tobin Tax 
To be sure, the economic vocabulary of the Tobin tax has generated what Rorty 
might describe as a 'useful' discussion of the possibility of regulating/reforming 
global capital mobility in the wake of the decline of Bretton Woods. Involving 
top level academic and policy oriented economists In a debate that revolves 
around moderating the excesses of neo-liberal financial capitalism is certainly in 
line with Rorty's project of contingent reform. 
However, the economic vocabulary has settled on the rather straightforward issue 
of feasibility. Numerous studies and analytical papers concern themselves with 
making the case that the Tobin Tax would work or would not work. On a 
pragmatic understanding there are significant limitations with such a debate. 
Firstly, it assumes the possibility of an intrinsic financial reality that the Tobin 
Tax either coheres with or does not cohere with. Such a view ignores the way in 
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which economic theory is itself a constitutive element of the "world" it seeks to 
engage (Cameron and Palan, '1004; De Goede, 2003). And secondly, from an IPE : -n 
perspective, if activated the Tobin Tax would cease to be a technical question 
alone and would require political governance. Factors like political opposition or 
support simply cannot be predicted and must be worked out in contingent and 
experimental circumstances. Other vocabularies are required. 
This section therefore turns to the political and ethical vocabularies of the Tobin 
Tax that have emerged since the GFA reform debates of the 1990s. The Tobin 
Tax campaign has received varying degrees of support from the UN, significant I 1-n 
NGOs like the Halifax Initiative, ATTAC and political scientists like David Held 
(2005) and Heikki Patomaki (2001). While many proponents reprise key 
elements of the economic vocabulary, certainly in their use of the Spahn Tax (see 
below), a key element of these vocabularies is that, while they accept the 
importance of the question of feasibility, participants use the Tobin Tax to 
highlight the political, ethical and moral dimensions of global finance. As one 
advocate, Robin Round comments: 
... I agree with those who say that the 
Tobin Tax is not a panacea for 
our development ills and our financial woes. We must be very, very 
clear on that in all our discussions. But it is one aspect of what must 
be a fundamentally reformed global financial system. The guiding 
principles of this system should be human rights over investors' 
rights, people before markets, the equitable re-distribution of 
wealth, and democratization of economic decision-making. (Cit. 
Desir and Ford, 2000: 103). 
On this view, the Tobin Tax and the campaign which surrounds it become part of 
a broader discussion about the ethical possibilities and limits of current global 
arrangements. And in this way the ground is cleared to introduce cosmopolitan 
arguments to the discussion in subsequent chapters. Part I establishes the 
historical context for the emergence of the contemporary Tobin Tax campaign 
and the place it occupied in the GFA reform debates. And Part 2 identifies three 
important subjects in the new vocabularies: 1) Political Autonomy, 2) Global 
Justice, & 3) Global Democracy. 
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A kev ar-ument arising from this chapter is that political and ethical vocabularies 
of the Tobin tax can sometimes be deployed with an under-elaborated conception 
of justice and ethics. In activist circles, ethical arguments can easily become 
simple rhetorical assaults on the amorphous 'bad' that is global neo-liberalism. 
Likewise, the Tobin Tax is often presented as an unambiguously moral answer to 
the questions raised by globalisation and global finance. For these reasons the 
Chapter concludes by identifying points for critical development in the ethical 
vocabulary. Simply put, for the conversation about the ethical reform of global 
finance via a Tobin Tax to continue a greater level of theoretical and critical 
scrutiny is required. 
3.3.1 GFA Reform and the EmerE! ence of the Tobin Tax Camvaien 
As Chapter One recounted, the question of reforming the Global Financial 
Architecture gained prominence in policy circles in response to the financial 
)Oth crises of the late - Century (Eichengreen, 1999; Goldstein, 1999; Kenen, 
2001 : Meltzer, 2000). These reform debates were conducted at a time of growing 
scepticism and critique of the globallsation project in general. This is the context Z: ) 
in which the Tobin Tax (re-) emerged as a fitting, if ambitious, reform proposal. t: ' 
Initial political support for the Tobin Tax worked at the intersection of 
international organisations and technical experts. And as Tony Porter (2005: 145) 
details there has been a degree of support from certain states, 
Discussion of the Tobin tax first garnered significant international 
attention at the World Summit for Social Development in 1995. In 
addition to those civil society actors promoting the idea at that 
conference there were initial expressions of interest from the 
Swedish, Australian, Canadian and French governments. 
Indeed the Tobin Tax has been a common feature of debates about raising funds 
for development. Around the same time the UN Development Program 
sponsored an edited volume entitled The Tobin Tax: coping with financial 
volatility, in which a number of prominent economists concerned with financial 
reform began to discuss the idea relatively favourably (Ul Haq et. al., 1996). 
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Such mood swings in favour of the Tax came at a period of optimism about the 
possibility of reforming globalisation. Porter argues that there was a growing 
sense that the political will of key policy actors might be enough to put the Tobin 
Tax onto the political agenda. But he recounts the difficulty that many policy 
protagonists encountered when engaging economists over the issue: "While the 
[Halifax] summit held in the wake of the Mexican Peso crisis that had ignited in 
1994, was indeed preoccupied with how to stabilise global finance, the Canadian 
government dropped its initial consideration of the Tobin tax after it was panned 
by officials in the finance ministry" (Ibid: 146). Indeed a pattern of initial public 
zeal followed by a quick recognition of the technical complexities/ambiguities of 
the Tobin Tax has been repeated a few times in the history of the campaign C, II 
(Griesgaber, 2003). Moreover, there has been strong opposition from powerful 
states. Famously the US government listed the UN's support for the Tobin Tax as 
a reason for withholding its subsidies. As one American campaigner noted at the 
time, " The right win- of the Republican and the Democratic Parties have already C, Z7 I 
tagged this [Tobin Tax] with what they think is the kiss of death: a United 
Nations Tax" (Terry Provance, in Desir and Ford, 2000: 24). 
However, such problems have not prevented a number of civil society groups 
from adopting the Tobin Tax as a key focus of their activities. Proponents have 
included prominent NGO's and coalitions of various civil society actors. The 
Halifax Initiative was set up around the time of the Halifax summit on the reform 
of the global financial architecture. The French NGO ATTAC was set up in 1998 
and listed itself as an "international movement for democratic control of financial 
markets and their institutions". And Tony Porter (Ibid: 146) refers to New Rules 
for Global Finance Coalition; "a coalition of development, human rights, labour, 
environmental, and religious organisations and scholars dedicated to the reform 
of the global financial architecture" (www. new-rules. org). 
In Germany, the think tank WEED has produced a number of studies on the way 
in which the Tobin Tax can raise revenues for various objectives of the global 
justice campaign. The British NGO, War on Want, established the Tobin Tax 
Network in order to lobby the UK and European parliaments to introduce the 
Tax. And the Network Institute of Global Democratisation (NIGD) has produced 
a number of research projects concerned with the Tobin Tax and pushed the 
campaign forward at the World Social Forum. 1-n 
Such groups have backed the Tobin tax for numerous reasons. Some such as 
AT'fAC, Halifax and War on Want have used it as a too] for lobbying. Others 
including ATTAC and NIGD have further employed it as a mechanism for 
fostering public discussion. Such groups have produced and sponsored numerous 
expert studies of the Tobin tax ensuring that the idea has been updated in view of 
particular circumstances. For instance, War on Want has adapted the Spahn tax 
to emphasise the lower rate of taxation as a revenue raising device for the UK 
Treasury and its foreign aid budget (Spratt, 2005). Other studies have sought to 
address the relevance of the Tobin Tax to developing countries or international 
organisations like the European Union (AFRODAD, 2000; Patomaki, 1999). All 
such goups have brought political and ethical dimensions to the Tobin Tax z: I 
debate, which were not fully evident in the economic vocabulary. 
Of course, a straightforward economic or realist analysis could argue that despite 
the activities of such groups they will continue to be politically ineffective, 
particularly given US opposition. However, the discursive shifts within global 
financial governance are of significance even if the Tobin Tax is not adopted. Z: ) 
The fact that it is on the agenda of global financial reform means that it lies 
within the 'arc of possibilities' and therefore constitutes a clear (ethical) limit. 
Likewise, there is much to be said about the internal politics of global civil 
society in the adoption of the Tobin tax. Indeed, as Porter notes, the development 
of this civil society movement "to engage the technical questions about the Tobin 
tax's feasibility and implementation are significant in indicating the broadening 
of the range of financial governance issues of concern to civil society beyond 
debt rellef. "(Ibid: 146). In this way, it can be argued that the Tobin Tax 
campaign contributes directly to the evolution of a 'global public sphere' for 
finance. The next part will identify the significant political and ethical 
dimensions of the civil society campaign. 
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3.3. "1 Autonomy. Justice and Democrac 
Once the Tobin Tax was adopted by global civil society, it ceased to be purely a 
question of technical economic feasibility or non-feasibility. While civil society 
groups have not ignored these questions, they have sought to supplement them zn 
with appeals to political autonomy, justice and democracy in the face of certain 
ill effects of globalisation. While the move is nascent, it does suggest ways in 
which the discussion of cosmopolitan ethics in global finance can be developed. 
As Heikki Patomaki (1999: ii) argues, 
Twenty years after Tobin's onginal proposal, new rationales for the 
tax have risen: it would yield huge revenues both to the states and 
the world community; and it is also seen, more and more often, as 
an invaluable element in restoring democratic values and 
accountability. 
In this way the civil society campaign for the Tobin Tax has gone beyond the 
economic debate over feasibility, identifying political and ethical vocabularies of 
the Tobin Tax. An important first step was to 'politicise' the tax. Against 
economic arguments that celebrated the 'reformist' character of the tax, civil 
society activists heralded the idea as a way to resist the structural power of 
markets. In this context, re-distributive and democratic possibilities are 
developed. 
Political Autonom 
A common theme of many civil society arguments is to emphasise the political 
nature of the Tobin Tax as a way of reigning in the forces of global finance 
thereby granting some room for manoeuvre to national governments. This 
argument builds on previous points made within the economic vocabulary to 
identify important questions relating to financial citizenship and democracy. 
As section I recounted, the possibility of restoring macro-economic autonomy 
was already part of Tobin's (1978) original proposal. As he suggested, the 
proposal could restore some degree of control to states over monetary policy. 
Capital mobility can inhibit domestic monetary policy under fixed parities and 
domestic fiscal policy under flexible rates. A small anchor on currency markets 
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could reduce the elasticity of speculators to changes in interest rates or fiscal 
policy and restore some independence to states. Thus the tax was designed as a 
third way between the full capital controls of the Bretton Woods system and the 
unchecked - and imperfect - mobility of capital and currency under monetarist 
arrangements. As KavaIjit Singh (2000: 198) notes: 
... [the] Tobin Tax is expected to preserve the autonomy of national 
authorities in formulating monetary policy and also insure 
insulation from the deleterious effects of volatile international 
financial markets. Such autonomy is particularly valuable for the 
developing countries, as they are more vulnerable to external capital 
flows. 
However, some civil society campaigners have revisited this aspect of the Tobin 
Tax and have sough to politicise it by setting it in terms of the structural power of 
financial markets. In the wake of the financial crises of the late 20th Century 
many civil society groups sought to capitalise on a perceived sense of 
powerlessness that many felt. As senior policy adviser for War on Want, Sony 
Kapoor (2003: 15) recounts: 
Speculation, [ ... I exacerbates the depth of each ensis. Each crash 
seriously increases unemployment and causes severe cuts to public 
services, creating poverty and disadvantaging the poorest sections of 
society. In response to this, campaigning organisations began to work 
on this issue from the late 1990s, signalling their deep concern that a 
small set of players in the market could play a part in causing such 
devastating economic damage. 
Importantly, an ideological component has been introduced to many civil society 
accounts. Often to the chagrin of economists, groups like ATTAC have 
questioned the (political) authority of markets to decide social outcomes. Indeed 
the very name ATTAC - which translates as the Association for The Taxation of 
financial markets for the Aid of Citizens - is a sign that the power aspects of 
global finance are equally (or more) important than the economic feasibility. As 
the International Platfon-n of ATTAC (1999) 
Financial globalization increases economic insecurity and social 
inequalities. It bypasses and undermines popular decision-making, 
democratic institutions, and sovereign states responsible for the 
114 
general interest. In their place, it substitutes a purely speculative 
logic that expresses nothing more than the interests of multinational Zý' 
corporations and financial markets. 
For ATTAC the Tobin Tax is not then just a case of better economic rationality, 
it is also a mechanism for confronting the political and ideological power of 
financial markets. "Such a measure fits with a clearly anti -speculative 
perspective. It would sustain a logic of resistance, restore manoeuvring room to 
citizens and national governments, and, most of all, would mean that political, 
rather than financial considerations are returning to thefibre. " (ATTAC, 1999). 
This evolvino 'logic of resistance' is something that IPE scholars from different 
traditions have attempted to capture. For Eric Helleiner (2001), the Tobin Tax, as 
employed by groups like ATTAC and the Halifax Initiative, is an instrument that 
might provoke a Polanyian shift towards more socially embedded forms of 
global economic governance. And from a critical realist position Heikki 
Patomaki (2001: xvii), argues that the CTT may forrn the basis of a credible 
utopian project: 
Many economic activities and political aspirations have been 
subordinated to the power of the increasingly global financial 
markets. The Tobin tax provides emancipatory potential that goes 
far beyond simply stabilising the foreign exchange markets or, for 
that matter, taxing transnational hot money. z 
Global Justice 
In the NGO and charity community the Tobin Tax is often portrayed as an 
instrument of global justice. Chief among its benefits in this regard are the 
revenue raising possibilities. As Sony Kapoor (2003: 7) notes, "The CTT creates 
a directly quantifiable benefit in the form of a powerful income stream. " While 
Tobin had acknowledged this in his original proposal it was not considered a 
focal point of the scheme and many have considered his suggestion that the IMF 
could collect and distribute the money, quite naYve. However, civil society 
groups, NGO's, and the UN have focused on the revenue raising potential of the 
Tobin Tax as its key contribution. It is argued that large revenues could be used 
to fund global projects related to development like health and education. As Jo 
Marie Greisgraber (2003: 155) argues, 
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There are different options for what to do with the revenue. 
For example, the best, from a moral perspective, would be to 
give it to the poorest people on the globe for the essential 
common good of eradicating poverty. But, this may be the 
hardest to sell politically. 
For the UN this revenue stream was associated with the generation of funds in 
support of the project of providing global public goods. This project was 
designed to link the economic theory of public goods with the hard but 
(arguably) increasingly necessary requirement to ensure some form of global co- 
ordination over issues relating to clean air, clean water, and economic stability. 
As Inge Kau] and John Langmore (1996: 256) identify, Cý 
Growing Interdependence among countries generates growing 
needs for joint action - to safeguard the environment, maintain 
peace and security and end global poverty. Because these "global 
public goods" affect all countries, it would be inadequate and 
inappropriate to finance them from existing funds designated for 
official development assistance (ODA), that is, finance them 
throuOrh an income transfer from richer to poorer countries. It would : -n be more logical and effective to finance global public goods through 
levies and fees on international activities such as international 
currency transactions. 
In a similar vein the Tobin Tax has been tied to various UN initiatives aimed at 
providing funds for financing development. In particular, Chapters 4-6 highlight 
and interrogate War on Want's recent moves to tie the Tobin Tax in with the 
recent Millennium Development Goals. However, while such moves represent an 
interesting re-description of the economic vocabulary on development, global 
justice via the Tobin tax has been elaborated in far more nuanced terms. For 
many global civil society activists this financing mechanism is not simply about 
being 'logical' and 'effective' it also requires the subjection of global finance to 
basic principles of justice. As Heikki Patomaki of NIGD argues, 
Justice as fairness would dictate, as a bare minimum, that, if 
someone accepts the benefits of a practice, he should not refuse to 
do his part in maintaining it. The current system of individual 
profits, socialised risks' fails to meet even this minimalist criterion 
of justice. The Tobin tax is a way to make participants pay their fair 
share in maintaining the global financial system. (2001: xix). 
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Such theoretical moves present the possibility of a serious and engaged ethical 
critique of the GFA. Moving beyond the political rhetoric of some arguments 
Patomaki questions the 'justice' of currency speculation in terms of its ability to 
cause crises. He suggests a mechanism whereby the Tobin Tax is levied so that 
financial actors are responsible for their activities - maintaining the practice on 
his terms. And he links the Tobin Tax into an ethical critique of the system that 
advocates a financial compensation for past injustices. Such a move brings a 
strong moral dimension to the revenue stream and offers up the possibility of a 
cosmopolitan version of the Tobin Tax (see Chapter Four). 
An additional and strongly related reason for identifying the Tobin Tax as a 
source of justice is the sizeable revenues associated with it. Estimates vary 
idely depending on the size of the tax suggested, the size of the foreign wi t:: ) 
exchange market, and the expected elasticity of currency traders to taxation. I 
Tobin (1996: x0i) suggested that his initial proposal for a I% tax could, on the Z! ) 
1995,1.3 trillion dollar a day market, yield 312 billion dollars per year. But he 
notes that a lower tax of 0.1% with allowances for a tax-induced reduction of in 
the volume of transactions could yield the lower figure of 94 billion dollars per 
year. For his part, Jeffrey Frankel estimates that 0.1% tax that reduced the 
volume of trade by 45% would raise annual revenue of 176 billion dollars on the 
1995 market (Cit. Felix & Sau, 1996: 241). However, as the preceding discussion 
argued, the tide of opinion on the tax rate has been heavily influenced by 
arguments that the tax could actually destabilise the market by reducing the 
effective margin of trade. For this reason, and in line with Spahn's suggestion of 
a two-tier tax, a number of estimates have been performed for a much lower tax 
rate. 
Again civil society groups have been instrumental in the generation of new 
economic studies of the tax for ethical purposes. In a paper commissioned as part 
of the UNU/W1der project on 'Innovative sources of for Development Finance', 
and widely distributed among members of the Tobin Tax Network, Machiko 
Nissanke (2003: 21) estimated that setting a currency transactions tax" at 0.02 % 
applied to wholesale transactions would generate annual revenue of about US$ 
30-35 billions annually, while CTT at 0.01 % would produce US$ 17-19 
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billions. " And these lower rates have been used and advocated by the NGO War 
on Want in their Draft Report on the Tobin Tax (Kapoor, 2003). The proposal is 
restated in a Briefing Paper that proposes a 0.005 % rate of tax - referred to as a Z: ) 
'Stamp Duty' - which they estimate could raise 20 million dollars per year 
towards the Millennium Development Goals. (Stamp Out Poverty, 2005). 
While uncertainty remains as to the level and levy of the Tobin Tax, it is clear 
that the revenues are now a focal point for campaigners. Whether it is in the 
guise of increasing ODA as Stamp Out Poverty suggest, or to provide 'global 
public goods' in UNDP framing, the Tobin Tax has been linked with the 4: ý zn 
possibility of realising a form of global (social) justice. 
Global Democracy 
Finally, a number of groups have developed upon the concept of economic 
democracy. In part this builds on the political critique of financial globalisation. 
But it also suggests the normative possibilities of global governance reform via a 
Tobin Tax. For instance, ATTAC have argued in dialectical terms that the 
erosion of democratic space due to financial globalisation requires that the Tobin 
Tax be seen as a too] for taking that space back. As Bernard Cassen stresses, 
To put it simply, politics and politicians have to regain control of 
certain areas of the financial sector in order to benefit democracy. 
For twenty years politicians have progressively surrendered the 
majority of their powers to financial markets and it is this forum 
where civil and political action needs to regain its meaning. " (Cit. 
Desir and Ford, 2000: 17). 
On the one hand ATTAC have formed close links with government politicians in 
order to realise their democratic aspirations via conventional means. On the other 
hand, the network of ATTAC has been at the forefront of innovative techniques 
of political mobilisation that use the Tobin Tax as a too] for building a 
democratic public sphere. On this view, global democracy is concerned with 
politicising finance by opening it up to public debate, a strategy in which the 
mobilisation of people is a key contribution of the campaign. As Cassen (2003: 
43) reflects: 
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Since Tobin was an establishment economist, a Nobel Prize- 
winner in economics from the United States at that, his proposal 
possessed a certain automatic initial legitimacy, serving to 
highlight the scandalous character of the flows of global 
speculation today. So for the purposes of agitation, it makes an 
excellent weapon. But, of course, we never for a second thought 
that the Tobin tax was the one solution to the dictatorship of 
financial markets. It was just one point of entry to attack them. 
Reflexively then, the Tobin Tax campaign is itself an act of global 
democratisation. By drawing people together in a campaign against the anti- Z7 1: 1) 
democratic nature of global finance, a democratic space is instantiated. For 4: ) 
critical scholars of a neo-Gramscian variety such moves are related to the 
emancipatory logic of resistance politics (Birchfield and Annette Freyberg-Inan, 
'1005). 
Finally, a number of arguments have emerged that use the Tobin Tax proposal as Z-- 
the linchpin of a far more ambitious non-native project of global democracy. As 
Chapter Five will discuss in greater detail, the Network Institute on Global 
Democratisation has produced research that discusses how the Tobin Tax could 
fit within an agenda to democratise global governance. This view expands the 47ý 
metaphor of the Tobin Tax to include a fundamental reform of the institutions of 
global economic governance: 
... the Tobin tax issue is necessarily connected to struggles over the 
way global governance is organised: either oligarchically (a few 
rich and powerful dictate the ten-ns for others) or democratically 
(pluralistic and equal public discourse is combined with 
representative decision-making). Here, we see the proposal of the 
Council of Global Governance, CGG, to establish an economic 
security council of the UN as an interesting possibility. But a 
reconstructed Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) of the UN 
might be even more democratic and functional. " (Patomaki. 1999: 
4). 
The political and ethical vocabularies of the Tobin Tax increasingly tie up with a 
larger and more complex discussion of the ethics of global governance. For these 
reasons a careful scrutiny on the theoretical underpinnings of the proposal is 
required. 
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Conclusion: the limits of the ethical vocabulary? 
The chapter has drawn a line from early economic articulations of the TobIn Tax 
g through to more recent campaigns in and around global civil society. It was 
argued that the initially technical and reformist version of the tax - that sought to 
make global capital markets "work better" - has been augmented by recent 
advocates to stress political autonomy, global justice and democracy. However, it 
should be noted in that such vocabularies are not unproblematic. 
Against the strong position of War on Want who argue that: "There are no 
morally significant arguments against the Tobin tax", it might be necessary to zn z: 1 Z: ) 
look to the theoretical underpinnings and constitutive ambiguities of the 
proposal. In line with Chapters One and Two it is necessary to continue a ground 
ethical critique of the moral arguments for a Tobin Tax. This knits the campaign 
in with both the broader cosmopolitan arguments for global justice and 
democracy, and allows for the kind of engaged scrutiny of the limits of 
cosmopolitan ethics in global finance that animate this thesis. 
The next chapters will each, in turn draw out an aspect of the ethics of the Tobin 
Tax. Chapter Four will look at the Tobin Tax as a too] for cosmopolitan justice. 
It will question how far the Tobin Tax is supported by cosmopolitan arguments 
for global re-distribution and what kind of limits are placed on the vocabulary of 
global justice as result. Chapter Five will then analyse how and to what extent 
the Tobin Tax is supported by and indeedfurthers arguments for cosmopolitan 
democracy. And Chapter Six will develop on the constellation of civil society 
actors, critical academics and international organisations that have inter-weaved 
around a discussion of the Tobin Tax. 
Drawing these ideas together it can be argued that the Tobin tax campaign is an 
instance of an actually existing cosmopolitan public sphere. The campaigns, 
debates, conflicts and tensions that pervade the campaign thus offer a concrete 
articulation of cosmopolitan ethics in global finance. From a pragmatic 
perspective the task is to recognise and engage such tensions, identifying 
practical ways forward. 
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4. Cosmopolitan Justice and the Tobin Tax 
Introduction 
The first 3 chapters have laid the groundwork for continuing a conversation 
about cosmopolitan ethics in global finance. Chapter One established the prime 
concern of this thesis, namely: to criticall 
'v analyse 
the possibilities and limits of 
cosmopolitan ethics in globalfinance via a case study of the Tobin Tax. Chapter 
Two set out the theoretical framework, a pragmatic praxis, which treats 
cosmopolitanism as a contingent contribution to ethical conversation. By 
engaging this conversation with Ironic critique, it is argued that new possibilities 
can be explored. And Chapter Three cleared the historical ground for such an 
ethical conversation about the Tobin Tax. By charting the history of the 
campaign for a Tobin Tax in terms of three vocabularies - economic, political 
and ethical - Chapter Three argued that the theoretical content and implications 
of the proposal have shifted in recent decades. Specifically, it was argued that 
ethical arguments for the Tobin Tax are increasingly deployed. This represents 
an important touchstone for the conversation about cosmopolitan ethics in global 
finance. 
Chapter Four explores the potential synergies between cosmopolitan justice and 
the Tobin Tax. The chapter proceeds in three sections. Section I introduces the 
emerging vocabulary of cosmopolitan justice. It presents the arguments of those 
cosmopolitans who locate their work in a critical line following John Rawls 
(Beitz, 1979; Buchanan, 2000; Pogge, 2002). Their key agenda has been to 
undermine the state-centrism at the heart of John Rawls' theory of justice and 
make it applicable 'Internationally', or 'globally'. For his part, Charles Beitz 
(1979) has highlighted the importance of interdependence in the modern world 
economy. Similarly Allen Buchanan (2000: 705) has argued that patterns of 
capitalist accumulation in the global polity represent a 'global basic structure' 
that can found principles of global justice. And finally, Thomas Pogge (2002) has 
stepped outside state-centrism to begin his theory of justice from the point of 
view of human rights and cosmopolitan responsibilities. He argues that, 
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Existing global poverty manifests a core injustice: a 
phenomenon that the dominant strands of Western normative 
political thought jointly - albeit for diverse reasons - classify as unjust and can jointly seek to eradicate. Insofar as advantaged 
and influential participants in the present international order grant 
the argument, we acknowledge our shared responsibility for its 
injustice. We are violating a negative duty of justice insofar as we 
contribute to (and fail to mitigate) the harms it reproduces and 
insofar as we resist suitable reforms. (Pogge, 2002: 210). 
Section 2 looks at the importance of such arguments for a discussion of the Tobin 
Tax. On the one hand, they illustrate the limitations of state-centric approaches 
that either deny justice to large groups of people or privilege certain states. It is ID t::, 
araued that this basic principle of justice has motivated many in the NGO 
campaign for the Tobin Tax. On the other hand, they illustrate the kind of 
potentials that exist within contemporary global arrangements to build ethical 
agendas against world poverty. z: 1 
There is a fruitful synergy between cosmopolitan justice and the Tobin Tax. 
Thomas Pogge (2002) argues that global poverty is removable via the allocation 
of a very small part - 1% - of the income of the richest citizens. To ignore this 
fact and to ignore the role of current global capitalist system in producing 
poverty Is against all broadly acceptable principles of cosmopolitan justice. 
Likewise, Tobin Tax proponents state that a small, feasible tax on the richest 
financial speculators could generate enough funds to address the issue of 
idable severe poverty. To ignore it would be against the principles of justice. avoi I Z-- 
However, Section 3 identifies a number of ethical ambiguities and contradictions 
pertaining to the Tobin Tax. These call into question the cosmopolitan belief that 
ethical concern can be expanded by material re-distribution. Firstly, to levy the 
tax in all states requires a level of capital account convertibility that is not 
unambiguously desirable in partially or un-developed financial systems (Kim, 
2003). It is argued that such a requirement enforces a structure of financial 
universality that risks silencing alternatives (See De Goede, 2005: 147). Simply 
stated, as a technical proposition the Tobin Tax requires a well developed and 
open financial structure to operate, silencing the question of whether such 
structures are themselves universally desirable. 
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And secondly, even if feasible, it is not clear that developing states could levy a 
rnýjor amount from trade in their own currency. Thus an inevitable reliance on 
Northern states to generate the majority of the resources implies a cash-based 
approach to global re-distribution that may re-produce relations of dependence. 
Based on this analysis, it is argued that a core failure to undermine the structure 
of global capitalism, in both standard accounts of the Tobin Tax and in Pogge's 
schema, infers some deep ambiguities within cosmopolitan global justice. The 
problem is not that CVIobaI justice is hard to realise. Rather, the ethical dilemmas 
anse when ideal theories of cosmopolitan justice construct the world in their 
image. Thinking through the specific case of the Tobin Tax illustrates how a well 
intentioned cosmopolitan proposal can reify a level of financial universalism and 
a cash-based conception of justice. 
However, recognising such ambiguities does not mean succumbing to relativism. zn 
Firstly, one course of action is to construct a democratic argument for the Tobin 
Tax (Patomaki, 2001). As Chapter Five argues, the discourse of cosmopolitan 
democracy can help to situate and, where necessary, contest the problematic 
aspects of global finance reform via a Tobin Tax. And secondly, as Chapter Six 
argues, perhaps the problem is not one of overcoming, but of learning to live 
with the ambiguities of cosmopolitan global finance via a Tobin Tax? In this 
sense, the civil society campaign may be seen in terms of broader efforts at 
sentimental education that can support the development of cosmopolitan ethical 
sensibilities in global finance. 
4.1 Cosmopolitan Justice 
This section introduces theories of social justice as developed by political 
theorists in the tradition of John Rawls. Part I establishes Rawls' basic 
arguments regarding the justice as fairness and then addresses certain key 
criticisms of the state-centrism that underpins his theory. Writers like Charles 
Beitz and Allen Buchanan have expressed scepticism at the desirability of 
limiting justice to individuals within a bounded community. They therefore 
attempt to give a more global scope to justice. Part 2 develops this line of thought 
by addressing Thomas Pogge's development of an account of cosmopolitan 
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justice. Pogge begins from the assumption that the continuing fact of world 
poverty means that (in)justice must now be thought in global perspective. 
Crucially, rather than looking at justice between states -a common subject of 
cosmopolitan justice - Pogge prefers to locate his account In terms of individual 
duties not to harm. These arguments are then set in train with the rationales and 
objectives of the Tobin Tax in Section 2. 
1.1 UndennininýZ the State-Centnsm of Rawls 
Political theory in general and theories of justice in particular were re-ignited by 
the work of John Rawls. In A Theoty of Justice (197 1) John Rawls attempted to 
combine liberal and egalitarian approaches to justice via the construction of a 
social contract. Assuming an 'original position' in which individuals would be zn 
under a 'veil of ignorance' i. e. they would know nothing about their personal 
circumstances-, Rawls questioned what principles of liberty could be agreed upon 
by members of a society, understood as a "co-operative venture for mutual 
advantage". As Chris Brown (1992: 172) states, "The participants in the original 
position realise that to achieve the benefits of social co-operation it is necessary 
to determine principles for the distribution of these benefits - the principles of 
social justice. " To work this experiment Rawls employed a rationalist logic - that 
individuals seek to maximise their marginal gain and minimise their maximum 
loss - to argue that contractors would agree to a first principle that: "... each 
person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic 
liberties compatible with a similar system of basic liberty for all. " (1971: 302). 
However, having assumed that society is a 'co-operative venture for mutual 
advantage' it Is clear that this first principle will not yield some utopian 'equality 
of everything' scenario, since then the impetus for co-operation would be 
negated. Thus, the second of Rawls' principles seeks to rationalise the level of 
inequality that contractors in the veil of ignorance would accept in the 'difference 
principle'. As he suggests, "Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged 
so that they are both: to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent 
with the just savings principle and attached to offices and positions open to all 
under conditions of fair equality of opportunity. " (Op. Cit. ). 
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The argument is not uncontroversial. Critics have undermined the resource-based 
approach to justice preferring to look at 'capabilities' (Sen, 1999). And some 
have identified a core ambiguity between liberty and equality since, a principle 
of equality could allow for the diminution of liberty to foster equality. Another 
set of critics question the state-centrism of Rawls' approach. Many have taken 
issue with Rawls' attempt to limit the conditions of justice to social relations 
ivithin state boundaries. For anyone excited by Rawls' ability to place individuals 
at the heart of justice, the idea that this could only apply to certain individuals 
was a disappointment. As Chris Brown (1992: 173) notes, "In any event, Rawls 
does not believe that his principles of justice can apply on a world scale, for the 
simple reason that these are principles of social justice, a society is a 'co- 
operative venture of mutual advantage, and no such co-operative venture exists 
on a world scale. " 
The task for cosmopolitans has therefore been to undermine this assumption by 
questioning the capacity of states to achieve self-sufficiency. Charles Beitz 
(1979) takes issue with Rawls' depiction of (bounded) social justice in two ways. 
First, he suggests that if states, or state representatives, were placed in an 
original position' they would be able to frame a difference-principle because of 
uneven resource distribution. And secondly, more strongly, he argues that the 
fact of global interdependence undermines Rawls' conception of territorial states 
as & co-operative ventures for mutual sel f- advantage', by assuming a capacity for 
self-sufficiency that is increasingly redundant. ZýI 
By arguing for global redistribution on the basis of uneven resources Beitz 
undoubtedly taps a nerve. Since Rawls is attempting to refine the conditions of 
liberty by introducing onlyjustifiable forms of inequity there is great scope for 
(irresolvable) debate. While natural resources do not represent a 'surplus' from 
co-operative venture, they certainly count as fiat for individual benefit/liberty by 
creating uneven circumstances of justice. When extrapolated to relations between 
states Beitz has a good point in both the assumption that state representatives in 
the 'original position' will be concerned over the distribution of vital resources 
and able to agree on some form of re-distributive agenda on that basis. 
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However, conceding this point two problems arise in the internal consistency of 
the argument. First, it rests on a narrow definition of the nature and requirements Z- 
of development. Natural resources are not the only, nor arguably the fundamental 
determinant of growth. As Chris Brown (1992: 176) argues, on such an account 
we could even support the redistribution of natural gas from Namibia to Japan! 
And secondly, there is a contradiction in Beitz's position. On his first argument 
he supports redistribution on the principle of states in the 'veil of ignorance', on 
his second argument (below), he clutches to the notion of making individuals the In 
subject of justice. Which view we are to take would seem to be a choice based on 
persuasiveness? 
Beitz's second argument points to the fact of global interdependence. He seeks to 
undermine the concept of self-sufficiency deemed to be integral to Rawls' 
argument and goes so far as to argue that economic trends toward Z__ 
interdependence point to a "global scheme of social co-operation" (1979: 144). L_ 
On this view, a case can be made for viewing individuals as the prime foundation 
of justice, eliminating the need for a second contract between states, and eliciting 
the possibility of a global difference principle. This is certainly a strong Z__ 
cosmopolitan argument. By locating moral value in the individual Beitz 
questions the empirical and ethical autonomy of states and therefore 
problematises the fundamental assumptions of political theory and International 
Relations. However, the argument is undermined on two counts, one of dilution, 
one of internal contradiction. 
Firstly. although Beitz undermines the empirical and ethical strength of states, 
his methodological agenda concedes that states are still the central players in the 
global polity and will remain a "second-best solution" for implementing any 1-n 
'global difference principle'. As Molly Cochran (1999: 28) judges, on this view: 
"international distributive justice applies only derivatively to states and 
principally to persons in the founding principles for the establishment of just 
social arrangements". This is a compromise argument that surely creates more 
problems than it solves. How one justifies a policy on the ethical value of 
individuals and then persuades (different) states to administer to it, is a question 
that illustrates rather than solves the complexity of cosmopolitan justice. 
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And secondly, by attaching a universalist argument for distributive justice to Z: 5 
empirical rather than abstract criteria Beitz opens himself to empirical refutation. 
If justice pertains to those areas with a high level of interdependence, what 
becomes of those isolated areas less integrated into the global economy? It would 
appear that Beitz's argument could find a stronger case for re-distributive justice 
in Europe than it would in sub-Saharan Africa! However, despite these 
limitations, the general point has had an impact on Rawls. Simply put, if 4: ) 
individuals are to be the foundation of justice then some account needs to be 
provided as to which individuals are to be favoured and why. Rawls responded to 
critiques ranged against his account of 'the international' in the Law of Peoples. tý 
In it Rawls modifies his hypothetical contract so that parties representing 
'peoples' - as opposed to individuals - are able to decide on a set of just criteria 
to regulate international relations. He adduces the following principles: 
I. Peoples are free and independent, and their freedom and 
independence are to be respected by other peoples. 
2. Peoples are to observe treaties and undertakings. 
3. Peoples are equal and are parties to the agreements that bind 
them. 
4. Peoples are to observe the duty of non-intervention. 
5. Peoples have the right of self-defence but no right to Instigate 
war for reasons other than self-defence. 
6. Peoples are to honour human rights. 
7. Peoples are to observe certain specified restrictions in the 
conduct of war. 
8. Peoples have a duty to assist other peoples living under 
unfavourable conditions that prevent their having a just or 
decent political and social regime. (Rawls, 1999: 37). 
Of course one limitation that may be identified is that individuals are still absent 
from this set of principles. But this critique misses the important point that Rawls 
is attempting to adduce liberal principles that all can agree on. Short of a major 
conversion in global norms towards the idea of a world state, or the possibility of 
a global 'original position' between every individual, Rawls does 
indeed have a 
point that tolerance for different peoples' conceptions of the good would 
be a 
'fair' principle of international justice. When taken in conjunction with 
A Theory 
of Justice it is clear that Rawls is striving towards a 
'realistic utopia' (Brown, 
2002). 
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However, one author has taken exception to Rawls argument on its own terms. 
Allen Buchanan accepts Rawls basic intuition that some account of the 
conditions of justice between 'peoples' should be derived, which may not start or 
even rest with individuals (although we might ultimately hope it would). He 
agrees that, "Whatever else a morally defensible international legal system will 
include - and I believe it will include principles for individuals - it will include 
principles for relationships among states, at least if it is to supply any direct 
normative guidance for our world, in which the international legal system gives a 
prominent role to states. " (Buchanan, 2000: 700). But he goes on to question 
Rawls' conclusions, arguing that, C) Z: ) 
... the device of 
having representatives of peoples choose 
principles yields quite different principles from the ones that 
Rawls believes it does, once two important facts are appreciated. 
The first is that there is a global basic structure, which, like the 
domestic basic structure, is an important subject of justice 
because it has profound and enduring effects on the prospects of 
individuals and groups, including peoples in Rawls's sense. The 
second is that the populations of states are not "peoples" in 
Rawls's sense and are not likely to become so without massive, 
unjustifiable coercion, but rather are often conflicting collections 
of "peoples" and other groups. (Ibid: 700-701). 
For Buchanan (Ibid: 701) these two facts explain why Rawls is unable to address 
questions of international distributive justice or intrastate conflict. In particular, 
Rawls' omission of any principle of distributive justice is "surprising and 
disappointing for those who recognise that global economic institutions 
profoundly influence the prospects of individuals and groups, including peoples 
in Rawls' sense". 
For the purposes of the argument made bere, it is Bucbanan's understanding of a 
global basic structure that is most interesting for cosmopolitan justice. Bucbanan 
attacks the Westpbalia assumption in Law of Peoples, that states are autonomous 
both economically and in terms of their control over distribution: "A state is 
distributionally autonomous if and only if it can determine how much wealth is 
distributed within its borders" (Ibid: 702). But, he argues, the nature of the global 
economy is such that "states must attract and sustain capital 
investment" 
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(Op. Cit. ). In a context of dependency on capital states are constrained in their 
ability to control distribution within their borders. Buchanan argues that, 
11 governments will be reluctant to institute more egalitarian redistributive 
policies, for example, by levying higher taxes on corporations or on the wealthy, t7l 
if they fear this will lead to a flight of capital to other countries. " (Op. Cit. ). Z-- 
Rawls qualifies this assumption by arguing that resources are not the primary 
factor in economic development. Instead the sources of wealth lie elsewhere in 
the "political and cultural traditions" in "human capital and knowledge" and in 
the capacity for "economic and political organization" (Rawls, 1992: 72). But, 
Buchanan argues, this misses the point. Whether a state is able to call on these 1-n 
kinds of capacities makes no difference to its ability to control distribution, since 
global economic factors are not controlled. He makes this argument by analogy 
to Rawls' own concept of the "basic structure" or "the way in which the major 
social institutions distribute fundamental rights and duties and determine the 
division of advantages from social cooperation" (Rawls, 1971: 7). Rawls makes 
the basic structure the "primary subject of justice" because its effects are 
profound from the start, because men are born into a set of circumstances that 
may exhibit "deep inequalities" (Ibid: 7). So the question arises, if this is truefor 
domestic society then why notfor global society? As Buchanan inveighs, 
If there is a global basic structure -a set of economic and 
political institutions that has profound and enduring effects on the 
distribution of burdens and benefits among peoples and 
individuals around the world - then surely it is a subject of justice 
and a very important one. ... if there is a global 
basic 
structure, principles of justice for it will be required, just as 
principles are required for domestic structures. (2000: 705). 
Buchanan looks to trade agreements, international financial regimes, a global 
system of private property rights, and a growing set of global legal institutions. 
For Buchanan, "The chief point is that, like a domestic basic structure, the global 
basic structure in part determines the prospects not only of individuals but of 
groups, including peoples in Rawls's sense. " (Ibid: 706) It therefore cannot be 
ignored. As Buchanan surmises, 
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Reaardless of whether one represents a people whose internal 
conception of justice is egalitarian or hierarchical, one's 
commitment to protecting both the capacity of one's society to 
implement it's conception of justice and one's commitment to 
securing equal status in the international community for one's 
society require the choice of principles of justice for the global 
basic structure. (Ibid: 709). 
4.1.2 Cosi-nonolitan Justice as Re-Distribution 
Beitz and Buchanan cast doubt on Rawls' assumptions about international 
distributive justice. The former finds it hard to conceive of justice without 
including all individuals - either via state consent, or, more strongly, due to the 
interdependence of social life. The latter gives us strong reasons to believe that 
Rawls can be interpreted differently, to think about global justice in a post- 
Rawlsian fashion. Even if Buchanan doesn't develop a fully-fledged account of 
cosmopolitan justice, he nevertheless points to an interesting/important 
consideration: the global basic structure. Their ideas can be summarised in the 
following way. Cý 
First, a principle of justice that places individuals at its foundation cannot 
reasonably discriminate between individuals in different countries. Second, 
justice as fairness cannot 'fairly' ignore the social basis of injustice. A global 
basic structure informs the distribution of social chances in a way that requires 
mitigation. And thirdly, a principle of global re-distnbutive justice is not 
precluded by respect for the equality of peoples' conceptions of the 'good'. 
However, these points are currently fairly negative. They argue that theories of 
justice should not preclude from discussing global justice. In particular, 
Buchanan's identification of a global basic structure implies that more effort 
needs to be devoted to the question of global justice. 
Thomas Pogge provides an argument for cosmopolitan justice based on universal 
human rights and the responsibilities they entail. He identifies vast global 
(in)justices relating to human poverty and argues that basic negative duties 'not 
to harm' can be used to justify global re-distribution. As Pogge argues, despite 
increasingly effective moral norms protecting the weak and the vulnerable 
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poverty has slipped off the radar of many justice theorists. He cites the 
increasing 1-n conventions against 4-1! ) domestic violence, slavery, autocracy, 
colonialism and genocide as signs of moral progress. But he questions how 
poverty has been left out of this discussion of weakness: 
Some 2,800 million or 46 percent of humankind live below the 
World Bank's $2/day poverty line - precisely: in households 
whose income per person per day has less purchasing power than 
$22.15 had in the US in 1993. On average the people living below 
this line fall 44.4 percent below it. Over 1,200 million live on less 
than half, below the World Bank's better-known $]/day poverty 
line. People so incredibly poor are extremely vulnerable to even 
minor changes in natural and social conditions as well as many 
forms of exploitation and abuse. Each year, some 18 million of 
them die prematurely from poverty-related causes. This is one- 
third of all human deaths - 50,000 every day, including 34,000 
children under the age offive. (Pogge, 2002: 2). 
How can such severe poverty continue when there is enough money (and enough 
food, water, medicine, etc. ) to end it? And why do citizens of the affluent 
Western states not find it morally troubling? Pogge can provide only one answer: 
"Extensive, severe poverty can continue, because we do not find its eradication 
morally compelling. " (Pogge, 2002: 3). This is a significant double standard for 
liberalism to overcome. 
Pogge begins by arguing that there are no good reasons to ignore poverty. One 
simple reason often given Is that current global poverty is so enormous that 
nothing can be done. Pogge (Ibid: 7) retorts that, "The aggregate shortfall of all 
these people from the $2 PP a day poverty line amounts to some $300 billion 
annually or just 1.2 percent of the aggregate annual gross incomes of the income 
economies. " It is therefore do-able. A second response is to cite the history of 
failed attempts to solve poverty. Indeed, official development assistance (ODA) 
has been hugely ineffective at reducing poverty. But Pogge (Ibid: 8) rejoins, "... if 
anything this is a reason to think harder about world poverty and ways of 
attacking it. " And he asserts: 
131 
Where corruption is an obstacle, we can try to reduce it, 
circumvent it, or focus our efforts elsewhere. If foreign donations 
of food depress demand, prices, and hence incentives for 
production in the target country, we can instead enhance the 
income of the poor. Where direct transfers to poor households 
create dependency, we can, targeting children especially, fund 
vaccination programs, basic schooling, school lunches, safe water 
and sewage systems, housing, power plants and networks, banks 
and micro-lending, and road, rail and communication links. (Ibid: 
9). 
He admits that such a system of 'modernisation' will always be susceptible to 
critique, but he asserts that if this doesn't work then we can consider restructuring 
the global economic system so that it is more hospitable to "democratic 
government, economic 'ustice and growth in developing countries. " (Ibid: 9). And Z) i 
this is where Pogge's argument starts to resemble Buchanan's idea of a global 
basic structure. Against those who would argue that the global economic order is Z-7 Z71 
facilitating the decline of poverty, Pogge argues the exact opposite. Pogge attacks 
the common prejudice that "there is nothing seriously wrong with our conduct, 
policies, and the global economic institutions we forge in regard to world 
poverty. - (Ibid: 11). And he goes on to base cosmopolitan responsibilities on 
"negative duties: specific minimal constraints on what harms persons may 
inflict upon each other. " (Ibid: 13). He therefore challenges the claim that "the 
existing global order is not causing poverty, not harming the poor. " (Ibid: 13). 
And the point is consolidated in his Global Resources Dividend. 
[The] GRD proposal is meant to show that there are feasible 
alternative ways of organizing our global economic order, that 
the choice among these alternatives makes a substantial 
difference to how much severe poverty there is worldwide, and 
that there are weighty moral reasons to make this choice so as to 
minimize such poverty. (Ibid: 197). 
Pogge invokes three different areas of injustice that might be used in support of 
his argument that global economic structure violates a negative duty not to harm. 
These are: the effects of shared social institutions, the uncompensated exclusion 
from the use of (natural) resources; and the effect of a common and violent 
history. 
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When looking at the effects of shared social institutions Pogge lists three 
conditions that would be necessary to justify global redistribution: 1) There is a 
shared institutional order that is shaped by the better off and imposed on the 
worse-off. 2) This institutional order is implicated in the reproduction of radical 
inequality in that there is a feasible institutional alternative under which severe 
and extensive poverty would not persist. 3) The radical inequality cannot be 
traced to extra societal factors (such as genetic handicaps or natural disasters) 
which as such, affect different human beings differentially. (Ibid: 199). Z: ) 
Pogge asserts that the current global order does meet condition 1. He observes t: ) In 
"... a worldwide states system based on internationally recognized territorial 
domains, interconnected through a global network of market trade and 
diplomacy. " (Ibid: 199). Moreover, he notes the impact of loans, investments and 
sex tourism on the poor and argues that: "Their very survival often crucially 
depends on our consumption choices, which may determine the price of their 
foodstuffs and their opportunities to find work. " (Ibid: 199). And he argues that 
these relations and the structures of power that pervade them necessitate a radical 
rethink of justice: "... we must be concerned with how the rules structuring 
international interactions foreseeably affect the incidence of extreme poverty. The 
developed countries, thanks to their vastly superior military and economic 
strength, control these rules and therefore share responsibility for their 
foreseeable effects. " (Ibid: 200). 
Condition 2 requires us to trace the causes of poverty to the structure of social 
institutions. Pogge notes that such a project is hard 
due to the dominance of 
explanatory nationalism - the tendency of academic research to 
be structured 
along national lines. He also argues that such a project 
is unattractive as it 
involves the possibility of "seeing oneself as connected to the unimaginable 
deprivations suffered by the global poor. " (Ibid: 200). But for 
Pogge (Ibid: 201), 
t:: ) 
"The affluent countries have been using their power to shape the rules of the 
world economy according to their own interests and thereby 
have deprived the 
poorest populations of a fair share of global economic growth - quite avoidably 
so, as the GRD proposal shows. " (Ibid: 
201). 
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And condition 3 is met quite simply because if the poor were born in the affluent 
countries then they would have as much chance of survival as the rest of us. The 
combination of these three conditions means that 
... the citizens and governments of the affluent countries - 
whether intentionally or not - are imposing a global institutional 
order that forseeably and avoidably reproduces severe and 
widespread poverty. The worse-off are not merely poor and often 
starving, but are being impoverished and starved under our 
shared institutional arrangements, which inescapably shape their 
lives. (Ibid: '2201). 
The uncompensated exclusion from the use of natural resources has one 
condition: "The better-off enjoy significant advantages in the use of a single 
natural resource base from whose benefits the worse-off are largely, and without 
compensation excluded. " (Ibid: 202). This argument refers to the highly uneven 
use of the world's resources. In a sense, this condition ties with previous points 
about the global economic structure, since resources are generally governed via a Ln 
structure of property rights which precedes individual choices. Although the rich 
elites may pay for the resources they use, in the case of oil, this money goes 
towards corrupt autocrats who are not intent on distributing it widely. 
For Pogge the question remains, "... what entitles a global elite to use up the 
world's natural resources on mutually agreeable terms while leaving the global 
poor empty handed? " (Ibid: 202). And finally the 'Effects of Common and 
Violent History' adds the followIng condition: 1) The social starting positions of 
the worse-off and the better-off have emerged from a single historical process 
that was pervaded by massive, grievous wrongs. (Ibid: 203). This condition 
implies more than the simple argument that we owe something to the victims of 4: 1 
colonialism. For Pogge (Ibid: 203), 
'Fhe thought is rather that we should not uphold extreme 
inequality in social starting positions when the allocation of these 
positions depends upon historical processes in which moral 
principles and legal rules were massively violated. A morally 
deeply tarnished history should not be allowed to result in radical 
inequality. 
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Pogge makes a reform proposal on the basis that the status quo can be reformed in 
such a way as to satisfy all three approaches. So the proposal needs to show that 
inequality can be traced to the structure of the global economic order. And he 
adds the caveat that "the status quo is unjust only if we can improve the 
circumstances of the global poor without thereby becoming badly off ourselves" 
(Ibid: 204). He formulates the proposal according to the second approach - 
uncompensated exclusion from resources - arguing that "The second approach 
narrows the field by suggesting a more specific idea: those who make more Z: ) 
extensive use of [ ... ] resources should compensate those who use very little. " 
(Ibid: 203-4). And he notes, 
Modesty is important if the proposed institutional alternative is to 
gain the support necessary to implement it and is able to sustain 
itself in the world as we know it. I hope that the GRD satisfies 
these two desiderata by staying close to the global order now in 
place and by being evidently responsive to each of the three 
approaches. (Ibid: 205). 
Thus, the GRD can be quite a small levy because radical inequality is cumulative 
over centuries and not simply the result of centrifugal tendencies in the global 
economy. As he states, "It is, then, quite possible that, if radical inequality has 
once been eradicated, quite a small GRD may, in the context of a fair and open 
global market system, be sufficient continuously to balance those ordinary 
tendencies of markets enough to forestall its reemergence. " (Ibid: centri Z-- 
205). On this view cosmopolitan justice becomes re-distribution. 
4.2 Cosmopolitan Justice via the Tobin Tax? 
Having reviewed some of the key debates in the development of a cosmopolitan 
approach to global justice in the previous section, this section will identify how 
the rationales and objectives of the Tobin Tax campaign cross over. It is argued 
that cosmopolitan justice rests on a basic assumption that the scope of ethical 
concern should be extended globally to all individuals. On the reading of 
cosmopolitan (social) justice common to Rawls, Beitz, Buchanan and Pogge 
given here, this involves some notion of material re-distribution on a global scale 
to compensate those who suffer as a result of the global basic structure. This 
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section seeks to animate the position by first making the case for a synergy 
between cosmopolitan justice and the Tobin Tax before moving on to identify 
certain ethical ambiguities which pervade such accounts in the next section. 
4.2.1 Similar rationales/obiectives 
There are two basic reasons why the Tobin Tax can be seen as a useful case study 
of cosmopolitan global justice. First, the arguments deployed by civil society 
campaigners increasingly draw on rationales akin to cosmopolitan arguments. For 
instance, world poverty, and the role of wealthy (northern) banks in its creation 
are argued to unfairly prejudice the starting points for the developing south. 
Therefore some redress is sought via the Tobin Tax. And second, the reformist 
objectives of Pogge and the NGOs are very similar. A modest reform that takes a 
small percentage of the income of the wealthy to give to the poorest people Is 
seen as a feasible mechanism to build justice into the global capitalist System. 
Rationales 
The clearest lines of similarity between cosmopolitan justice and ethical 
arguments for the Tobin tax campaigners emerge over their reading of the causes 
of poverty and the feasibility of its eradication. For instance, just as cosmopolitan 
theorists like Buchanan and Pogge highlight the role of global economic 
structures in the production of radical inequality, so campaigners for the Tobin 
Tax put the blame squarely with the structure of global finance. As a Network 
Institute for Global Democratisation (NIGD) report argues: 
In addition to giving rise to growing disparities and alienation in 
the world, the global economic system has been, since 1997, at 
the edge of a crisis potentially as severe as that of the Great 
Depression of the 1930's. In many sites in South-East Asia, 
Russia and Latin America the picture has been already gloomy 
enough. [ ... 
] At the heart of this crisis is the volatility, instability 
and irresponsibility of a global, neo-liberalised financial system. 
(Patomaki, 1999: 2). 
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Ethical arguments for the Tobin Tax are therefore born out of a sustained critique L- 
of the global structure of finance. As an early War on Want (2002: 4) paper 
concurs: 
The financial crises of the 1990s were triggered, and their effects 
intensified, by currency speculation - localised shocks to the 
market led to large outflows in capital, the effects of which spread 
to other markets through a process of contagion. The lives of 
millions have been destabilised by financial crises, which have 
increased poverty and insecurity. 
The basic view observes that something akin to a global basic structure exists in 
global finance. To the extent that this structure has an effect on poverty, Tobin D 
Tax campaigners argue that it is negative. Moreover, a number of Pogge's 
rationales for re-distribution can be used in support of the Tobin Tax. 
It can be argued that global finance exhibits an increasingly "shared institutional 
order" that benefits the rich at the expense of the poor. And, importantly, the 
Tobin Tax does (like the GRD) provide evidence of a feasible institutional 
alternative. Indeed, just as Pogge stresses that the situation is changeable by a 
straightforward and minor reform, in polemic fashion, Stamp Out Poverty (2005: 
2) argue that the feasibility of the idea is of paramount importance: 
Our generation is the first to have the technology, expertise and 
resources to stamp out poverty. World leaders are calling for new 
money to be found. $50 billion extra each year would provide 
clean water, healthcare and education to the most deprived. This 
is not expensive. Rich countries spend $600 billion on defense 
and $245 billion on farm subsidies each year. We need to find 
new ways to raise these funds. A solution could be found in the 
richest market in the world - the trade in money itself. A simple 
stamp duty on currency transactions is practically and politically 
possible and would raise this urgently needed revenue. 
Of course there is an issue of how to interpret Pogge's focus on resources. On the 
one hand, it would be simple to just ignore this point. It is part of the 
experimental interplay of policy development that different mechanisms will be 
suggested. On the other hand it is possible to see how currency becomes a 
resource to be exploited by the rich. If we understand capital as a resource, then 
currency suzerainty is a major factor in development. 
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The high value of currencies like the Dollar and the Euro mean they become the 
denominator currency of major loans. Much business and loan debt in the Third 
World is denominated in hard currency. This represents a net outflow of money 
from the south to north and a resource for capitalist development. Moreover, 
currency speculation imposes a destabilising insecurity on developing states. The 
subsequent preponderance of short-term investments and susceptibility to 
currency crash mean that the wealthy both enjoy an unequal use of the resource of 
currency, but also benefit from structural power accorded. Dependence on foreign 
capital can mean that economic growth is conditional and prone to instability. 
And, while it may be a polemical point, many elements of the global financial 
system, including debt and insurance, arose from economic practices closely 
linked with colonialism. Extending cosmopolitan justice to finance via a Tobin 
Tax may therefore perhaps address the third of Pogge's moral rationales, 'The 
Effects of a Common and Violent History'. 
Objectives 
As well as certain similarities in moral reasoning, there are direct parallels 
between Pogge's observation that in the case of world poverty: "We are violati týl I ing 
a negative duty of justice insofar as we contribute to (and fail to mitigate) the 
harms it reproduces and insofar as we resist suitable reforms" (Pogge. 2002: 
210) and Sony Kapoor's (2003: 3) claim that: "... the present CTT proposition is 
not only possible but eminently desirable. From the world's poorest 
communities, who would benefit from the revenue it can generate, to the world's 
business community, who would benefit from far greater market stability, it is 
clear that the advantages of a CTT are so considerable that fiailure to make 
progress along this road would be verý, costlY. " And it is costly precisely in 
terms of world poverty: 
Desperate poverty and the acute disparity between the rich and 
poor countries of the world require an urgent response from many 
perspectives. From the humanitarian point of view, millions of 
lives are lost to hunger, malnutrition and water-borne diseases 
every year. Each life lost, or blighted, is a personal tragedy. 
(Ibid. 
35). 
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Thus the principle objectives of the GRD and the Tobin Tax are the same. Pogge 
seeks to provide a "modest proposal" that seeks to "leave each country in 
control ... of the resources in its territory" and moderate constructions of the Tobin 
Tax araue that: "... the CTT is a mainstream proposal. The base rate of the tax is L- 
conceptually identical to security transaction taxes that are already a part of 
mainstream financial systems. These taxes are levied in six of the G 10 
economies. Two examples are the 0.5 % stamp duty reserve tax levied in the UK 
and a 0.00217c tax on all stock transactions in the US. " (Ibid. 102). 
Moreover, the higher rate in the two-tier version of the tax is argued to fall in line 
with common features of many existing financial systems: "The higher (circuit- 
breaker) rate of the tax, sometimes called the surcharge rate or the second tier, 
acts as a means of halting excessive volatility. It is conceptually identical to the 
circuit breaker that was introduced in the New York Stock Exchange after the 
Black Monday crash in 1987. " (Ibid. 102). On this view, the objective of 
moderate, feasible reform via global re-distributive efforts is seen as a way to 
introduce justice to the global financial system. 
4.3 Ethical Ambiguities of the Tobin Tax 
In its rationale to counter world poverty, its diagnosis of the causes of that 
poverty, and its proposal for a moderate reform of the existing system, the recent 
constructions of the Tobin Tax bare comparison with discourses of cosmopolitan 
justice. Indeed, in a recent interview Pogge endorsed the Tobin Tax, arguing that 
the principal opposition to the idea is political: 
It is rather disingenuous to blame the unfeasibility of the 
Tobin Tax on the possibility of a few noncompliant tax havens 
when nearly all rich countries are refusing to go along. If they zn 
supported the Tobin Tax, they could do a great deal to discourage zn 
circumvention: Major players - corporations, banks and hedge 
funds - are unlikely to break the laws of countries on which they 
depend for customers and legal protection merely to avoid a small 
fee on foreign exchange transactions. (Pogge, 2005: 4). 
But, feasibility questions aside, does the equation of justice with re-distribution 
exhaust ethical possibilities? Moreover, does thinking in this 
fashion act as a 
139 
limit on ethical possibilities for global finance? This section outlines three inter- 
related problems with the Tobin Tax that infer a broad set of questions for 
cosmopolitan justice. 
Firstly, implementation of the tax requires some level of capital account 
convertibility that is not unproblematic for developing states. Secondly, even if 
feasible, it is not clear that developing states could levy a major amount from 
trade in their own currency. Thus the reliance on Northern states to generate the 
majority of the resources implies a cash-based approach to global re-distribution 
that may re-produce relations of dependence. And thirdly, drawing these ideas 
together, a core failure to undermine the structure of global capitalism, in both 
standard accounts of the Tobin Tax and in Pogge's schema, infers deep ethical 
ambiguities: global justice is all too easily conflated with inclusion in the global 
financial system. 
Why are alternative patterns of organisation not explored? What of the argument, 
popular among Southern scholars, that de-globallsation is a preferable and more 
empowering route to development (Bello, 2005)? Indeed, there is a striking 
double think in arguments for cosmopolitan justice which begin by implicating 
the global basic structure of capitalism in the production of world-wide poverty, 
but then propose a piecemeal reform of this system - to take some cash from the 
top and re-direct it to the bottom - in order to address the problem. Why is the 
structure left intact? 
An important aspect of the Tobin tax proposal, common to all its constructions, 
is that it is moderate in the sense of being a half-way point between full 
insulation of the domestic economy and full openness. That is to say, that the 
structure of knowledge that permits, indeed encourages capital account 
convertibility is left largely in tact, an idea that is not unproblematic for 
developing states. As one campaigner asserts: 
The hierarchies that are part of the financial markets, and the 
tendency of this system to produce a concentration of wealth, 
inequality, poverty, capital flight and capital theft leads to the 
breakdown of our systems of social protection. In developing 
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countries the breakdown of societies robs them of the chance to keep the wealth that is produced in those locations for national development either throu(-)rh national use of resources or through 
effective taxation of income, natural resource extraction and 
profits. (Kohonen, 2005). 
Even if the majority of campaigners address the issue from the perspective of 
questioning what is possible, there is a tendency to see the Tobin Tax as the 4n 
solution. In this context, the campaign and mainstream discourses coincide over 
the Tobin Tax - with the (etemal) caveat that it is probably unfeasible. Indeed, 
the Global Policy Forum has published IMF working papers on the Tobin Tax 
that support this general proposition: 
the main risks a country faces when it liberalizes its capital 
account are primarily associated with unpredictable and 
potentially large capital inflows and outflows - most notably 
sudden and significant reversals in capital inflows - that may have 
little to do with the soundness (or lack thereof) of its own 
economic policies. Since private sector speculators do not 
internalize the destabilizing impact on the country of such capital 
flows in their investment decisions, their actions generate a 
negative externality - as viewed from the perspective of the 
country in question - in the classic sense, and would thus call for 
an equally classic economic remedy, i. e., a Pigouvian tax on the 
external i ty -ge nerati no activity which, in this case, would be a tax Z! ý C7 
on capital flows into or out of the country, or both. (Zee, 2000). 
The argument being made here is not that, pace a Marxist critique, the campaign Z: ý 4-- 
for global justice has been co-opted by the bourgeois ideology of the IMF. 
Rather, it is to argue that the question of opening up to foreign capital is never 
questioned in the first place. The critical and ethical edge of the Tobin Tax is 
blunted by a relatively unproblematic acceptance that financial universalism is a 
straightforward reality to which we have to respond. C) 
The risk is not that the Tobin Tax is not radical enough - where radical is 
understood as forming a suitably strong resistance to the dominant power of a 4n) 
neo-liberalism - but rather that the potential alternatives may get silenced. As 
Yong Chu] Kim (2003: 148) argues, Z: 5 
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... the Tobin tax needs capital liberalization as a condition to 
apply it. The Tax is meaningful only when capital moves freely 
across national borders. [ ... ] China and Malaysia employ domestic measure of capital control, successful in arresting 
speculation and volatility of capital flows through domestic policy 
tools and, consequently, are in no need of the global scale scheme 
of the Tobin tax. UNCTAD's chief economist Yilmaz Akyuz says 
"Malaysia's capital controls are now widely accepted as a 
success" and make it possible to have a fundamental reorientation 
of an economy toward a more self-reliant pattern of growth. " 
China has also been strongly opposed to efforts of western 
countries and international bodies to speed up financial 
liberalization of developing countries, arguing that it is necessary 
to strictly separate trade and investment liberalization from 
financial liberalization. These countries do not find any 
motivation to join the alobal design to control the free movements 
of capital. 
A second ethical ambiguity of global justice illustrated by the Tobin Tax is the 
nature of re-distribution. Building on the point about financial universality there 
is additionally the question of how the global ethic of the Tobin Tax is played 
out. 
On the one hand, campaigners in developing areas could well be faced with the 4: ) 
slightly paradoxical position of advocating capital account liberalisation in order 1-n 
that the state then places the Tobin Tax on the currency. On the other hand, even 
if this were possible (if not desirable), it is clear that the majority of the funds 
would be accrued in the larger more developed financial markets. Thus, re- 
distributive justice would consist mainly of cash flows from North to South. As 
one (rare) study of the Tobin Tax as it applies to African countries found: 
There was general agreement from the reports that a Tobin Tax 
alone would not be sufficient to address Africa's key problems of 
slow development, high indebtedness and endemic poverty. The 
tax is unlikely to yield sufficient revenue within the continent to 
be directed towards solving these problems. However, levying the 
tax in developed markets and channeling proceeds to developing 
countries through various mechanisms and programs will change 
the nature and impact of international financial flows to and from 
developing countries. (AFRODAD, 2000: 6). 
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But this framing of the Tax as a cash based solution to global justice creates its 
own dilemmas. On the one hand, it risks producing an ethical limit in the sense 
that under-developed countries are stripped of ethical/financial agency except 
insofar as they can achieve capital account convertibility. On the other hand, 
when War on Want frames the Tobin Tax in terms of charity - e. g. 'The Robin 
Hood Tax' - it risks alienating large sections of the Southern campaign. Again as 
Yono Chul Kim (2003: 147-148) argues, 
people in East Asian countries simply understand the Tobin tax as 
being levied on the very wealthiest countries and distributed 
among poor countries. In short, the Tobin tax is viewed as the Z! ) 
game between North and South, with some advocates simply 
motivated by ethical and humanitarian claims. But, speculative 
money gave people in East Asian countries 'real' shocks and the 
impact of the Tobin tax would be much more pronounced to 
emerging' markets than any other countries. They find themselves 
distanced by the way Westerners deal with the issue of the Tobin 
tax. 
Drawing these ideas together, potential alternatives either at the local or regional 
level can perhaps be silenced in the dominant framing of cosmopolitan justice 
and the Tobin Tax. These might be local level alternatives, or regional forms of 
organisation. They may entail liberalisation. Or they may require slow and 
sequenced liberalisation of the capital account. As one report (AFRODAD, 2000: 
6-7) lists, potential alternatives may include: 
1) Halting financial liberalization ... 2) Imposing 
feasible capital 
and exchange controls at the earliest opportunity... 3) 
Distinguishing between inflows of hot money and production 
oriented foreign direct investment (FDI) ... 4) 
Revisiting current 
and capital accounts including imports and foreign liability 
structures with a view to reducing current and capital account 
vulnerabilities. 5) Redirecting financial resources into productive 
purposes, including meeting human needs, away from largely 
speculative and unproductive outlets. At a general level this 
involves changes being made in domestic monetary and financial 
regulation to both enhance the security of investment portfolios 
and to direct funds to much more production and basic 
consumption-oriented ends. 
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Conclusion: From Justice to Democracy 
The chapter has analysed the vocabulary of cosmopolitan justice and developed 
some fruitful lines of synergy with the Tobin Tax. Section I reviewed the 
emerging discourse of cosmopolitan justice in terms of a set of critical positions 
on John Rawls theory of justice. Thomas Pogge's (2002) account of 
cosmopolitan responsibilities was identified as the most ambitious project of 
global re-distribution. Section 2 argued that the campaign for a Tobin Tax bares 
a number of similarities - both of rationale and objective with the discourse of 
cosmopolitan justice. However, Section 3 found a number of ethical ambiguities 
in the discourse of cosmopolitan justice via a Tobin Tax. 
Firstly, to implement a Tobin Tax requires capital account convertibility which is 
not unambiguously desirable in partially or non-developed financial systems. 
And secondly, even if implemented, the majority of funds would be accrued in 
the North requiring a cash based practice of justice where funds are taken from 
northern states and given to southern states. It was suggested that both of these 
issues infer a problem with the financial and ethical universalism that reside in 
the Tobin Tax and cosmopolitan justice. As Chapter One argued, the problem 
with such universalism is that may risk silencing potential alternatives. At one 
level, cosmopolitans like Pogge abstract an ideal conception of what it is 
reasonable for individuals to do (and not to do). This view ignores - or places at 
one stage removed - the historical contingencies and cultural contexts from 
which people emerge. At another level, when such ideal theory is 'applied', it 
acts to constitute the world in a particular way. This move is potentially negative 
because it imposes a limit on ethical possibility, namely: universal capitalism, 
rather than exploring the different possibilities that might be generated in 
political context. 
In light of these arguments the next chapter will turn to the discourse of 
cosmopolitan democracy to question whether, despite certain ethical ambiguities, 
systems of representation and accountability may be built to mitigate them. By 
placing justice in a social and political context cosmopolitan democracy may 
provide the basis for addressing, if not overcoming, such problems. 
144 
5. Cosmopolitan DemocracY and the Tobin Tax 
Introduction 
Chapters 1-3 cleared the ground for a conversation about cosmopolitan ethics in 
, 21obal finance via a case study of the Tobin Tax. Using a pragmatic approach, it 
was argued that cosmopolitanism can be viewed as a contingent contribution to 
an ethical conversation about reforming global finance. Moreover, it was argued 
in Chapter Three that the Tobin Tax campaign is ripe for inclusion in this 
conversation. Increasingly, ethical arguments for global re-distribution and 
democratic global governance suffuse the civil society campaign. Specifically an 
emphasis by NGOS on global redistribution and making global financial Z: ý 
, governance more accountable reflect broad cosmopolitan ambitions. The Tobin 
Tax is a good case study for thinking through the ethical possibilities, 
ambiguities and limits pertaining to cosmopolitan ethics in global finance. 
Chapter Four pursued this line of thinking via an analysis of the vocabulary of 
cosmopolitan justice and its potential synergies with the Tobin Tax. 
While important for extending Tobin Tax debates, it was argued that 
cosmopolitan justice is more ambiguous than may be supposed. If cosmopolitan 
thought seeks to place individuals at the heart of justice then there is ambiguity in 
the way that 'practical justice' - either via a GRD or a Tobin Tax - falls back on 
a cash-based solution to poverty, where money comes from the 'North' (usually 
states) and goes to the 'South' (usually states). This is not to argue that such 
money transfer could not be put to good use, rather it is to identify that the 
position does not question the principle of universal capitalism and thereby 
precludes those alternatives - individual, local, regional, global - that might 
empower people in the construction of finance/justice. 
Pragmatically speaking, the question of how a cosmopolitan approach to global 
finance via a Tobin Tax responds to particularity -a particularity that may 
require Chilean style capital controls, or widespread popular education as to what 
finance is - means that the democratic questions of representation and inclusion 
should be central. As one Tobin Tax advocate, Rudy De Meyer argued: "We do 
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not want the Tobin Tax to become another Money Machine. The democratic and 
emancipatory aspects of our campaign should be clear' 3 Therefore the discussion 
will now turn to the potential for a cosmopolitan democratic framing of he Tobin 
Tax. 
Chapter Five proceeds in four sections. Section I introduces the discourse of 
cosmopolitan democracy. Part One outlines David Held and Tony McGrew's 
articulation of liberal cosmopolitanism (Held, 1995; Held and McGrew, 1998). 
This approach seeks democratic global reform in accordance with the defence 
and preservation of individual autonomy. Its guiding logic is to extrapolate 
outwards the domestic polis to ensure democratic rights both inside and outside 
the state. In Part Two James Bohman's (1999; 2004) deliberative 
cosmopolitanism based on a principle of non-domination is set out. This 
approach is arguably less ends-orientated than liberal cosmopolitanism. Instead, 
it seeks to understand and foster bottom-up processes of democratisation that 
employ the (ethical) agent of global civil society (See Cochran, 2002). 
The reason for engaging these two distinct strands of cosmopolitan democracy is 
to reflect the ncbness of the cosmopolitan democratic paradigm. At one level, the 
diagnosis of bow globalisation affects and undermines previous conceptions of 
democratic liberal politics provokes a number of questions and reform agendas 
relevant to the campaign for a Tobin Tax. At anotber level, the deliberative 
concern wItb 'opening' up exclusive and tecbnocratic areas of decision-making 
provides an interesting & situated model of civil society activity. Reflexively, the 
approacb is relevant to many of the practical issues of organising and promoting 
the Tobin Tax witbin global civil society. 
Section 2 assesses the relevance of these arguments in the context of the 
campaign for a Tobin Tax. Cosmopolitan arguments share much in common 
with, and lend support to, existing democratic arguments for a Tobin tax. On the 
one hand, the cosmopolitan argument that global interconnectedness both infers 
that political 'fate' cannot be exclusively underpinned by the nation-state and 
3 Rudy De Meyer, comments made at the Stamp Out Poverty, Proggess and Action meeting, 19" 
November, 2005, Camden Town Hall. 
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requires supra-territorial regulation of trade and finance, is directly applicable to 
the Tobin Tax. In this way cosmopolitan global finance via a Tobin tax is an 
interestinc, extension of broader debates surrounding the possibilities for zn 
cosmopolitan global governance. On the other hand, emerging arguments within 
the campaign itself, which place emphasis on the possibilities for 'emancipation' 
via a Tobin Tax, lend weilaht to cosmopolitan democratic ambitions. 
Sophisticated proposals by the Network Institute for Global Democratisation 
(NIGD) (Patomaki, 1999) point to new organisations and democratic practices 
that can enrich the cosmopolitan paradigm. The nexus of cosmopolitan 
democracy and the Tobin Tax is therefore fertile ground for developing an 
account of the possibilities and limits of cosmopolitan ethics in global finance. 
However, as Section 3 argues, such cosmopolitan 'models' are not without their 
problems. Two central critiques are discussed. Firstly, the liberal cosmopolitan 
model of multilayered global governance has been criticised for reifying a state- 
centric conception of politics (Walker, 2003; Vaughan-Williams, 2006). It is 
argued that this problem is further (and somewhat ironically) exacerbated in 
NIGD's model of a 'Tobin Tax Organisation' (TTO) (Patomaki, 1999). In 
addition to the fact that the tax is levied on a state by state basis, thus confirming 
a statist conception of global finance, the decision making power of the proposed 
authority is to be based on the power of states, above NGOs or 'individuals'. 
And secondly, cosmopolitan democracy suffers from the potential critique of 
euro-centrism. It is argued that even in Bohman's more contingent, experimental 
approach a lot is assumed about the conduct of politics and the political. As 
Winfried Thaa (2001: 504) argues, such agendas "tend to overlook that political 
deliberation, agency and practice presuppose commonalities such as historic 
experience, communication based on everyday language, and commonly 
accepted institutions. " Extending this point to the Tobin Tax, a common heritage 
of Keynesian welfare measures could make it far easier for western actors to 
understand what is at stake in the distribution of revenue yields and trust the 
establishment of bureaucratic procedures, than for non westemers who may lack 
the cultural experience of successful welfare states. 
147 
However, section 4 stops short of a full-scale rejection of cosmopolitan 
democracy. From a pragmatic perspective, undermining the universal 'Truth' of C) 
cosmopolitanism, or the Tobin Tax, does not diminish its value. As Rorty (1999: 
272) argues, takino truth or universality out of the equation does not render the 
idea of cosmopolitan democracy non-natively unappealing: 
"Pragmatists are entirely at home with the idea that political theory 
should view itself as suggestions for future action emerging out of 4! ) 
recent historical experience, rather than attempting to legitimate 
the outcome of that experience by reference to something 
ahistorical. " 
Indeed, by following through Bohman's argument and (reflexively) examining zn C) 
the role of civil society in the discussion - and generation - of cosmopolitan 
reasons, a grounded and experimental account of the Tobin Tax may be 
elaborated. For instance, examples of democratic localisation via a Tobin Tax, 
and various strategies of de-globalisation imply that a sophisticated and nuanced 
conversation is ongoing within the campaign (Bello, 2005; Kim, 2003). Indeed, 
Chapter 6 moves on to develop a pragmatic cosmopolitan account of the 
conversation. Such an account retains many cosmopolitan aspirations but 
politicises them completely by dropping any ahistorical or transcutural claims. 
As Rorty (2000: 9) argues: 
... democratic politics should 
leave truth alone, as a sublimely 
undiscussable topic, and instead turn to the question of how to 
persuade people to broaden the size of the audience they take to be 
competent, to increase the size of the relevant community of 
justification. The latter project Is not only relevant to democratic 
politics, it pretty much is democratic politics. 
5.1 Cosmopolitan Democracy 
This section outlines the dominant arguments for cosmopolitan democracy made 
by David Held and Tony McGrew on the one hand and James Bohman on the 
other. Each seeks to articulate a democratic response to globalisation that 
mitigates the concentration of unaccountable power and (to some extent) wealth 
in the hands of a few. The former develops the notion of individual autonomy to 
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argue that evolving 'communities of fate' - ecological, financial, military - 
necessitate a legal reconstruction of governance to be more accountable to 
human rights issues. This approach envisages a multi-layered conception of 
democratic governance with an extensive cosmopolitan legal framework and an L, 
active global civil society. The latter envisages a political democratic response 
to transnational capital based on the principle of non-dominantion so that those 
affected by an activity/policy can deliberate over its content. In the next section 
their arauments will be extended to the case of the Tobin Tax. zn 
5.1.1 Liberal Cosmopolitanism 
David Held and Tony McGrew are foremost among liberal cosmopolitans that 
respond to the perceived challenges to the nation-state model of democracy 
brought about by globalisation. Their brand of liberal cosmopolitanism draws 
from critical theory because it regards democracy as something that can be 
adapted to changing circumstances. But it is also very much a liberal theory as it zn 
posits the foundation of such a reconstruction to be individual rights to L_ 
autonomy: 
The anticipation of autonomy for each and all constitutes a 
regulative idea - an idea which has guided conflicts over the 
institutionalization of democracy. It is an idea, moreover which has 
provided a non-native standard which could be turned against 
existing institutions, as it has been by the working class, feminist, 
anti-racist and anti-colonial activists, to reveal the extent to which 
the principles and aspirations of equal liberty and equal political 
participation remain unfulfilled. (1995: 7 1). 
Liberal cosmopolitans argue that the contemporary relevance of the principle of 
autonomy is that it can serve as a comprehensive critique of the potentially 
undemocratic aspects of global capitalism. As Held (Op. Cit. ) affirms, it is "an 
idea which could be drawn upon to interrogate the degree to which democracy 
, made safe' for the modern world has failed to address the problems of 
accountability created by sites of power beyond the state, such as those generated 
by leading economic organizations,... ". And, in this way, an argument for 
cosmopolitan democracy is tied directly to globalisation, defined as "[the] 
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historical process which transfon-ns the spatial organization of social relations 
and transactions, generating transcontinental or interregional networks of 
interaction and the exercise of power. " (Held &McGrew, 1998: 220). 
For Held (1997: 2), processes of globalisation precipitate a number of issues that 
don't sit easily with national-level democracy: "How can problems such as the 
spread of AIDS, the debt burden of many countries in the 'developing world', the 
flow of natural resources which escape national jurisdiction, the drug trade, 
international crime be satisfactorily brought within the sphere of democracy? " In 
response to these global issues, Held and McGrew (1998: 221) argue that 
governance is being re-spatialised; a state-centric global political system is 
gradually replaced by a form of "heterarchy -a divided authority system - in 
which states seek to share the task of governance with a complex array of 
institutions, public and private, local, regional, transnational and global 
representing the emergence of 'overlapping communities of fate"'. 4: ) 
While the subject of global governance is now a common question in political 
theory, perhaps what distinguishes Held and McGrew's approach is that global 
change is not only a political issue, but also (in part) a condition of the possibility 
for thinking about cosmopolitan democracy. That is to say, liberal cosmopolitans 
seek to anticipate those immanent trends within contemporary globalising 
process which may hold forth the possibility of more inclusive and accountable 
systems of global governance. On this view, global communications, global 
technology and global wealth could be combined with the institutions of global 
governance to produce a cosmopolitan world. For instance Held (1997: 12) finds 
inspiration in the UN, 
"There are forces and pressures which are engendering a reshaping 
of political cultures, institutions and structures. [ ... ] one must note 
the emergence, however hesitatingly, of regional and global 
institutions in the twentieth century. The UN is, of course, weak in 
many respects, but it is a relatively recent creation and it is an 
innovative structure which can be built upon. It is a normath, e 
resource which provides - for all its difficulties - an enduring 
example of how nations might (and sometimes do) cooperate better 
to resolve, and resolve fairly, common problems. " 
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Perhaps on a minor re-interpretation it could be argued that institutions like the 
EU, the WTO or the IMF provide at least the basis for global co-ordination. If an 
Z-- agenda of inclusion could be attached to such institutions then a cosmopolitan 
world order could be considered a more or less nascent reality. 
Thus, at the same time as globalisation retards democracy, Held makes the 
critical argument that trends and themes arising with globalisation contain the 
seeds of change. As well as global institutions like the UN he points to the 
emergino, actors within transnational civil society as potential agents of 
cosmopolitan democracy. In this way, Held and McGrew (1998: 243) contend: 
"Globalization is not, as some suggest, narrowing or foreclosing political 
discussion: on the contrary, it is reilluminating and reinvigorating the 
contemporary political terrain. " Global institutions, groups and forces point "in 
the direction of establishing new ways of holding transnational power systems to 
account - that is, they help open up the possibility of a cosmopolitan 
democracy. " (Held, 1997: 12). And this kind of cosmopolitan democracy could 
develop administrative capacity at global and regional levels to compliment 
existing local and national forms of governance. As Held contends, 
"The case for cosmopolitan democracy is the case for the 
creation of new political institutions which would co-exist 
with the system of states but which would override states in 
clearly defined spheres of activity where those activities have 
demonstrable transnational and international consequences, 
require regional or global initiatives in the interests of 
effectiveness and depend upon such initiatives for democratic 
legitimacy. "(0p. Cit. ). 
Thus, a basic quality of cosmopolitan democracy is that it locates itself within 
contingent and complex political changes while retaining a level of critical 
distance that can identify future alternatives. In particular, liberal cosmopolitans 
have attached their agenda to evolving discourses of global governance and, in so 
doing, elaborate a model similar to the multi-level, multi -dimensional image of Z=) 
global finance identified in Chapter One. Held and McGrew (2002: 9) define 
global governance as follows: 
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... the focus is on the evolving system of (formal and informal) 
political co-ordination - across multiple levels from the local 
to the global - among public authorities (states and IGOs) and 
private agencies seeking to realize common purposes or 
resolve collective problemsj ... ] It differs dramatically from the concept of world government in that it does not 
presuppose the idea of a central global public authority, which 
legislates for the common affairs of humanity. On the contrary 
it is defined by diverse sources of rule-making, political 
authority and power. 
Cosmopolitan democracy is therefore 'global' in the sense that it undermines 
straightforward appeals to fixed, territorial political communities associated with Z"- 
nation states. Instead it identifies numerous and overlapping communities - of 
fate, faith, gender, etc. - that now exist in a supra-territorial context. And 
cosmopolitans seek to re-imagine the political basis of democracy by subjecting z! ) 
this complex global context to the normative principle of autonomy. This leads to 
various avenues including global institutional reforrns to promote accountability It) 
and inclusion, increased recognition of the potential contribution of global civil 
society actors, and the possibility of a cosmopolitan legal order. Importantly 
states do not drop out of this equation. But they are seen as one site amongst 
many others where democracy is more or less achievable. 
5.1.2 Deliberative Cosmopolitanis 
To be sure, liberal cosmopolitanism is the most cited and most criticised version 
of the cosmopolitan democratic paradigm. It has spawned a plethora of 
extensions of the paradigm and has attracted numerous critiques that will be 
discussed in detail in section 3. However, an alternative articulation of the 
paradigm also exists which offers fruitful avenues for the discussion of 
cosmopolitan democracy. This approach is less concerned with the 'model' of 
cosmopolitan democracy and more focused towards generating a theory of 
situated, bottom-up processes for building democratic spaces. 
James Bohman (1999: 499) begins from a similar position to Held and McGrew 
regarding the challenges now facing democracy: "Even as more and more 
polities at least claim that they are democratic, the scope of even the best 
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democratic government is becomin more and more limited owing to the tý, 9 
consequences of globalization. - This paradox is arguably the motivating factor of 
most contemporary cosmopolitans. Particular difficulties have arisen with the 
failure of either national Keynesianism or global monetarism to stabilise capital 
flows. And the situation is a major concern for political democrats because there 
is of course no over-arching authority that could 'command obedience' in a 
similar vein to the way the nation state (allegedly) once did (Op Cit. ). Rather 
than address this problem by envisaging a world state, or a model of global Z: ) 
governance, Bohman pursues a different option that 'builds up' from existing and 
complex systems of governance: 
"Th[is] ... option seeks a practical 
foothold in the myriad 
responses to the anarchy of the international arena: the many 
current, cross-cutting, non-territorial and more or less 
decentralized forms of governance that succeed in organizing 
and regulating certain governments and firms. Rather than 
enlarging existing organizations as the basis on which to 
exercise political authority, this approach seeks to overcome 
the democracy deficit through a strategy of building up 
transnational agreements (and their resultant international 
4rec, imes') as emergent norms and institutions. " (Ibid. 500). 
This approach has three important strands. Firstly, in common with liberal 
cosmopolitanism it is concerned with the question of how, practically and 
effectively, to re-construct democracy in an age of globalisation, stressing a 
reflexive strategy of incremental action. Secondly, Bohman proceeds with a 
thicker conception of democracy that, as the next section will argue, holds 
important implications for the Tobin Tax campaign. And thirdly, Bohman "sees 
the problem of regulation in terms of the distributive effects of continuing 
institutionalization" with the "... important addition that such a decentralized 
process must also be democratic. Such democracy is a necessary condition not 
only for cooperative governance, but also for global distributive 
justice. " (Op. 
Cit. ). In this way, the social democratic possibilities of cosmopolitanism are 
addressed. 
Such a cosmopolitan praxis is obviously less ends-oriented than the 
liberal 
paradigm. It rather seeks to operate contingently and experimentally 
in order to 
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develop certain ethical values. Bohman is primarily concerned with the equality 
of political influence over decision making. This is not to argue that everyone 
should have a say in the making of every decision. Such an idea is not practically zn 
possible and therefore perhaps not normatively desirable. Rather he argues that at 
a minimum people should not be affected by agreements the making of which 
they have no influence over. As he contends, 
"Beim', effective in the public sphere is not a matter of agency 
(of bringing about a specific outcome), but of having the 
reasonable expectation to be able to influence deliberation 
about decisions that affect one's lives. This is not just a matter 
of having particular opportunities or resources (however tn important they may be), but of capability. " (Op Cit. ). 
For Bohman, one of the principle retardants for public functioning is the unfair 
distortion of communication because of power asymmetries. So while he argues 
that a citizen need not be able to determine the outcome of a decision "all must 
successfully be able to initiate communication about interests and needs. " (Ibid. 
503). And he contends: 
Such expressive restrictions are typical in inequalities of 
status, race, and gender and lead to the often implicit and 
publicly unrecognized exclusion from participation in public 
life dependent on receiving uptake from others, affecting 
opportunities to speak in implicit norms of turn-taking, 
interruptions and topic changes. In all such cases, some 
dominant group's control over the 'means of interpretation' 
restricts the socially acceptable possibilities of expression and 
uptake needed to create mutual obligations. Here we say that 
they lack access to political influence and thus to the public 
sphere directly related to decision-making. (Op Cit. ). 
On such a view, fair deliberation requires the opening up of the 'means of 
interpretation' so that excluded or marginal groups can understand and engage 
the dominant modes of financial governance. The logic contained within this is 
not simply the creation of mutual obligation as an end in itself. Rather there is a 
clear normative aspect that expands upon the concept of liberty used by liberal 
cosmopolitans. 
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Bohman draws on Sen's distinction between "effective freedom" - where power 
coheres with what one would choose - and "freedom as control" to argue that 
institutions should be "structured to be responsive to the sort of goals and reasons 
that might be goals that the agent would otherwise seek to achieve through the 
use of her resources. " (Ibid. 504). And he posits that such an argument is social 
in two senses: 
It is social in that it constitutes the ability to influence 
cooperative activities such as public deliberation and the 
capability to participate In a democracy, including the social 
dimensions of civil society or the public sphere. But it Is also 
social in the sense that no agent or group of agents can take 
over the levers of power or control without violating 
democratic norms. (Op Cit. ). 
And this brings him to the somewhat elitist argument that "Even if I do not 
control the outcome, however, my freedom is effective when institutions produce 
decisions based on the sort of reasons that I could endorse. "(Op Cit. ). However, 
he qualifies the position with the notion of reasonable consensus: "The 
reasonable expectation that I may influence a decision-making process that is 
responsive to reasons and the discipline of reasons is sufficient for a minimal 
criterion of freedom as 'non-domi nation. "'(Op Cit. ). Thus, Bohman provides a 
clear critical and emancipatory edge to deliberative cosmopolitanism: I could 
very well not be interfered with by various macro-economic policies (and thus 
my negative liberty would remain intact); but the consequences of those policies 
could put me under the arbitrary will of economic experts and firms in no way 
open to my influence or accountable to my reasons. " (Op Cit. ). 
The agenda for Bohman is to place the hope for greater democratisation 
according to principles of freedom as non-domination in the evolving nexus 
between the institutions of international 'regimes' and an increasingly active 
global civil society. He terms this agenda, "equal access to institutionalization": 
The social foothold for this democratic norm is already 
present in current national and international political 
institutions and in national and transnational public spheres 
and civil society. Market Instability and inaccessible large 
scale institutions can be avoided only if some form of 
institutionalization creates access to an influence over the 
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social processes of globalization themselves By fostering 
communicative interaction, such transnational public spheres 
and civil society have already produced self-regulating forms 
of co-operation among those affected by global processes. " 
(Ibid. 506). 
5.2 Operationalising Cosmopolitan Democracy via a Tobin Tax 
While Held and McGrew attempt to reconstruct a domestic image of the polls at 
a transnational level, seeking to insulate autonomy via the extension of rights to 
inclusion within more accountable 'communities of fate', Bohman is less willing 
to propose a 'model'. Instead he locates his reform agenda within bottom up 
processes aimed at building democratic spaces. In this way, he sets up a basic 
dialectic between technocratic global institutions and morally motivated global 
civil society, where the construction of a more inclusive global public sphere is 
the aim. However, both arguments intersect on a crucial point that can lend 
support for the Tobin Tax: globalisation requires us to re-think the space and 
content of political democracy. 
This section draws together cosmopolitan democratic arguments with the Tobin 
Tax. In Part 1, the principle of responding to globalisation via the institution of a 
Tobin Tax is discussed. Developing from liberal cosmopolitanism It can be 
argued that changes and instabilities in global financial markets warrant the kind 
of political accountability and control that a Tobin Tax regime could provide. 
Groups like ATTAC draw on similar discourses about restoring the manoeuvring 
power of states and the effective democratic spaces for citizens. 
Part 2 outlines certain arguments emanating from the campaign which both draw 
upon and contribute towards the vocabulary of cosmopolitan democracy. For 
instance, the Network Institute for Global Democratisation as well as WEED and 
ATTAC have each published arguments that place the Tobin Tax at the heart of 
the agenda to reform global finance along democratic lines. Indeed, it is 
suggested that one NIGD report (Patomaki, 1999) significantly contributes to the 
discussion of cosmopolitan democracy by engaging the practical difficulties and 
emancipatory potentials of a 'Tobin Tax Organisation'. 
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5.2.1 Cosmopolitan Dernocrac. 1 and the Tobin Tax 
Cosmopolitanism provides good democratic and normative grounds for 
supporting a Tobin Tax. Held's idea that governance arrangements should be 
structured so that they do not infringe upon the autonomy of individuals or 
groups - and when they do that they should be subject to democratic and legal 
accountability - implies the need for reforms to the system of free capital 
mobility and floating exchange rates. On the one hand, it is clear that severe 
poverty infringes upon individual autonomy. The project to globalise autonomy 
must therefore in some sense recoanise the importance of global re-distribution. 
As Held (2005: 5) argues, 
... development policies must challenge unequal access to the 
global market, and ensure that global market integration, 
particularly of capital markets, happens in sequence with the 
-rowth of sustainable public sectors, if such measures 
were combined with a (Tobin) tax on the turnover of financial 
markets, and/or a consumption tax on fossil fuels, and/or a 
shift of priorities from military expenditure (running at over 
$950bn a year olobally) to the alleviation of severe need 
(direct aid amounts to $50bn a year globally), then the 
developed world might really begin to accommodate those 
nations struggling for survival and minimum welfare. 
On the other hand, Bohman's argument that freedom is constrained if placed 
under the arbitrary will of economic experts could suggest a greater degree of 
(democratic) control is required, something that a Tobin Tax could potentially 
provide. At the moment the system of central bank negotiations via the BIS and 
Treasury discussion via the IMF do not really take account of the alternative and 
conflicting voices that might wish to contest the situation. A cautious but 
plausible extension of this way of thinking could support democratisation along a 
scale of institutional forms, where the Tobin Tax would be a step on the way to 
reform. Indeed, ATTAC (1999) argues: 
Such a measure fits with a clearly anti -speculative perspective. It 
would sustain a logic of resistance, restore manoeuvring room to 
citizens and national governments, and, most of all, would mean 
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that political, rather thanfinancial considerations are retuming to 
thefore. 
This point can be further extended by examining Bohman's argument regarding 
the distributive and re-distributive consequences of global monetary regimes. At 
one level, the Tobin Tax could stabilise the level of speculation - allowing for a 
predictable and less drastic accumulation of wealth by speculators. At another 
level, it could provide funds for compensation when financial crises do occur, 
thus confirming Bohman's point that cosmopolitan democracy is a condition for 
the possibility of -global distributive justice. " L- 
Finally, there is much in the key signifiers of 'global civil society' and the 
'orlobal public sphere' that could lend support to the Tobin Tax campaign itself. 
Held's prognosis that civil society can contest, resist and generally hold 
transnational power systems to account ties in with many critical IPE and NGO 
arguments that the Tobin Tax is a way of opening up the systems of transnational 
economic governance to popular scrutiny. On this view the Tobin Tax would be 
like a stepping-stone for a social democratic turn in global policy discussions. 
Indeed Bohman (1999: 507) ]ends support to such an agenda when he introduces tD 
the idea of "cosmopolitan publicity": 
Given the many problems that require the cosmopolitan uses 
of public reason (from global warming to economic regulation 
to widen disparities in well-being), establishing the bases for 
such cooperation in innovative forms of publicity is an urgent 4: 5 
task. Cosmopolitan publicity helps solve these problems of 
cooperation by creating conditions for democratic accessibility 
to the process of the formation of international regimes and 
ultimately new institutions. Without such accessibility, there 
can be no basis for accountability to transnational publics. 
The cosmopolitan democratic potentials of the Tobin Tax are important and as 
yet barely articulated except for a few allusions to the idea in fairly broad 
agendas for global governance reform (Giddens, 1998: 150-15 1; Scholte, 2005). 
There are clear connections between cosmopolitan arguments for resisting 
unaccountable global policy by subjecting it to critique in terms of autonomy and 
non-domination and civil society arguments for the Tobin Tax. Politicising 
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economic policy in this way could form the basis of support for the Tobin Tax, 
which seeks to moderate market speculation and restore public control. 
Moreover, on a minor re-interpretation, cosmopolitan arguments could be 
deployed in support of using the revenue potential of the Tobin Tax as the basis 
to actively. foster democratic inclusion. Finally, there is a level of attractiveness 
in Bohman's idea that publicising "cosmopolitan reasons" is a key political 
imperative. In this vein the next chapter argues that a key contribution of the 
Tobin Tax campaign is to publicise the ethical importance of global finance and 
the institutions that govern it to large audiences. 
5.2.2 The Tobin Tax and Cosmoi)olltan Democrac 
While the preceding section showed how cosmopolitan arguments can be 
deployed to justify the Tobin Tax there is perhaps a more important synergy 
between democracy and the Tobin Tax. Despite numerous cosmopolitan 
endorsements of the Tobin Tax as part of broad efforts to rein in global capital 
there has not been a sustained attempt to justify or model the tax. One of the 
central contributions of activists within the Tobin Tax campaign has been to 
build a critical and emancipatory agenda of global democratisation around the 
Tobin Tax. Whether such models depart from or merely develop cosmopolitan 
democracy is a critical question that will be addressed in the next section. 
The Network Institute of Global Democratisation has consistently supported the 
Tobin Tax on democratic and normative grounds. In a working paper and book 
project authored by their chief researcher, Heikki Patomaki, NIGD have 
promoted a line on the Tobin Tax that confronts the prevailing opposition to the t) 
tax. The account is situated within contemporary power structures, but perceives 
the Tobin Tax as a 1ever' to control and democratise such structures. The 
argument therefore speaks to cosmopolitan concerns in terms of current political 
&realities', engaging with neo-liberal theoretical hegemony, Realist power 
structures, and the difficulties of building truly democratic global institutions. In 
this sense, the democratic model of the Tobin Tax anticipates many of the critical 
problems with liberal cosmopolitanism. 
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Patomaki places his argument for the Tobin Tax in opposition to the standard 
economic critiques. He critiques the dominance of positive economics that 
underpins monetarist scepticism towards the tax. As Chapter Three argued, much 
of the opposition toward the Tobin Tax has re-stated basic economic beliefs in 
the distributional attractiveness of free markets. Against this view Patomaki 
(1999: 10) asserts: 
Economic theory is based on an irrealist philosophy: it denies 
the existence of social beings and relations, and instead asserts t: ) 
a set of mostly - and in many cases explicitly - untrue or very 
partial assumptions, which are justified by their instrumental 
value for enabling simple and parsimonious models that are 
able to predict certain allegedly important things. 
On this view the development of economic theory can be seen in terms of a 
aeneral contentment with fitting abstract formula to ex-post empirical traces and 
a concomitant creation of evermore complex formulas. For Patomaki, this has 
meant a conflation of arguments for free trade with arguments for free movement 
of capital while reality would severely undermine the latter exercise. As he 
observes: "Typically and in most cases only with minor modifications, the 
models of economists support the thesis of optimal efficiency of free market 
capitalism, quite independently of the specific context under discussion. " (Ibid. 
13). And he argues that this has acted to reduce economics to little more than an 
ideological exercise: 
Obviously, the suspicion is that ideology is, indeed, the reason 
for the hegemony of economics. Typically, at least 
individually and in the short run, the free markets ideology 
runs in accordance with the interests of those entitled to make 
investment decisions in capitalist market economy ... (Ibid. 
14). 
Thus the response for Patomaki is to engage with the historical and 'real' 
structures that might tell us more about the feasibility of the Tobin Tax. Echoing 
cosmopolitan concerns, Patomaki critiques the growth of financial speculation 
within foreign exchange markets for seemingly being divorced from and capable 
of upsetting trends in the real economy and polity. He cites the numerous 
financial crises that hit towards the end of the twentieth century as a key 
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justification for the Tobin Tax. And he builds on arguments by Ignacio Ramonet 
that "Absolute freedom of movement of capital undermines democracy and we 
need to introduce machinery to counter its effects... " (Ibld. 30). 
Importantly however, he takes the argument beyond these common observations Z: ) 
to highlight the democratic leverage of the Tobin Tax in I the context of the very 
critiques of feasibility marshalled against it: principally the question of evasion. 
To that end, NIGD support the two tier taxation rate of Spahn and crucially, by 
noting the unilateral applicability of the tax they elaborate a two stage agenda 
whereby a state or group of states can initiate the first phase before moving 
towards a universal tax in the second phase. The argument begins by stressing 
the feasibility of taxing foreign exchange markets: L- -- 1ý 
The problems of tax evasion are practical and technical. If 
they are used as argument against a tax, the logic must be the 
following: since X will be able to find ways to evade these 
taxes, X should not be taxed. But this is fallacious. Given that 
there is a case for taxing X the right conclusion should be: X 
should be taxed, and the loopholes should be closed. Even a 
stronger conclusion might be possible: creating loopholes 
should be penalised, too. (Ibid. 36). 
Patomaki rebuts the standard critique of evasion by arguing that the tax can be 
made at the point of trade. "In the case of spot transactions, the actual currency 
transactions are quite clear. They are also visible in the case of forward 
transactions: a counter party is already paying for the currency he is soon going 
to get from the other country. " (Ibid. 38-39). In the case of swaps - where the 
underlying transaction is already taxed - he argues that they should not be 
exempted, thus taxing them double: "This would mean throwing more sand in 
the wheels of global financial markets, and is well in accordance with the idea of 
the Tobin Tax. " (Ibid. 39). And he uses such engaged technical analysis to infer 
some direct ethical consequences in the form of new demands on governance. 
In all cases the payment of the tax should be split into two: the 
seller pays half, the buyer pays the other half. [ ... ] When the 
tax is levied on a national basis, banks cannot avoid it by 
moving their dealing sites to tax free locations - to countries, 
whose governments do not collect the tax. (Ibid. 40-41). 
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But he argues, "... even in the case of a low global tax, there is a need for a tý 
supranational authority for three reasons. " 
Firstly, there must be a body that closely follows 
developments in the currency markets, quickly initiates 
actions when problems occur, and provides a forum for 
discussions and decision making concerning relevant 
developments in the financial markets and improves the Tobin 
Tax campaign. Secondly, there is also a need for a collective 
body that sees to it that countries really implement the 
principles and rules of the Tobin Tax. This body must be 
given power to sanction non-complying countries. Finally it 
must also be responsible for collecting, with the national 
authorities, the tax revenues, and allocating them further. 
(Ibid. 41-42). 
This is comprehensive stuff. By undermining the principle of evasion and placing 
the responsibility for collection with national states, Patomaki opens up the 
possibility considered by Spahn that a non-universal tax could be implemented. 
But instead of seeing this as a second-best option, rather he sees it as a step along 
the way to a far more ambitious project: 
In its first phase, the system should consist of the euro-EU 
and a group of other countries, or a bigger group of other 
countries without the EU. However constituted, this 
grouping should establish an open agreement - any state can 
join at any time - and a supranational body orchestrating the 
tax and collecting the revenues... (Ibid. 5 1). 
2. "In its second phase, which should be carried out either 
when all major financial centres and most other countries 
have joined the first phase system, or at latest by, say, year 
2010, a universal and uniform Tobin tax at a relatively high 
rate would be applied. (Ibid. 52). 
In this way, Patomaki takes the Tobin Tax beyond a technical reform, an 
instrument of global justice - though he of course concentrates on both of these - 
and turns it into the apex of a political campaign for institutional reform. As a 
contribution to the discussion of cosmopolitan democracy it is politically 
grounded and, in some ways, his argument for a Tobin Tax Organisation takes us 
beyond the common proposals by cosmopolitans to reform existing institutions, 
suggesting a new body with an array of possible applications. And he notes two 
of the key themes of cosmopolitanism as central to the TTO: 
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Two ethico-political issues of organising the TTO are 
particularly important and delicate. First concerns the structure 
and decision-making rules. The second is about the allocations 
of resources. DemocracY should play a major role in 
deliberations about the first, while social justice seems to be a 
more important consideration in the latter. (Ibid. 85) 
He argues that the TTO could be crucial to the answering the question of how 
democratic ideals might be worked out in a "world of globalised power and inter- 
dependency relations". In this regard he argues that it is important to recognise 
that certain non-liberal states will need to be engaged and included within the 
system: 
Instead of any exclusion, all states should be included in the 
TTO. Despite possible deficiencies in the legitimacy of some 
states, we should assume that they represent their populations 
and weiyh the decision-making powers of them in the TTO 
accordingly. The rule should be qualified majority decision- 
making with secret ballots. (Ibid. 86-87). Z: ý 
And the TTO would be dedicated to the achievement of global democracy and 
.n 
, global social 
justice. not as a bluepnnt, but rather as a process. As NIGD (Ibid. 
87) explains: 
Let us suppose that the TTO would have two main bodies, the 
Council of Ministers and the House of Democracy. The House 
of Democracy should comprise representatives from those 
national parliaments whose members are appointed by multi- 
party elections and a sample of interested and concerned civil 
society actors, picked through a screening procedure and 
lottery. Even though the inclusionary, state-centric Council of 
Ministers would have a stronger say in decision-making, the 
House of Democracy should be fully empowered to set 
motions as well as to have control over the budget and a 
qualified veto power over some of the major decisions of the 
Council. 
While other articulations exist, that set the Tobin Tax within the auspice of the 
UN Economic and Social Security Council, it is fair to say that NIGID's proposal 
remains the most comprehensive, politically grounded and ethically ambitious 
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project. While it has a critical attitude towards cosmopolitan democracy per se, 
the proposal makes a significant contribution to the discourse. 
5.3 Ambiguities of Cosmopolitan Democracy via a Tobin Tax 
As the preceding sections demonstrate there are numerous points of convergence 
between cosmopolitan democracy and the Tobin Tax. Cosmopolitan attempts to 
address global democratic deficits by reforming the very institutions and 
processes that are causing the deficit would seem to support the Tobin Tax in 
conceptual terms. The idea of 'reining in' foreign currency speculation, restoring 
autonomy/power to states, building democratic supranational authorities and 
partially using the funds to politicise global governance can all complement the 
project of cosmopolitan democracy. Indeed, in some of NIGD's more forward 
lookincy suacrestions, the Tobin Tax campaign can be seen to offer up innovative 
new organisations of global governance that would repay cosmopolitan analysis. 
However, these programmes are not without detractors. On the one hand, 
traditional critiques that 'all this is simplýy unlikelY! ' may seem particularly 
appealing when such scholars start envisaging organisations that will unite the 
world in a form of democratic revolution. On the other hand, there are a number 
of ethical questions to be posed in this discussion that focus on the foundational 
and universal assumptions of cosmopolitan democracy. It is further argued that 
the critique of assumptions is placed in sharp relief when extended to the Tobin 
Tax as a mechanism for reforming the global financial architecture. The chapter 
makes two critiques of cosmopolitan democracy and suggests that they are lent 
greater substance when they are considered in relation to the Tobin Tax. 
Firstly, despite a long tradition of opposition to the idea that the state can serve as 
the locus of political authority, it is argued that a system of multilayered 
cosmopolitan global governance rests on a number of state-centric foundations. 
Such critiques point to the state centrism of certain foundational assumptions 
within cosmopolitanism to argue that very little has actually changed regarding 
the locus of political power and its perceived practices of inclusion/exclusion. 
This critique is born out by a proposal like the Tobin Tax that is placed on 
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-national' currencies, levied by 'state' central banks and organised by a 
supraterritorial organisation where states have the defining role in decision Z71 
making. At the very least, an ethical approach to financial reform would want to 
say something about the arbitrariness of being born into a strong stable currency 
zone vs. a weak one 
And secondly, a common charge of cosmopolitan arguments - that hold on to the 
principle of moral universalism - is that they simply export a European model of 
politics. As Winfried Thaa (2001: 504) argues, such agendas "tend to overlook 
that political deliberation, agency and practice presuppose commonalities such as 
historic experience, communication based on everyday language, and commonly 
accepted institutions. " In the case of the Tobin Tax, for instance, the trust in 
institutions required to support such a project is most clearly felt within the 
history of Keynesian welfare systems and ongoing attempts to re-construct them 
in a Post-Bretton Woods financial system. Whether such a project of global 
reform is agreed with by those southern advocates of de-globalisation and 
localization is a critical issue within the Tobin Tax campaign. 
5.3.1 The State-Centrism of Cosmopolitan Democracy via Tobin Tax 
As Chapter One argued, traditional critiques of cosmopolitan democracy have 
tended to portray it as simply unlikely. Political realists stress the challenges that 
cosmopolitanism must face. They normally argued that ethical reform on a world 
scale is simply unlikely given the interests of powerful states or private interests. 
However, the thesis has consistently argued that such points miss the mark in 
terms of developing an ethical critique of cosmopolitanism. On the one hand it 
leaves cosmopolitanism basically untouched as the appropriate normative 
paradigm of world politics. On the other hand the position fails to recognise the 
implications of a general acceptance of this paradigm on the part of global policy 
makers, civil society activists and academics alike (whether they think it feasible 
or not). 
Another line of critique has questioned the possibility of universal morality 
itself. Writers in the communitarian tradition have launched a number of assaults 
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on the foundational categories of cosmopolitanism. Writers like Sande], Walzer, 
and McIntyre have undermined the notion of the 'individual' that resides in 
cosmopolitan theories as an abstraction that would only be understood in 
western contexts. Instead they posit that ethical communication is only possible 
within the situated and particular social mores of a community. The inference is 
twofold. Firstly, cosmopolitan arguments all too easily turn out as the Z: ) 
imperialism of western thought and traditions. And secondly, attention should Z: ) 
instead be turned to theorising the particular ethics of communities. In this they 
raise the question of the power of foundational assumptions. 
While sympathetic to these lines of critique this debate between cosmopolitans 
and communitarians has certain limiting effects. On the one hand, it has 
produced a trend amongst cosmopolitans of seeking ever more impartial starting 
points. Endless qualifications of a position risk a step away from 'the political' 
and a dilution of the actual ethical argument. On the other hand, communitarians 
posit a further universal foundation in the sense of a 'particular'. That is to say in 
place of the cosmopolitan universal individual, communitanans make a claim to 
have identified the universal of ethical 'community'. In place of the abstract box 
of the 'individual' we are presented with the abstract box of the 'community'. 
Such a dichotomous debate is arguably self-perpetuating and somewhat 
irresolvable (Parker and Brassett, 2006). 
Instead, this thesis has sought to think through the possibilities, ambiguities and 
limits instantiated by cosmopolitan arguments. On this view, a sympathy for the 
desire to expand the scope of ethical concern that inspires cosmopolitans is 
retained. However, it remains sensitive to the political and epistemic moves that 
they inevitably make. Claims to speak about the world - no matter how well 
intentioned - also construct the limits of the possible. In that sense, a clear 
internal contradiction can be found in the state-centrism of cosmopolitanism. 
For post-structural authors, a significant problem with cosmopolitan models of 
democracy is a re-production of state-centric logics of representative democracy. 
By providing an account of global governance, cosmopolitan democrats 
inevitably make certain epistemic moves that risk reifying particular signifiers. 4: ý 
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In short cosmopolitans risk re-producing what they seek to overcome, namely: a 
territorialized and state-centric bureaucracy that defers questions of ethics to 
institutional processes. In this sense, the critique builds on Rob Walkers (2003) 
argument that theories of politics must be seen in some sense as themselves L, 
constitutive of the problems they seek to solve. As James Brassett and Federico 
Merke (2005) argue, this is not to dispense with cosmopolitanism: L- 
Developing the importance of actors and institutions above, Z1- below, and regional to the state, would certainly go some way 
towards reforming the exclusionary power of the state. But, an 
important distinction must be drawn: despite the theoretical 
depth of these approaches, from a Derridean perspective, they 
turn out as technical solutions to technical problems. 
Theoretically speaking, they construct a system within which 
to include (subsume? ) a plurality of communities. They 
neither undermine the system, nor, more importantly, question 
the very concepts of community, justice, or democracy. 
In this sense, to posit additional actors to the state does not - of itself - 
undermine the impact of state-centric cartographies of politics and the political. 
For his part. Nick Vaughan-Williams (2006) has critiqued the foundational 
category of citizenship that resides at the heart of much cosmopolitan discourse. 
Taking the example of cosmopolitan hospitality towards foreigners, he argues, 
that this hospitality is always-already limited, conditional upon and policed by 
the laws of the state. While hospitality would at first sight appear to increase the 
rights of a 'citizen of the world' over and above the state, in fact, the limited 
hospitality of the 'cosmopolitan ideal' simply reprises the centrality of the state 
in our thinking of the ethics in world politics. Cosmopolitanism actively 
produces the ethico-political problems it apparently seeks to resolve. The state 
still remains at the heart of his cosmopolitan hospitality and "[t]his is 
problematic since it is precisely the state that produces the foreigner, immigrant, 
exiled, deported, or stateless person in need of greater levels of hospitality in the 
first place. " 
How does this critique inveigh upon the Tobin Tax? First and foremost the 
Tobin Tax is designed to be levied on national currencies. On one level, this acts 
to legitimise - and shore up -a system whereby financial players effectively bet 
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larc, e on small marains with little benefit for the real economy. In particularly 
dramatic incidence this involves widespread and often co-ordinated speculation 
against a single currency. On another level, the Tobin Tax leaves unquestioned 
the very notion of nationally demarcated currencies. This is ethically 
questionable because currency has such a large impact on the welfare 
possibilities of individuals. If you are born into a country with a strong currency 
there is a greater chance of achieving financial credibility. Certainly, the welfare 
possibilities for states in strong and stable currency zones are far greater than for 
those in weak and unstable zones. Likewise, being born into a country with a 
weak currency increases the likelihood of suffering a financial crisis or 
experiencing a weak welfare state because any available funds are invested in 
foreign currency reserves. 
While this critique is quite 'profound' and it may seem unfair to criticise the 
Tobin Tax for reifying structures so large and entrenched as to be almost 
unchangeable, it nevertheless points to a weakness in the ethical case for Tobin 
Tax. Firstly, what starts out as a seemingly quite large critical weapon against 
global finance, turns out on closer examination to be something which actually 
entrenches that system. Secondly, the institutional architecture, as envisaged by 
NIGD, would leave states at the crucial nexus of decision making. For all the 
critical worth of Patomaki's arguments then, it seems that the edge is blunted by 
an institutional proposal where the "state-centric Council of Ministers would 
have a stronger say in decision-making". And thirdly, drawing these points 
together, there is a consistent failure to explore alternatives. 
For example, an impressive, 'If ambitious, proposal for alleviating speculation on 
currencies is the old argument from economics that there should be only one 
single global currency (Frankman, 2002). Or else, there could be different forms 
of currency that resist the idea of paying interest on loans or savings. Such Local 
Exchange Trading Systems (LETS) are already well established forms of 
monetary organisation that reduce and sometimes eradicate the possibility of 
speculation. For those who would argue that these arguments miss the revenue 
raising potential of the Tobin Tax, this is potentially a fair point. But taxing 
currency is not the only way to raise revenues or effect justice. Closing down tax 
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havens would, for instance, have a dramatic impact on the tax receipts of many 
states and could be used for re-distributive purposes. 
5.3.2 The Euro-centrism of Cosmopolitan Democracy via a Tobin Tax 
Building from this notion of state-centrism in cosmopolitan democratic z: 1 
arauments there is a further question of euro-centrism. Most fundamentally the Z-- I 
idea of the state - and its political sovereignty - as the basis of political theory 
are practices that emerge from European Enlightenment thought. This euro- 1-n 
centrism poses certain challenges to the political effectiveness of cosmopolitan 
ambitions. For instance in one paper Heikki Patomaki (2003: 353) argues, 
... the project of cosmopolitan democracy is, among other 
things, about building a sense of identity of citizenry as a 
whole. Then the problem becomes one of transforming people 
and collective actors to accord with the preferred democratic 
world order. It is also clear that there will/would be 
differences between the states and areas with respect to their 
progress towards the requirements of the model of 
cosmopolitan democracy and that many actors, including 
many states, would also straightforwardly oppose such a 
development. 
However, there is a deeper sense in which the euro-centrism of cosmopolitanism 
creates cntical problems. This works at the limit of cosmopolitan ethics to 
question the very desirability of the conversation itself. As Vaughan-Williams 
(2006, forthcoming) argues, there is a lot at stake in the claim that universalism 
in cosmopolitanism is simply the cultural logic of European progress: "the 
teleological view of universal history underpinning the Kantian ideal is itself 
grounded specifically in Greco-Roman, Christian, and therefore 
Westerri/European thought. Kant's narrative of the unfolding of nature leading to 
the victory of reason that in turn leads to the emergence of a society of nations 
cannot be read outside the context of modernity and European colonialism. " 
The very building blocks from which cosmopolitans begin - foundational 
assumptions like the state, the citIzen, democracy, and dIaloIgue - are culturally 
tied epistemic signifiers. This is important because it infers that the very 
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vocabulary with which any discussion of cosmopolitan democracy proceeds is 
tainted by a certain history of colonialism. In short, in a Derridean sense, the 
other cannot be respected as other because a definition of the other - as subject, 
as foreian, as 'south' - has been imposed in a prior cultural linguistic C- 
Z: ý Z: ) engagement. So even when an impartialist account of the space and practice of 
political democracy is elaborated by Bohman, he uses language that is situated. 
As Winfried Thaa (. 
C, Z: ) 
2001: 504) argues, such agendas "tend to overlook that 
political deliberation, agency and practice presuppose commonalities such as Z-- 
historic experience, communication based on everyday language, and commonly 
accepted institutions. " When such historic commonalities are violent ethical 
questions must be asked. 
This argument is placed in sharp relief by the question of the Tobin Tax and 
broader questions about the reform of global finance. Firstly, in terms of content, 
the idea of the Tobin Tax emerges from post-Keynesian debates about how to re- 
embed liberal welfare states after the demise of the Bretton woods system of 
fixed exchange rates and capital controls. This obviously implicates the 
campaign in a historically specific set of relations that are most evident amongst 
the economists and policy makers of the US, Britain and a number of European 
states. At best such contingency means that the subject of deliberation over the 
Tobin Tax is culturally difficult to grasp for anyone not involved in this history. 
At the worst, there is potential imperialism of European ideas regarding welfare. 1-n 
Thus secondly, there may be difficulties for creating a global dialogue around the 
Tobin Tax as a basis for cosmopolitan democracy? Building form the previous 
point there may be a degree of resistance to the perceived euro-centrism of what 
Walden Bello (2005) refers to as the 'Back to Bretton Woods Project', i. e. those 
northern, white, educated economists and policy makers who 'tinker' at re- 
embedding the 'global financial architecture'. On this view, one of the key issues 
in the Tobin Tax campaign is that it rests on an implicit trust that large financial 
and governmental institutions can solve major societal problems. For people in 
states where welfare systems have provided healthcare, education, defence, and 
sound infrastructure, the Tobin Tax is a conceivable extension of social 
democratic ideas. However, for those who live in countries where the welfare 
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state has provided little, taxed a lot but spent the majority of its finances on 
repaying debt, buying foreign bonds or sending its elites to foreign universities, Z: ) :n 
the idea is not unambiguously attractive. t) 
Conclusion 
This chapter has elaborated how cosmopolitan democratic arguments might be 
used in support of the Tobin Tax. Liberal and deliberative arguments both 
suggest that a realm of global economic policy is developing which requires 
opening up to greater accountability and inclusion. While the former suggests 
specific reforms that might support the Tobin Tax, the latter is more concerned 
with the bottom up processes of publicising cosmopolitan 'reasons' regarding 
non-domination. It was argued that each of these arguments lends a partial 
support to the Tobin Tax as a way of reining in unaccountable global power or 
as a mechanism for fostering positive liberty. In addition, arguments emerging 
from i0thin the campaign have developed additional resources in terrns of a 
critical and emancipatory bent. 
However, a number of critiques were ranged against a cosmopolitan democratic 
argument for the Tobin Tax. Firstly, the model of a Tobin Tax organisation re- 
produces a state-centric logic of representative democracy. Patomaki is quite 
clear that the Council of Ministers in the TTO would have a 'stronger say in 
decision making'. This defers questions of the ethical to agreement between 
states who may not ultimately uphold cosmopolitan reasons. And secondly, even 
though this approach sets out to be more democratic and dialogic in its pursuit of 
such goals, we should not perhaps ignore the important role of Euro-centric 
histoncal experiences is making this possible. Specifically, the trust in 
institutions that is required to support such a project is most clearly felt within 
the history of Keynesian welfare systems and ongoing attempts to re-construct 
them in a Post-Bretton Woods financial system. 
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Despite the worth of cosmopolitan democratic approaches then, recourse to the 
Tobin Tax campaign illustrates the question marks that arise when we engage Cý 
the content of deliberative processes. However, the next chapter argues that it is 
precisely by engaging with such processes that alternatives may become 
thinkable. As Kim Hutchings (2005: 165) surmises in a critique of deliberation, 4n 
To seek a mode of dialogue in which power is bracketed out [ ... I 
is 
to underestimate the weight of moral responsibility carried in 
communication. This responsibility is not equivalent to the equal 
distribution to each person of a duty to speak for themselves and 
listen to others, according to the principles inherent in a shared 
communicative rationality. Rather, it is a responsibility, in the 
context of opacity of meaning and radically inegalitarian power 
relations, to put your own assumptions into question and strain to 
imagine what it might mean to be and think differently. Zý Z7 
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6. Pragmatic Cosmopolitanism: 
the Tobin Tax Campaign as Sentimental Education 
Introduction 
If cosmopolitanism is a name to be given to an openness to 
connections, to a sense that we all participate in various 
patterns of both commonality and diversity that are not and 
cannot be fixed by the lines inscribed by modem 
subjectivities, and that also Insists on recognizing the radically 
uneven developments and sites in which people struggle to act 
in the world, then there is much to be said for it. [ ... ]I prefer to underline its status as a question, and a practice, rather than 
a given ... (Walker, 2003: 284-285). 
We remain profoundly grateful to philosophers like Plato and 
Kant, not because they discovered truths but because they 
prophesized cosmopolitan utopias - utopias most of whose 
details they have gotten wrong, but utopias we might never 
have struggled to reach had we not heard their prophecies. Zlzý (Rorty, 1998b: 175). 
The thesis has explored the ethical dimension(s) of global finance broadly, 
conceived. The central research objective has been to critically analyse the 
possibilities and limits of cosmopolitan ethics in global finance. This is important 
because it addresses a pressing question of global finance: how to understand and 
address its ethical vagaries? Rapid developments in global financial activity - the 
expansion of markets in debt, equities and currency - have exacerbated ongoing 
instabilities within the global economy/polity (Murphy, 2000; Higgott, 2000). 
And as Chapter One argued, attempts to reform global financial governance have 
generally rested on technical economic agendas to improve transparency via 
existing combinations of state-centric institutions and private market actors 
(Langley, 2004; Meltzer, 2000). Developing cosmopolitan approaches that seek 
justice and democracy is an interesting and potentially beneficial course to 
expl ore. 
The subject is also important insofar as it contributes to an emerging political 
cosmopolitanism. To date, attempts to extend cosmopolitan arguments to global 
finance have been suggestive rather than concrete; intimating ways in which to 
think about principles of fairness and accountability in the context of global 
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financial institutions and actors (Coleman and Porter, 2000). Beyond the 
traditional realist and/or positivist critiques of such an approach - that it is 
idealistic or Simply unlikely, Chapter Two argued that cosmopolitan approaches 
to global finance should speak to ongoing political practices. The development of I tn' C, 
a -rounded ethical critique of cosmopolitan ethics in global finance via an 
analysis of the Tobin Tax was therefore supported. 
Chapters 2-5 have established a pragmatic praxis towards these questions. For a Z71 
pragmatist, all knowledge is practical knowledge and a praxeologleal intent 
requires that cosmopolitan ideas about global justice, democracy and fairness 
should be intertwined with ongoing political agendas like the Tobin Tax. For 
instance, as Chapters Three and Four argued, the campaign for a Tobin Tax as 
currently contituted contains strong moral arguments for global re-distribution 
that are substantively and semantically similar to Pogge's (2002) arguments for 
global justice. Thinking through the proposals and the problems and possibilities 
inherent in each contributes to their development as well as a critical awareness 
of their limitations. In this vein, Chapter Four argued that limitations in the Tobin 
Tax proposal can illustrate telling ambiguities in proposals for global justice. 
And Chapter Five found cosmopolitan agendas to democratise the global public 
sphere (Bohman, 1999) that are echoed in the Tobin Tax campaign re-produce a 
state-centric and universalistic logic of global democracy. 
Drawing these points together, the thesis argues that cosmopolitanism is a 
promising, but limited, agenda for reforming global finance. Problems of 
historically contingent power structures and the multiple silences of financial 
knowledge question whether any one agenda of institutional reform could ever 
make finance more 'ethical' (De Goede, 2005: 147). Using the Tobin Tax 
campaign to illustrate, it is argued that deep ambiguities pertain to the possibility 
of cosmopolitan ethics in global finance. In straightforward terms, the 
institutional project of 'Inclusion' and the practical solution proposed - throvlý 
money at it - fall shy of an appreciation of the complexity and context(s) of 
injustice. Further, it reifies the financial system as a single unitary whole which 
we must react to, failing to explore alternatives that may arise in the context of 
partially or non-developed financial systems (Op Cit. ). 
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However, as Chapter Five suggested and Chapter Six will now explore in more 
detail, from a pragmatic perspective the conversation may be of value, per se. r7l 
Just as cosmopolitans like Bohman (1999) celebrate campaigns that publicise 
'cosmopolitan reasons' to a larger audience including global institutions, a 
pragmatist is able to find value in a 'limited' agenda like the Tobin Tax because z1- 
it illustrates an imaginative way of doing global finance to a larger and larger 4: 1 4: 1 
audience. While there are certainly contests and dilemmas within the campaign, 
it is precisely in these contests that new and imaginative directions may be found. 
My central thesis is therefore that the Tobin Tax can be understood as a too] of 
sentimental education. It provides a simple heuristic metaphor for understanding 
globalisation and a way to change it. The power of this metaphor has led it to 
occupy a central stage in a burgeoning global civil society and it is repeatedly Z: -ý Z!: 7 
included in discussions at the World Social Forum (See Patomaki and Taiveinen, 
2004). And, importantly, the ambiguities that pertain to it - entrenched financial 
universalism and poor attention to democratic initiatives that fall outside of 
, -Iobal/universal mechanisms - are highlighted within the campaign itself. In 
discussions that continue in social forums, in public meetings of NGO's, and 
(even) the stylised narratives of charities, the opacity and technicality of finance 
can be de-naturalised. Such discussions disturb the black box of global finance 
and open it up to the broad based democratic conversation that cosmopolitans 
seek. While there may be no guarantee of the outcome of such conversation this 
chapter identifies a number of ways in which it can act to expand our vocabulary, 
identifying limitations in the current vocabulary and proffering alternatives that 
might be developed. 
The chapter proceeds in three sections. Section I defines pragmatic 
cosmopolitanism and shows how the Tobin Tax can be seen as a tool of 
sentimental education. Section 2 highlights some instances of the practice of 
sentimental education in the Tobin Tax campaign, using evidence 
from the War 
on Want campaign. And Section 3 recounts some 
instances where the 
ambiguities of the Tobin Tax have been raised and alternatives identified 
in the 
public sphere of the campaign. 
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6.1 Pragmatic Cosmopolitanism and the Tobin Tax 
This section draws the central theoretical strands of the thesis together by 
I recounting the limitations with existing cosmopolitan arguments for justice and 
democracy via the Tobin Tax found in Chapters Four and Five. This discussion 
sets the context to re-describe the problem of the thesis as one of thinking 
through cosmopolitan ideas, identifying ethical limits and suggesting possible 
alternatives, a task addressed in the next section via a narrative of the Tobin Tax 
campai om. Zýl 
Following, on from the theoretical framework developed in Chapter Two, a 
pragmatic cosmopolitan approach to the Tobin Tax involves three related steps 
1) a recognition of the contingency and resultant ambiguity of many of our moral 
precepts, 2) an ironic disposition about what 'we' value and why, and 3) an 
experimental attitude towards the construction of solidarity against suffering. In 
pragmatic fashion, cosmopolitanism - and cosmopolitan arguments for a Tobin 
Tax - can therefore be seen rather like 'attempts' (amongst many others) to make 
global finance more ethical. 
Stripping cosmopolitanism of its foundations and instead seeing it as a paradigm 
cattempt' allows for a more suitable rendering of the Tobin Tax is as sentimental 
metaphor: a too] for provoking sentimental responses to the suffering caused 
by/within global finance and illustrating some ways in which it might be changed 
(Brassett. 2006). As Chapter Two argued, for the conversation to remain open it 
is unlikely that we will ever reach a final definition of what counts as meaningful 
suffering, so the suffering caused by poverty and the suffering caused by 
imposing (violent) subjectivities like 'poor', 'financial' and 'citizen' must be 
engaged simultaneously. Thus, as Jenny Edkins (2003: 257) notes in an 
analogous discussion of the relative merits of humanitarian sentiments vs. 
humanitarianism, "It is not an either/or contradiction but a question of doing 
both, somehow. " 
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1.1 The Tobin Tax as an Ethical Limit 
Cosmopolitanism is an important addition to global governance scholarship in 
L, eneral and global finance in particular. Arriving on the back of widespread In I 
acknowledgement of the limitations of the Washington Consensus and bolstered C) 
by the newfound zeal for 'legitimacy' among policy actors in the global financial 
architecture, cosmopolitanism represents a promising avenue for introducing 
ethics to global finance (Brassett and Hi gott, 2003). Subject areas that were ý1- 9 
previously dominated by technical and economic expertise have subsequently 
pushed appeals to democratic inclusion and civil society participation onto the 
list of reforms that had centered on fiscal rectitude and informational 
transparency (Murphy, 2000). 
However, the analysis of cosmopolitan ethics in global finance via a Tobin Tax 
has exposed a number of possible ambiguities. In terms of cosmopolitan justice 
via the Tobin Tax three key ambiguities were identified. First, the Tobin Tax 
requires a well developed financial system, including capital account 
convertibility, in which to operate (Kim, 2003). Advocates in partially or non- 
developed financial systems are therefore faced with a curious aim: to push for 
capital account convertibility in order to then rein it in. This is a paradoxical 
agenda for many states where the debt repayment schedule far outstrips the 
welfare budget in the first place. Adding further financial openness to these 
economies - even if tempered - is unlikely to deal with the lack of indigenous 
economic development or financial strength (AFROAD, 2000). Second, 
regardless of whether or not the tax can be implemented or not, it is clear from 
all estimates that the majority of the revenue will be levied in a select group of 
wealthy states (Griffiths-Jones, 1996: 148). Thus, if 'cash', is to be redistributed 
it will have to flow from the wealthy (northern) states to poor (southern) states. 
And thirdly, the Tobin Tax is ultimately a cash-based instrument that neither 
fully escapes charity or ODA models of justice, nor does it undermine the 
existing structures of finance. Such an agenda risks forcing a spurious and 
violent subjectivity upon populations, that they are either 'Rich' or 'Poor'. For 
instance, when asked in an interview whether the proceeds from the Tobin Tax 
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could be directed to poverty alleviation in the UK, David Hillman replied: "No. 
The UK is a developed country where welfare systems are established. We have 
,, 4 to direct funds towards poverty in the South . While there may be a debate over 
levels of poverty, this straightforward geographical division is insufficient. :n 
In the case of cosmopolitan democracy via the Tobin Tax the following 
ambiguities were identified. First, the Tobin Tax is levied by states. For a 
cosmopolitan tradition bent on thinking outside the polis, this would surely 
represent a contradiction or at least a major challenge (Vaughan-Williams, 2006). 
The supposed re-articulation of citizenship is therefore still dependent on the 
same logic of representation and accountability that defines the state-centric, 
inside/outside logic of political theory that cosmopolitans seek to escape 
(Walker, 1993). And secondly, it was argued that the principle of consensus at 
the heart of cosmopolitan democracy via the Tobin Tax all too easily falls down 
on a universal proposition: some form of world government. Even in Patomaki's 
more sophisticated and dialogical model, his proposed Tobin Tax Organisation is 
still a world authority (1999: 87). And possibilities for de-linking or establishing 
local autonomous or regional authorities is ignored or seen as a step on the way 
towards full global co-ordination. Arguments articulated within a cosmopolitan 
framework therefore (re)produce a (western) logic of power and identity that is 
not by definition the 'answer'. As Heikki Patomaki himself sunnises, a key fault 
in cosmopolitan democracy is a foundational use of citizenship that quickly 
achieves a status of blueprint model: 
... the project of cosmopolitan 
democracy is, among other 
things, about building a sense of identity of citizenry as a 
whole. Then the problem becomes one of transforming people 
and collective actors to accord with the preferred democratic 
world order. It is also clear that there will/would be 
differences between the states and areas with respect to their 
progress towards the requirements of the model of 
cosmopolitan democracy and that many actors, including 
many states, would also straightforwardly oppose such a 
development. (Patomaki, 2003: 353). 
4 Interview with David Hillman, conducted July, 2003, War on Want offices, Clapham. 
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However, to what extent do such ambiguities undermine cosmopolitan ethics as Z71 
an embedded way of thinking and acting in the world? To be sure, there is merit 1_ý 
in the arguments of post-structural critics that see some uses of 'ethics' as a : _n 
means to entrench a specific logic of existence. For instance, Rob Walker (2003) Zn 
has argued that Held (re)entrenches a spatial layering of power that neither Z__ 
escapes nor criticises territoriality as such. As William Connolly argues "territory 
is sustaining land occupied and bounded by violence. By extension, to 
territorialize anything is to establish exclusive boundaries around it by warning 
other people off. " (Cit. Patomaki, 2003: 354). Moreover, it is a serious critique 
of cosmopolitan 'models' that they sometimes fail to explore alternative forms of 
local or regional level organisation, except insofar as they contribute to the 
establishment of a global organisation. In this way, cosmopolitan ethics via a t: ) Zn 
Tobin Tax can be seen as a limit. 
However, a key argument of this thesis is that from a pragmatic perspective the 
ethical limits of cosmopolitanism should not be seen as an end to the story. 
While some versions of post-structural thought may seem to suggest that there is 
little to be resurrected from ethical frameworks like cosmopolitanism, as did 
Caputo (1993) when he declared himself to be against ethics, it is perhaps an 
exaaaeration to reject such frameworks because they reify particular 
'subjectivities' or because they bear a western hallmark. A cosmopolitan could 
well argue that the money generated from a Tobin Tax could save lives by 
funding much need healthcare and/or food and water. And the possibility of 
global democratic co-ordination would mark a modest improvement on current 
circumstances. Indeed many advocates of the Tobin Tax regard it in precisely 
this way: a beginning for global ethics not the end point. As Harlem Desir 
argues, 
"The Tobin Tax is not the miracle cure for all the ills of the world. 
It does not exhaust the debate on economic regulation, on 
globalization and on North-South relations. But it could be the first 
step towards the construction of a global economy in which growth 
would sustain co-development and the reduction of inequalities. 
(Desir Cit. Desir and Ford, 2000: 36). 
The space for a pragmatic cosmopolitanism therefore seems apparent. 
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Following Rorty, this requires us to give up on the idea of finding an 'answer' to 
the question of global ethics. Instead, it would be better to think about t) 
cosmopolitanism - and cosmopolitan ideas like the Tobin Tax - as 'attempts' 
(among many others) to reduce suffering, tn 
[D]ilemmas we shall always have with us... [T]hey are never 
going to be resolved by appeal to some further, higher set of 
obligations which a philosophical tribunal might discover and 
apply. " 
We have to start from where we are.... What takes the curse off 
this ethnocentrism is not that the largest such group is 
"humanity" or "all rational beings"... but, rather, that it is the 
ethnocentrism of a "we" ("we liberals") which is dedicated to 
enlarging itself, to creating an ever larger and more variegated 
ethnos. (1999: 197-198). 
As Chapter Two argued, if we were to unpack Rorty's understanding of "we 
liberals" then the argument holds telling implications for the Tobin Tax 
campaign. At some level, it can be argued that campaign activists have given up 
on the idea of finding a 'once- an d-for-al F answer to global ethical problems. 
Instead they direct their energies toward experiments in reforming global 
governance, forming linkages around issues and following them through in the 
hope of creating a constituency (witness Stamp Out Poverty's recent move in 
support of Air Ticket Levies 5 ). Likewise pragmatic cosmopolitanism would 
respond to the limits and ambiguities of the Tobin Tax with similar experiments. 
Understandings of suffering are contingent, changing and unlikely to be fully 
resolved. All we can do is continually expand the scope of what counts as 
meaningful suffering via ongoing practices of sentimental education and suggest 
mechanisms to mitigate such suffering (Brassett and Bulley, 2005). Drawing on 
Rorty, a cosmopolitan ethic can therefore be based on irony and self doubt, 
... the self-doubt which 
has gradually, over the last few centuries, 
been inculcated into the inhabitants of the democratic states - doubt 
about their own sensitivity to the pain and humiliation of others, 
doubt that present institutional arrangements are adequate to deal 
with this pain and humiliation, curiosity about possible alternatives. 
(Rorty, 1989: 198). 
5 www. tobi ntax. oFg. uk/? Iid= 10 196 
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And it is this 'curiosity about possible alternatives' that creates a significant 
value-added. A pragmatic approach takes seriously the limits and ambiguities of 4: ) 
developing cosmopolitan ethics in global finance. But it argues that it is only In Z: ) zn 
the democratic conversation about such ambi-ulties that we can we educate our 
sentiments about them and find alternatives. 
The next section argues that the Tobin Tax campaign has created a viable forum 
in which to continue this conversation. As the campaign has spread across 
countries and audiences, it has proved remarkably capable of involving diverse 
voices in a conversation - albeit sometimes fractious - over the development of 
global financial ethics. In this way, it has contributed to the evolution of Cý 
cosmopolitan space for imaginative deliberation over possible alternatives to 
talobalisation and the monolithic image of global finance. 
6.1.2 EmiaLYM2 Ambi(2uitv: the Tobin Tax as a sentimental metai)hor 
My own view is that it is not much use pointing to the "internal 
contradictions" of a social practice, or "deconstructing" it, unless 
one can come up with an alternative practice - unless one can at 
least sketch a utopia in which the concept or distinction would be 
obsolete. After all, ei, eiý, social practice of any complexity and 
every element of such a practice contains internal tensions. (Rorty, 
1991: 16). 
From a pragmatic cosmopolitan perspective, the task is straightforward, if 
infinite: to continue the struggle(s) to realise cosmopolitan ethical utopias while 
remaining aware of their "Internal contradictions". The product of such struggles 
is not to be thought of as truth, or greater knowledge, or even the 'answer' to 
global ethics. Rather, the best product we can hope for is an increasing awareness 
and sensitivity to the connections between people. As Rorty argues: "The best, 
and probably the only, argument for putting foundationalism behind us is the one 
I have already suggested: it would be more efficient to do so, because it would let 
us concentrate our energies on manipulating sentiments, on sentimental 
education. " (Ibid. 176). 
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While some of Rorty's remarks may smack of complacency, it is fair to 
remember that the position is based on an honest recognition of the tensions that 
pervade liberalism. Rorty has never written off ironic thought. Indeed, as Chapter 
Two argued he has clearly opened the space to engage ironic approaches, as 117, 
when he argues: 
On my definition, an ironist cannot get along without the contrast 
between the final vocabulary she inherited and the one she is trying to 
create for herself. Irony is, if not intrinsically resentful, at least 
reactive. Ironists have to have something to have doubts about, 
somethinc, from which to be alienated. (Rorty, 1989: 87-88). 4: 1 
On this view, it can be argued that a pragmatic cosmopolitan approach to the 
Tobin Tax campaign performs a dual function of both celebrating the expansion 
of a conversation about global financial justice and engaging with the contests 
and contradictions that pervade that conversation. 
To qualify. the pragmatic cosmopolitan approach elaborated here is subtly, but 
crucially, distinct from the more Deweyan version espoused by Molly Cochran 
(2002). For Cochran the problem with cosmopolitan democracy is not its ethical 
limitations, but rather its political mechanisms. She argues that writers like David 
Held have been too concerned with 'top-down' mechanisms for institutionalising 
fairness and accountability. Instead she looks to the deliberative democrats, like 
Bohman and Dryzeck, who seek a bottom-up approach. However, despite her 
emphasis on the 'agent' of cosmopolitanism, Cochran stops short of a full 
recognition of the ambiguity and unpredictability of that agent and the ethics it týl 
espouses. As she attests: 
Cosmopolitan democrats must theorize the democratic 
potential of bottom-up processes, but in particular, how 
[International Public Spheres] and their members - 
individuals - come together, work to resolve 
indeterminacies, and make their views authoritative in 
international decision-making. This is what a pragmatist 
approach to the concept of [International Public Spheres] 
contributes to the consideration of democracy at the 
transnational level. (2002: 519). 
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On this argument, it seems that the content of the cosmopolitan public sphere is zn 
to be valued when it is able to 'oi, ercome' its indeterminacies and make its views 
'authoritatwe'. Just as with the cosmopolitan democrats considered in Chapter 
Five, there seems to be little concern placed on substantive content of 
deliberation: the process is perceived as an apriori good. 
The pragmatic cosmopolitan approach advocated here would precisely question 
the content of the public sphere. By playing off cosmopolitan proposals with 
ironic critiques, analysis is situated m4thin the ethical ambiguities of the 
campaign. For instance, the Tobin Tax does not undermine the structure of Z: ) 
financial universalism, nor does it take us far beyond the charity or ODA models 
of alobal justice. The administration of the tax would be by states and (perhaps) Z-- 
gover-ned through some cosmopolitan authority like the TTO, or the IMF. And z 
representation would be primarily territorial with the slight caveat that civil 
society groups/NGOs would be given a voice in discussions. 
Recognising such ambiguities is not a nihilistic position. Indeed, as Louise 
Amoore and Paul Langley (2004: 105-106) argue, the very opposite is the case: it 
is by not recognisIng these dilemmas that problems are created: 
... within a named and assumed civil society grouping 
there are 
tensions surrounding 'who' is being empowered, or 'what' is being 
resisted. To deny these tensions in a search for a single galvanising 
manifesto or agenda is to miss the very heart of the politics of 
transformation. 
On this view, the campaign itself can be seen as an instance of the contested 
politics of a cosmopolitan public sphere. This Chapter argues that it is by going 
to the campaign - its discourses and contests - that pragmatic cosmopolitanism 
can move beyond the banal but important 'publicity' that Bohman discusses and 
find the space for innovative and imaginative alternatives. And it is in this sense 
that the Tobin Tax is perhaps better understood as a tool of sentimental 
education. It is argued that the Tobin Tax and the different ways it 
has been used 
in the campaign, has played the role of a sentimental metaphor in two ways: 
183 
1) It provides a simple heuristic, a metaphor of global finance as 
I controllable' and 'changeable' which is easily understood. 
2) The malleability of the sentimental metaphor means that - like human rights - it can be used in diverse ways for different 
purposes. In this way conservative reformist articulations of the 
tax can co-exist alongside radical and transformative ideas, which 
might include cfitique of the tax, providing for a more Zý' tl 
sophisticated form of education. 
Importantly, this twofold understanding of the ways in which the campaign is 
conducted allow for conflicts and alternatives to be openly debated. It is here that 
sentimental education can become more than mere platitude. Re-describing the 
Tobin tax as a sentimental metaphor allows us to engage with the ambiguities of 
cosmopolitan justice via concrete democratic discussion, opening up the space to 
make alternatives thinkable. In this sense cosmopolitanism becomes a reflexive 
political project. 
At one level, the Tobin Tax is a remarkably effective 'conversation opener'. This 
can be in terms of illustrating to broader publics the hann done during financial 
cnses. An important technique of TT campaigners is to dramatise the social and 
political impact of financial crises (War on Want, 2000). It may also be in terms 
of straightforward communication about the vast sums of wealth involved in 
foreign exchange trading. Likewise, organisations including the UN have 
emphasised what the potential revenue could buy: medical vaccinations, disaster 
relief, and education resources etc (Kaul and Langmore, 1996). 
At another level, once the conversation has begun there are clear instances when 
the ethical limits of the Tobin Tax are readily exposed within the campaign. This 
can be through public criticism of the tax by Marxists and post-Developmental 
activists in social forum discussions. lt can also be via detailed technical studies 
of how the tax fits in different countries. As Chapter Four argued, even the 
advocacy of AFRODAD (2000) involved a stark appreciation of the limited 
applicability of the tax in Africa. And finally, the use of the tax to articulate de- 
globalising and local-ist resistance strategies has directly confronted the 
universalist models of cosmopolitan renditions of the Tobin Tax (Bello, 2002: 
96; Hines, 2001: 112). 
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Touether, these aspects of the Tobin Tax campaign combine to make it an active Z-- Z: ) 
and fertile forum for the development of cosmopolitan and critical sensibilities 
towards global finance. And in this sense a pragmatic cosmopolitan would seek 
to support and develop the conversation. 
6.2 The Tobin Tax as a Conversation Opener 
Most people in a general audience would not be expected to 
understand the financial arguments, although very many would Cý 
certainly respond to the obvious social justice principles under- 
girding such proposals. Staying within this campaign construct, the L_ 
Tobin tax has wide appeal because both the problem and the 
solution are easy to grasp, and the usual audience will rarely ever 
have to pay that tax. This campaign-ability of the Tobin tax issue is 
responsible in part for the political momentum the issue currently 
enjoys in several countries. The campaigners' audiences are the 
committed and the principled general public. (Griesgraber, 2003: 
15"). 
Griesgraber's comments indicate that there is more going on in the activities of 
campaigners than the straightforward representation of 'cosmopolitan reasons 
(Bohman, 1999). Strategies of communication are fundamental to the success or 
failure of campaigns. And her argument that non-technical audiences respond to 
the "obvious social justice principles under-girding" the Tobin Tax underlines 
the important ethical vocabulary of the tax. This section will address the first way 
in which the Tobin Tax acts as a sentimental metaphor through providing a 
simple heuristic, a metaphor of global finance as 'controllable' and 
'changeable' that is easilY understood. 
The aim is to illustrate how the Tobin Tax is an effective too] for educating 
general audiences about the arcane world of global finance. It draws on 
principles underlying the tax, documentary sources on how different groups 
campaign for the Tobin Tax, as well as, participant observation of public 
discussions in social forum meetings (London, 2003; Paris, 2003 & Mumbai, 
2004). Broadly speaking, it provides a narrative of the campaign and how it has 
developed within global civil society generally and via one campaign in 
particular: War on Want's Tobin Tax Network, which has now been renamed 
Stamp Out Poverty. 
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The narrative is followed through to the position it now holds as (arguably) a r: 1 
rather curious perennial at the World Social Forum. This curiosity is evoked 
because the radical, anarchistic and subversive principles embodied in many 
aspects of the World Social Forum do not sit easily with a straightforward 
reformist proposal like the Tobin tax. 
6.2.1 A Simple Idea with a Large Impact: Tobin, ATTAC and the WSF 
"... many[ ... ] have said there are two good reasons to be in favour of the Tobin Tax, firstly to slow down and reduce 
speculation and secondly, to increase revenue indispensable to 
the poorer countries. I would like to add a third reason which 
is to develop grass-roots organisations and a movement in this 
direction. " (Agulton Cit. Desir and Ford, 2000: 17). It- 
Traditional engagements with Tobin Tax have attempted to supplant it with a 
certain logic - economic, political or ethical - that is used to explain its role in 
something larger. Typically, critical academics like to portray the Tobin Tax as a 
Polanylan 'second-movement' (Hellemer, 2001). On this view, globalisation is a 
shift towards market liberalisation and Tobin gave us an effective spur to re- 
regulate. More critical approaches then tell a story about how the progenitors of 
this second movement are the organic intellectuals at the helm of an historical 
watershed. For instance, In a study of ATTAC, Birchfield and Freyberg-Inan 
(2005: 1611) argue that the network "contains elements of organic 
intellectualism" and that the call for a Tobin Tax can be seen as a "clever 
discursive move" (2005: 161) which allowed ATTAC to fulfil a 'deeper' logic of 
resistance: 
... the emergence of 
ATTAC seems theoretically congruent with a 
Gramscian framework in that it can be seen as a response to the 
ideational and material forces of the latest phase of global capitalist 
instability. Linking the structural crisis of global capitalism to the 
local realities of everyday life of ordinary citizens and wage-earners 
is an important step in establishing connections between the 
material power of capital and its ideological influence on the state... 
However, this thesis is unconvinced by such arguments on two grounds. First, 
globallsation is not reducible to a market/society split. As Chapter One argued, 
globalisation is better understood as a multi -dimensional (economic, social, 
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political, psychological) and multi-level (individual, local, national, regional, 
Zglobal) process that encompasses a re-spatiallsation of life. Dialectics between 
economy and society do not tell the whole story (Scholte, 2005: 121-154). And 
second, from a Rortyan perspective, the thesis is sceptical of attempts to tie the 
Tobin Tax into a 'critical education' project that somehow identifies the 'true 
reality' of global capital and identifies a way to resist it, if on/Y we all understand 
and agree. This is not simply an intellectual question regarding the diagnosis 
provided by neo-Gramscian political economy. It also opens up space for 
thinking through new forms of resistance by detracting from the debilitating 1ý 
binary of 'us' and 'them'. 
The narrative presents a less theorised version of events. Simply stated, the 
campaign can be valued for its ability to involve more and more people in a 
discussion about global financial governance of which they previously would t) 
have not have heard. It does not need to be tied to anything larger. As a too] of 
sentimental education then, the Tobin Tax is a simple idea with a large impact. 
As Bernard Cassen (2003: 43) recounts: 
Since Tobin was an establishment economist, a Nobel Prize- 
winner in economics from the United States at that, his 
proposal possessed a certain automatic initial legitimacy, 
serving to highlight the scandalous character of the flows of 
global speculation today. So for the purposes of agitation, it 
makes an excellent weapon. But, of course, we never for a 
second thought that the Tobin tax was the one solution to the 
dictatorship of financial markets. It was just one point of entry 
to attack them. 
Such strategic thinking does not fit so easily within the discourse of 'second- 
movements' or vanguard elements. Instead, it depicts an honest appreciation of 
the limitations of the tax as well as a celebration of its capacity to open up the 
opaque nature of financial markets to a larger audience. Indeed, the role of the 
Tobin Tax in the story of ATTAC is now a legend of global civil society. 
Founded in France in 1998 after the Asian Financial crisis, ATTAC was set up 
with a proposal to tax financial markets as its mandate (Ancelovici, 2002; Cassen 
2003; Birchfield and Freyberg-Inan, 2005). Very quickly the membership of 
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ATTAC grew to around 60,000 and it formed affiliate groups across the world in 
some 40 countries. It drew on the French tradition of popular education and 
public discussion became the modus operandi of ATTAC. Membership is now 
largely middle-class, educated and white. It includes journalists, academics, 
doctors, teachers amongst others (Cassen, 2003). In small public meetings held in 
schools and cinemas, experts are invited to talk on subjects like the Tobin Tax in 
an effort to make understandable the often complex and arcane world of the 
global economy. And this strategy is known by the French term sensisbilisation a 
French word meaning 'to make sensitive to'. 
In addition, ATTAC has been able to form links with NGO's and Trade Unions 
across the world; successfully establishing the World Social Forum (WSF) 
movement as a counter point to the World Economic Forum (WEF) in Davos. 
(See Patomaki & Teivainen, 2004). Of course, there have been important 
political deals and manoeuvrings that underpinned the development of the WSF 
movement. It is not claimed that the Tobin Tax caused the WSF. But it is a basic 
observation that within this political mobilisation the Tobin Tax has been a 
significant and changing policy symbol that expresses some of the contests and 
ambiguities of the actually existing cosmopolitan publics involved in global civil 
society. As Bemard Cassen argues, 
The Tobin Tax is above all a symbol -a first attempt [ ... ] to 
affect a finance system that too often places itself above or 
outside of the law as in the case of fiscal havens. It is this 
symbolism, more than its content or cost, which profoundly 
irritates those in the financial sector and which above all 
pleases citizens. That is why this measure is present in all 
international movements and why it is here to stay. (Cit. in 
Desir and Ford, 2000: 17). 
However, within this symbolism, within this sentimental metaphor, neither the 
Tobin Tax idea, nor the groups which advocate it remain fixed or clearly 
demarcated quantities that fulfil a straightforward role as either cosmopolitan 
reason, or cosmopolitan publics. Groups like ATTAC, War on Want, NIGD, 
WEED, and the Halifax Initiative have contributed to thinking about global 
taxation in a political context - i. e. the need to secure funding, influence 
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institutions, gain membership, form linkages with likeminded organisations, etc. 
In this sense, and beyond the 'legend' of ATTAC, there is much to be gained in 
terms of an understanding of the politics of cosmopolitanism that is often missed 
bN, models and theories of justice/democracy. This is not to give up on justice by 
turning to politics - as Chapter Two argued it is not possible to sustain any such 
separation. Rather it is to expand the conversation. The next part will address the 
evolution of one campaign - War on Want - in the context of this evolving 
constellation. 
6.2.2 Sentimental Education in Practice: War on Want and the Charity Discourse 
War on Want is a development NGO founded in 1951, based in south London 
with close ties to the Labour Party and the Guardian Newspaper. It enjoys links 
with numerous Christian groups and faith charities and sources considerable 
funding from those organisations. While its campaign objectives are wide, 
including the promotion of human rights, trade justice, tax justice, and 
development, it has consistently targeted poverty as an over-riding concern. As 
its website introduction asserts: 
"War on Want knows that poverty is political. The decisions of 
politicians in rich countries can mean life or death for people in 
developing countries. We have the power to reshape the global 
landscape - to ensure that people across the world can 
live in justice 
and peace. " (www. waronwant. org). 
The group adopted the Tobin Tax campaign at the end of the nineties, first under 
the direction of Steve Tibbett and then David Hillman. It embraced the campaign 
more comprehensively in 2002 when it established the Tobin Tax Network: a 
grouping of over fifty campaign agencies, charities, faith groups and trade 
unions, which organisations like Oxfam, Christian Aid, Unison and the united 
Reform Church. And it has linked up with the Make Poverty History Campaign 
under the title 'Stamp Out Poverty' btti): HwxN, w. tobintax. or,! ý. uk/). 
War on Want has used the Tobin Tax as a campaign tool to 
lobbying the 
Treasury and Department for International Development (DFID), as well as, 
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creatino awareness at social forums and other public discussions. Importantly, in 
a number of policy documents it has actively contributed to the intellectual 
development of the Tobin Tax. This section will analyse some of the key 
activities and arguments of C) War on Want identifying the ways in which it 
contributes to the practice of sentimental education. 
The Tobin Tax Network has focused on the revenue raising potential of the 
,6 Tobin Tax what David Hillman describes as the "discourse of social justice' . In 
a number of policy briefs the NGO has funded experts to produce detailed 
studies of how revenues could be leveraged to fight poverty in a way that would 
be acceptable to governments and business (War on Want 2002; 2002a; Kapoor, 
2003-, Spratt, 2005). In particular the key campaigners - David Hillman, Sony 
Kapoor. Avinash Persaud - have rapidly taken on a strategic edge, attempting to 
leave behind their self professed incarnation as the "sandal wearing brigade" 7 to 
promote a more hardnosed and economically credible version of the Tobin Tax. 
Therefore the version of the Tobin Tax promoted by War on Want has changed 
markedly over the course of the campaign. Under different campaign leaders the 
group has shifted its focus from a universal Tobin Tax at 0.1 % (War on Want 
2002a) through a Currency Transactions Tax (Kapoor, 2003), to a unilateral I-- 
'Stamp Duty' on Sterling at 0.005% (Spratt, 2005). Cý 
As well as promoting an ambitious version of the Tobin Tax, the initial 
incarnation of the War on Want campaign, under Steve Tibbet, contained many 
of the democratising and transformative dimensions of the Tobin Tax highlighted 
by writers like Heikki Patomaki (2001). For instance, the keynote report 
(tellingly) entitled Pie Robin Hood Tax called for 
a new, body under the aegis of the UN to formulate policy on 
the tax, to oversee compliance and to decide how to spend the 
revenue. The body could be called the Global Development 
Commission and it would necessarily involve a body to 
distribute the revenue, made LIP of independent but elected 
advisors .... 
(War on Want, 2002: 3). 
6 Interview with David Hillman, conducted July, 2003, War on Want offices, Clapham 
7 Comments by Avinash Persaud at the Stamp Out Poverty, Progress and Action meeting, 19 th 
November, 2005, Camden Town Hall. 
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However, as the personnel changed at the War on Want and David Hillman took 
over to form the Tobin Tax Network, many of the larger aspects of the Tobin Tax 
were dropped and the advocacy became focused on a more straightforward 
'Currency Transactions Tax' to raise revenue for development (Kapoor, 2003). 
Indeed, a recent report commissioned by Stamp Out Poverty even articulates a 
version of the tax that would be a unilateral lobby. It argues for a simple levy by 
the UK government via the central bank (Spratt, 2005). And the aim is to raise 
revenues to contribute towards the UK's commitment to the Millennium 
Development Goals. The campaign has therefore undergone a substantive shift 
from Tobin's original proposal to a unilateralist augmentation of the Spahn tax to 
raise revenues for foreian aid. Z: ) 
Despite these discursive shifts the modus operandi of the campaign has remained 
consistent throughout. The aim is to set up a simple narrative and re-produce for Cý 
diverse audiences, namely: 'Bankers make vast amounts of moneY by betting on 
currency. This exacerbates poverty and there exists a simple solution - the Tobin 
Tax - to both calm speculation and raise jundjorpovertýy. 
This narrative is often augmented with various strategic touches. For instance, 
War on Want are adept at bringing in famous endorsements like Jon Snow, 
Baroness Shirley Williams who participated in the making of the Tobin Tax 
video (see below). And they have used academic economists like Rodney 
Schmidt and financial market players like Jim O'Neil to add to the credibility of 
their proposal with technical audiences. But the basic narrative remains the same: 
an easily communicated account of what globalisation is followed by the Tobin 
Tax as a way to change it. In this way War on Want use the Tobin Tax as a form 
of sentimental education about the suffering caused by global finance and the z: 1 
ethical possibilities that exist. 
A clear example such sentimental education can be found in the Earth to the 
Moon leaflet distributed at social forums and campaign presentations across the 
world. The cover of the leaflet shows a faceless man in a suit carrying a stack of 
fifty pound notes that stretches to the moon above with the phrase: "Imagine a 
stack of E50 notes reaching from the Earth to the Moon... " Inside the cover there 
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are three sides of text and a cut out postcard intended for the reader to sign and 
send to Gordon Brown. The text reads: "Incredible as it may seem, a pile of 50 
pound notes stretching from the earth to the moon truly illustrates the 
astronomical size of the money market each year. " The proposition gives a direct 
and quantifiable image of the 'problem of globalisation' and continues the 
narrative outlined. 
Millions upon millions of dollars, euros, pounds and yen are 
traded every day - mainly by banks. Imagine now, adding 
together everything that is bought and sold in the world - like 
all food, housing and transport. The money trade is worth 
more than 50 times the value of all these other markets 
combined. It is the richest by far, yet amazingly, this trade is 
not subject to any specific tax at all. Even a tiny tax on this 
enormous pile of money could bring millions of the world's 
poorest people out of poverty. 
Importantly, the leaflet also deals with some of the more arcane problems of 
finance under the heading: Financial Shocks. "An extremely unpleasant 
dimension of this huge money trade is that the economies of vulnerable countries 
can be ruined, as powerful financial actors target certain currencies to make vast 
profits. " It argues that a two-tier Tobin Tax is not only feasible but that there is 
an emerging political will to back it in the guise of the "historic Millennium 
Development Goals": "France has already passed Tobin Tax legislation and UK 
Chancellor Gordon Brown, has said he is 'open-minded' to currency transactions 
taxation. But he needs to be convinced and that's where you come in. " 
The aim is to persuade the reader to send a postcard to the Treasury and then 
when enough postcards are received, the Treasury will arrange a meeting with 
War on Want. On this view, sentimental education is used. The practice of 
sentimental education is therefore instrumentally tied to the discourse of charity 
espoused by War on Want. 
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Playing on the same narrative War on Want launches many of its public Zn 
presentations with a campaign video. 8 The video is narrated by Jon Snow and 
tells a similar story about greedy bankers who are exploiting helpless and 
vulnerable financial systems in developing countries. One banker refers to the 
moment of a currency crisis as one in which like sharks traders "smell the blood" 
of their prey. And in an interview David Hillman referred to the making of the 
video as an excellent learning experience where he found out that he could 
communicate the problem of development, not with words, but by simply 
-showing pictures of starving people. " Importantly, the video ends with Steve 
Tibbet's argument that there are no "morally relevant arguments against the 
Tobin Tax". 
To be sure there are clear limitations with the discourse of the Tobin tax 
elaborated in the War on Want campaign. It is geared towards a charity discourse 
and sometimes more focused towards elite level lobbying than issues of broad 
based public democracy Indeed the aesthetics of the campaign are sometimes Z_ 
particularly ambiguous. Its publications portray a stark dichotomy between rich, 
suit wearing 'bankers' and poor, starving 'black' people. Indeed, in one 
particularly ironic inversion at a recent Progress and Action Meeting of Stamp 
Out Poverty, the power point projection system reverted to a default picture of a 
'starving black woman' in between power-point presentations by suit wearing 
campaigners with laptop computers. 9 zn 
It could well be argued that the 'Stamp Out Poverty' campaign leaves 
unquestioned financial universalism and re-produces the Charity discourse of 
global justice. Perhaps this is unsurprising given that a number of its donors are 
indeed charities and faith groups? However, there is also a political adaptability 
in the way the campaign has developed. David Hillman has been able to target 
different audiences - civil society, Treasury, DFID - with a similar message. In 
this way, a conversation on global justice is opened. The final section will 
discuss how the tensions in this conversation can be engaged. 
8 http: //www. tobintax. oi-,;,,. Uk/? Ild=')546 
9 Stamp out Poverty, Progress and Action meeting, 19'h November, 2005, Camden Town Hall. 
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6.3 Exposing Ambiguities in Social Forums and Campaign Meetings 
As Davidson puts it, "speaking a language ... is not a trait a man can zn Z: ) Z: ) lose while retaining the power of thought. So there Is no chance that 
someone can take up a vantage point for comparing conceptual 
schemes by temporarily shedding ones own. " Or to put the point in Heidegger's way, "language speaks man, " languages change in the Z: )Zl Z: ) t: l 
course of history, and so human beings cannot escape their own 
historicity. The most the 
,v can 
do is manipulate the tensions within 
their oii, n epoch in order to produce the beginnings of the next 
epoch. (Rorty. 1989: 50 Emphasis added). 
While Rorty's call to "manipulate the tensions" is pitched at the level of epochal 
change. it is here argued that such a method can be identified and encouraged in I 
the Tobin Tax campaign. From the above analysis of the War on Want campaign, 
critics could be forgiven for wishing to dispense with the project. Not only is the 4-- 
Tobin Tax arguably unfeasible, but the campaign itself is publicising a rather 
jaundiced picture of the nexus between global justice and global financial reform. 
A Marxist or a post- Structural 1 st could be forgiven for having deep problems 
with the campaign and wish to look elsewhere. However, a pragmatic 
cosmopolitan could highlight how the tensions within the conversation are 
themselves producing new possibilities. To this end, it is aroued that the War on 
Want campaign should be seen in the context of the conversation it develops 
among campaigners and other advocacy groups. These groups interact and form 
linkages with other groups to publicise and refine the Tobin Tax proposal, as 
well as identify altematives like the recent adoption by Stamp Out Poverty of the 
Air Ticket Levy. 10 
Many panel discussions at the World Social Forum are co-sponsored meaning 
that conservative approaches like War on Want are juxtaposed with democratic 
reformist agendas like ATTAC and more critical propositions made by NIGD. In 
addition there are clear splits between different groups. Two leading campaigners 
Heikki Patomaki and Sony Kapoor regularly engage in open critique of their 
respective positions. And finally, but perhaps most importantly, the structure of 
'() www. tobintax. or(,,. u]J? Iid= 10 196 
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the public discussions in European and World Social Forums means that the 
audience are readily involved in criticisIng the agenda and suggesting 
alternatives. In social forum discussions, in technical reports, and in campaign 
meetings the limitations and ethical ambiOuities of the Tobin Tax are exposed. 
While such exposure is often conflictive and can sometimes produce broader 
divisions alono the line conservative/reformist/radical, it is suggested that critical 
space is also opened up for considering alternative possible futures of financial 
J ustice. 
The public meeting co-sponsored by ATTAC and War on Want at the European C) 
Social Forum, 2003, was attended by approximately 200 people and the 
presentations and discussion were translated simultaneously into 10 languages. 
The meeting opened with a presentation of the War on Want video and David 
Hillman gave his presentation of the evolution of the Tobin tax. In an interview 
just previous to the presentation he identified three discourses of the tax 
including stability, autonomy and social justice. Bruno Jetin followed his 
presentation with a discussion of the technical aspects of the tax. Then the 
conversation was opened to the floor. 
A clear ambiguity arose when one delegate took issue with Steve Tibbet's line for 
the Tobin Tax video that "there are no morally relevant arguments against the 
Tobin Tax". Against ATTAC's advocacy of the Tobin Tax to curb global 
financial speculation and raise revenue for development, Marxists critique such 
ventures because they "legitimise the right of investors to speculate against a 
currency, a country, the producers, the workers and its people". 
" Just as Chapter 
Four argued, the moderation of the CTT reform leaves unchecked and benefits 
from (at least some) of the speculation it seeks to criticise. 
In a similar vein, ATTAC Finland has published multi -perspective books that 
critique any easy claims to morality in the Tobin Tax proposal. Heikki Patomaki 
(2005: 17) accused the War on Want version of the tax of being about "charity", Z: ) 
"The aim is to get the rich countries, and the UK in particular, to establish a tax 
II Delegate of the European Social Forurn, Paris. 2003. 
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on currency transactions, the revenues of which they can use also as ODA 
(Development Aid), on their own terms and subject to their assessment of the 
need. " He accuses the campaign of being "uncritical about the current practices 
of the ODA, assuming that it suffices to give money through the traditional 
channels of bi- and multilateral aid, i. e. that ODA is the way to eradicate 
poverty. " And he suggests (2005: 19) that such models are complicit with the 
current financial system by accepting "the neo-classical idea that liquidity trading 
is rational and will therefore enhance the efficiency of the markets". In this way, 
a more sophisticated discussion of global finance is evoked. 
At a recent Progress and Action meeting of Stamp Out Poverty, 12 David Hillman 
billed the main point of the day - to launch their report on the Stamp Duty on 
Sterling - as having the strategic objective of "de-linking the two tiers" of the L- 
Spahn tax in order to "focus on the lower rate" revenue raising tier. They wanted 
to break the "stereotype that NGO's are big on sympathy and empathy but low 
on hard headed realism. " 
While the meeting was effectively a campaign oriented day, designed to focus on 
past successes and future challenges, ambiguities began to arise when the 
questions were asked. One delegate asked what the connection was between the 
Stamp duty and the MDGs. "Why would the UK spend the levy on MDGs 
instead of say, poverty in this country? " Avinash Persaud responded that it would 
be "hard to persuade them" But David Hillman said the money must be ring 
fenced for International Development as it is "historically tied to ODA" or else, 
he threatened, the NGO coalition would "go public". A further question from the 
audience attacked the idea more fundamentally when he argued: 
The problem with the Tobin Tax - which says it's going to 
solve all our problems - is that it doesn't question anything. 
It 
doesn't question the system. Money is created out of nothing. 
Why do we pay interest on money? Stop tinkering with Tobin 
Tax and address the fundamental issues. I am a member of the 
campaign for interest free money. 
13 
12 Stamp Out Poverty, Prog-Tess and Action meeting, 19'h November, 2005, Camden 
Town Hall. 
t: 1 
13 Comments by delegate at the Stamp Out Poverty, Progress and Action meeting, 19 
November, 2005, Camden Town Hall. 
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Such questions go to the heart of the issue of financial universalism. By 
undermining the entire basis of global finance, particularly the idea that charging 
interest, it could be suggested that this view is too radical, too transformative to ZNn 
even get consideration. However, it is precisely in the context of such attempts to C) 
undermine the limit of financial universalism that ethical alternatives become 
thinkable. For instance, it is precisely in the context of a realisation of the limited 
applicability of the Tobin Tax in Africa that one report (AFRODAD, 2000: 6-7) 
lists potential alternatives, including 
1) Halting financial liberalization 
... 2) Imposing feasible capital 
and exchange controls at the earliest opportunity... 3) Z! ) 
Distinguishing between inflows of hot money and production 
oriented foreign direct investment (FDI) ... 4) Revisiting current 
and capital accounts including imports and foreign liability 
structures with a view to reducing current and capital account 
vulnerabilities. 5) Redirecting financial resources into productive 
purposes, including meeting human needs, away from largely 
speculative and unproductive outlets. At a general level this 
involves changes being made in domestic monetary and financial 
regulation to both enhance the security of investment portfolios 
and to direct funds to much more production and basic 
consumption-onented ends. 
In this way a sophisticated discussion of global finance emerges from the very 
limits of the campaign. Treating the Tobin Tax as a metaphor that promotes Z-- 
sentimental education allows us to operate at the limits of global financial 
knowledge, educating our sentiments about the ethical possibilities of global 
finance and, where necessary, undermining existing knowledge. 
Conclusion 
The chapter has outlined a pragmatic approach to cosmopolitan ethics developed 
via an engagement with the Tobin Tax campaign. Section I placed the argument 
in the context of certain limitations and ethical ambiguities within 
cosmopolitanism in general and cosmopolitan articulations of the Tobin Tax, in 
particular. It then outlined a pragmatic extension of the paradigm by re- 
describing the Tobin tax a sentimental metaphor. 
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Rather than view the Tobin Tax as a more or less accurate depiction of global 
financial justice - that we could all sul)port so long as we understand the truth - 
it \xas argued that it is perhaps better to see the idea as too] of sentimental I 
education. Section 2 illustrated the role of the Tobin tax as a sentimental 
metaphor in two stages 1) as a mobilising idea for ATTAC and the social forum 
movement in general, and 2) as 'conversation opener' used by War on Want and 
their charity discourse of the tax. Although there are obvious limitations to some 
of the dominant framings of the Tobin Tax, Section 3 recounted moments and 
events within the campaign where the ambiguities of cosmopolitan global 
finance via a Tobin tax were openly identified. It was argued that it is precisely 
in these moments of confrontation that alternatives become thinkable either by 
highlighting the way that the Tobin Tax is bound up with a monolithic image of 
global finance, or via the straightforward suggestion of better and/or 
complementary alternatives like LETS or de-linking. 
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7. Conclusion 
The thesis has argued that the question of ethics should be a subject of critical Z-: ) 
scrutiny for scholars of IPE in general and those concerned with global finance 
and the Tobin Tax in particular. This argument was made via an analysis of the 
possibilities and problems for the development of cosmopolitan ethics in global 
finance using the case study of the Tobin Tax. The study revealed a number of 
ethical limitations and ambiguities in the theorisation of global 'ustice and 
democracy. A praxeological method based on the philosophical pragmatism of 
Richard Rorty was employed to both engage with these questions, as well as 
identify routes beyond them. 
This Conclusion is divided into four sections. Section I recapitulates the main 
arguments and findings of the thesis. Section 2 reflects upon the wider 
implications of these findings and the central contributions they make to both the 
discipline of ILPE and the study of global ethics. Section 3 will discuss the 
research process and identify those aspects that worked well, as well as those that 
may be improved upon. And finally Section 4 will elaborate how the thesis leads 
on to a future research agenda. Briefly, the theoretical framework of pragmatism 
can be developed against contemporary articulations of the cosmopolitan 
paradigm as well as via alternative case studies of global ethics. In particular, 
emerging discourses of global trade justice found in both the dominant positions 
of leading trade negotiators associated with the 'Doha Round' of the WTO and Z7ý 
more critical positions of both Southern negotiators and civil society groups can t:: 1 
be analysed in terms of the ethical limits they generate. 
7.1 Main Argument and Findings 
Three broad arguments are made in this thesis. Firstly, the question of ethics 
should be a subject of critical scrutiny for students of IPE. Straightforward 
celebrations of 'ethics' on the one hand, as well as realist and/or positivist 
dismissals on the other, cannot begin to approach the importance and 
implications of various discourses of global ethics. Secondly, the growing 
popularity of cosmopolitanism as a research paradigm represents an excellent 
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means to animate and further the discussion of global ethics. But this research 
paradiam should be addressed by means of a grounded ethical critique that takes il-- 
account of both the benefits and limits of cosmopolitan theory in political 
context. And thirdly, by developing a pragmatic approach it was argued that 
cosmopolitanism should be seen as a contingent and experimental 'attempt' to 
reform global governance in general and - in the case study developed - global 
finance in particular. This section will re-capitulate how these general arguments 
were born out and developed via the specific case study of the Tobin Tax 
campaign. C) 
Cosmopolitan ideas regarding global 'ustice and democracy have experienced 
resurgence over recent years (Held, 1995; Habermas, 2001; Linklater, 1998; 
Pogge, 2002). Cosmopolitan ideas have been deployed to make sense of and 
provide critical reform agendas for the emerging practices of global economic 
governance (Held and McGrew, 2002). And the thesis was particularly 
concerned with recent articulations of a cosmopolitan approach to reforming 
global finance (Coleman and Porter, 2000; Germain, 2001,2002,2004; Porter, 
2001 -, Porter and Wood, 2002; Scholte. 2002b; Thirkell-White, 2004). 
Chapters One and Two introduced these ideas and addressed the limitations with 
the dominant responses found in IPE and global governance scholarship more 
generally. Two basic responses were identified and critiqued. Firstly, there is a 
tendency towards a straightforward celebration of 'ethics' as an inherently good 
thing that we should welcome. Secondly, on the opposite view, there are those 
realist and critical scholars who tend to dismiss talk of ethics and ethical 
discourses in global finance as unrealistic or simply unlikely. Stronger versions 
of this position suggest that ethics can all too easily act as the legitimising z! ) Cý 
rhetoric of powerful interests that acts to mask an ongoing and over-riding 
instrumentalism in global finance. 
Each response ignores the important constitutive aspects of cosmopolitanism. 
Cosmopolitan ideas regarding transparency, accountability, fairness and re- 
distribution are increasingly written in to the rules and procedures of global 
financial governance. Moreover, the role of cosmopolitan scholarship in the 
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education of business/policy elites infers that cosmopolitan theory carries an 
implicit political relevance which requires scrutiny. However, while 
cosmopolitanism represents an excellent 'hook' for developing ethical 
approaches to global financial governance, any straightforward celebration Zý 
should be postponed in lieu of both a study of actitall 
, i, existing cosmopolitan 
ideas and an analysis of their ethical limits (Fine, 2003: 465; Rorty, 1991c; 
Walker, 2003: 284, 185). Therefore Chapters 3-6 turned to develop a grounded 
ethical critique of cosmopolitan ethics in global finance via a case study of the 
Tobin tax campaign. Zý 
The Tobin Tax is a good case study of cosmopolitan ethics in global finance 
because it represents a clearly established campaign to reform global finance 
according to the principles of global justice and (in more recent articulations) 1: 1 Z: 7) 
global democracy. Moreover, its central place in a burgeoning global civil 7 
society means that the campaign itself represents an interesting example of an 
actually existing cosmopolitan public sphere. Chapters 4-6 identified clear ethical 
limits relating to financial, ethical and democratic universalism. lný 
In terms of cosmopolitan justice via a Tobin Tax, Chapter Four argued that two 
fundamental limitations can be identified in the Tobin Tax campaign, which 
highlight important questions for cosmopolitanism. Firstly, the Tobin Tax Zý 
requires capital account convertibility for its implementation. Thus a proposal 
that has been feted as an ethical reform of global finance actually requires a 
country to be exposed to global capital mobility in order that this can then be 
reined in. This is a somewhat paradoxical proposition that entrenches the logic of 
financial universalism. Secondly, even if universal implementation is not 
required (a popular position amongst advocates after Spahn, 1995), it is clear that 
the majority of revenues would be levied in wealthy, developed states. Thus, 
'justice' quickly reverts to a system of charity where money is taken from richer 
northern states and given to poor southern states. The combination of financial 
universality and advocacy of 'large' solutions like cash-based re- 
distribution/charity infers both the creation of violent subjectivities ('financial', 
gpoor', 'helpless', etc. ) and the preclusion of potential 'small' alternatives like 
de-linking, LETS and interest free money. 
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In the case of cosmopolitan democracy via the Tobin Tax, a number of 
ambiguities were identified. First, in many accounts the Tobin Tax is supposed to 
be levied by states. For a cosmopolitan tradition bent on thinking outside the 
polis, and indeed for a set of campaigners who refer to 'global justice', this 
represents a paradox. Attempts to re re-articulate logics of citizenship and 
representation are actually dependent on the same state-centric; inside/outside 
organising principles of political theory that cosmopolitans seek to escape tý C, 
(Walker, 2003). Secondly, it was argued that principles of dialogue, deliberation 
and/or consensus that underpin cosmopolitan democracy all too easily fall down 
on a universal proposition: some form of world government. As Chapter Five 
argued, even in Patomaki's highly sophisticated model, the proposed Tobin Tax 
Organisation is still a ivorld authority (1999: 87). This means that possibilities 
for 'de-linking' and/or establishing local autonomous authorities is either 
ignored, or seen as just one step on the way to full global co-ordination. 
Arguments articulated within a cosmopolitan framework therefore (re)produce a 
(western) logic of power and identity that is not by definition the 'answer'. 4- 
The case study of the Tobin Tax campaign therefore illustrated and developed 
the importance of a number of ethical limits and ambiguities constituted within 
cosmopolitanism. Simply stated, while an important and laudable addition to the 
scholarship on global governance, cosmopolitan approaches inevitably make 
certain epistemic moves which require scrutiny. In particular, an underlying 
universalism in the Tobin tax campaign re-produces many of the problems that 
its advocates wish to resolve. As Rob Walker (2003: 268) argues, 
44cosmopolitanism must be read as a constitutive aspect of the problems that 
many of those attracted to cosmopolitanism seek to address. " 
However, Chapter Six developed a pragmatic praxis in the context of such 
constitutive ambiguities. Drawing from the philosophical pragmatism of Richard Z-- 
Rorty (1989), it was argued that by politicising the limit/ethics of the Tobin Tax, 
we can both illustrate the drawbacks of current constructions of global finance as 
well as open up the space to suggest (ethical) alternatives. This approach was 
termed pragmatic cosmopolitanism. While cosmopolitanism may well draw from 
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a contingent and time-bound set of arguments, that has previously rested on an Z-1 Z: ý 
outmoded universalism, there is every reason to believe that it can survive after 
the pretence to universalism is dropped (Rorty, 1991 c). This argument was made 
in two stages. 
First, the Tobin Tax can be understood as a too] of sentimental education. Any 
discussion of the tax serves to illustrate for diverse audiences the potential 
suffering caused by global finance either through financial crises or by ignoring 
the huge possible benefits afforded by re-distributing a small fraction of the 
money trade. And second, it was argued that while sentimental education might 
appear a rather banal benefit, the conversation that has developed within the 
campaign is sophisticated and important. In campaign meetings, social forum 
discussions and expert technical reports, the very limits and ambiguities that are 
contained within the Tobin Tax become a subject of critique and contest. In this 
way alternatives are made thinkable and ethics becomes less about problem 
solvinL, and more about fostering an ongoing conversation. 
7.2 Wider Implications and Central Contributions 
The wider implications of this thesis are both disciplinary and theoretical. Firstly, 
IPE theorists who have embraced the sophisticated assumptions of critical theory 
and allowed ethical considerations into their research should reflect upon the 
question of ethics. 'nis requires an ongoing engagement with moral philosophy 
as well as a continued scrutiny of advocacy campaigns that draw on ethical 
imaginary. And secondly, a central contribution of this thesis is to develop a 
pragmatic approach to ethics and cosmopolitanism that draws singularly from the Z-- 
work of Richard Rorty. 
On the one hand, this contributes to the development of thinking about how 
pragmatism can contribute towards thinking about global ethics at a time when 
neat universal assumptions seem increasingly divorced from politics. On the 
other hand, a new understanding of global civil society as a space in which the 
substantive ethical content of campaigns is openly debated and contested has 
been elaborated. This section will reflect on each of these points in more detail. 
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7.2.1 Ethics and IPE? 
This thesis questions understandings of ethics and 'the ethical' in IPE. As 
Chapter Two argued, the growth in the popularity of critical IPE over recent 
decades has ushered in a degree of epistemological heterogeneity that allows for 
such thinking. By re-politicising the theoretical assumptions and substantive 
concerns of IPE (Hay and Marsh, 1999) the critical scholar is increasingly 
required to provide a normative account of what is to be resisted and/or 
supported (Brassett and Higgott, 2003). Indeed, much of the neo-Gramscian 4! ) 
literature on resistance can be seen in precisely this light (Gill, 2000; Murphy, 
2000). For such approaches, a critical analysis of the prevailing log c of , obal I ol 
neo-liberalism is understood as an essential foregrounding to the identification of 
appropriate modes of resistance. 
However, despite a laudable emphasis on the agency of reform, Chapter Two 
ar(yued that in the race to discredit positivism, neo-Gramscians may have 
produced the fallacy of a 'coherent' and 'knowable' ethics which can provide 
normative foundations for reform. A key implication of the thesis is to question 
the veracity and desirability of such a move. Likewise, in an analogous point, 
Nick Rengger (2000: 769) argues that a danger for international political theory 
is that it may "become seduced by the lure of thinking it can 'help'. " The thesis 
has therefore underlined the constitutive ambiguities of global ethics that are left 
underexposed in many contemporary IPE approaches. 
This is not just a theoretical point. It holds important implications for the 
advocacy positions of researchers and campaigners. For instance, the Tobin Tax 
has become so embedded in the imaginary of the globalisation debate that to 
speak of global justice or resistance to global neo-liberalism, very often, means 
to speak about the Tobin Tax. When Stephen Gill received his distinguished 
scholar award at the 2006 International Studies Association conference and was 
asked to outline the normative underpinnings of his work, he responded that he 
was "against injustice" and that he advocated the Tobin Tax. While he conceded 
that the tax was just a technical reform, he saw it as an important step on the way 
to j usti ce. 
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Examples of this conflation of the Tobin Tax with global justice abound. Harlem 
Desir (2001: 5) refers to the Tobin Tax as a "question of World Economic 
Justice". Heikki Patomaki (2001: xix) invokes John Rawls to argue that: "The 
Tobin tax is a way to make participants pay their fair share in maintaining the 
global financial system. " And Steve Tibbet of the British NGO War on Want 
states in a campaign video, "There are no morally relevant arguments against the 
Tobin Tax. " The point here is not that these arguments are all wrong. Rather, it 
suggests that the ethical limits and potential alternatives to such proposals are 
being overlooked as a subject of critical scrutiny. And it is this kind of scrutiny 
that could well be extended to other campaigns for global justice including in 
areas such as trade reform (See Section 7.4), environmental regulation, corporate 
accountability programs, etc. that all fall within the purview of IPE. In this way, 
IPE may become a key discipline in the study of the politics of global ethics. 
7.2.2 Pragmatism and Global Ethics 
The thesis makes a central contribution to the development of thinking about 
alobal ethics. The argument adds to emerging debates about how the 
philosophical pragmatism of Richard Rorty can contribute to the study of global 
ethics in general and cosmopolitanism in particular (Brown, 1999; Cochran, 
1999). 
The theoretical framework developed in Chapter Two and applied throughout the 
thesis has demonstrated the potential of Rorty's work to engage global ethics. 
Rorty is often regarded as a 'playful' philosopher who is content to indulge in 
philosophical games that are increasingly self-referential and prone to sophistry. 
Despite certain limitations though, it was argued that Rorty's arguments are not 
frivolous. Rather they are reflective of deep tensions in modern liberal thought. 
Following Rorty, where proclamations of 'True' or 'Rational' ethics are 
themselves understood as rhetorical moves and post-structuralism offers little by 
way of a positive program with which to combat large-scale suffering, the 
exhortation that we should engage with current vocabularies in political context 
and re-describe them to generate sentimental education is attractive. 
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More substantively, the thesis developed a pragmatic praxis towards 
cosmopolitanism and the Tobin Tax. While Rorty does not provide us with a 
'theory' of olobal ethics, it was argued that he provides a way of addressing both 1ý1 
public' liberal ethics, i. e. 'large' theories of humanist reform, as well as 'private' C, 
ironic approaches, i. e. post-structuralism, that can be useful. By playing off 
cosmopolitan arguments for alobal justice against ironic critique, a global ethics 
was evoked that remains sensitive to its own internal ambiguities and limits. 4-n 
Indeed, Chapter Six developed from this by following through Rorty's 
suggestion of a contingent and fallible form of cosmopolitanism, an approach he t__ 
describes as 'Cosmopolitanism without Emancipation' (Rorty, 1991c), which 
could form the basis of a pragmatic cosmopolitanism. 
Importantly, the pragmatic cosmopolitan approach developed in this thesis 
differs subtly, but crucially from the version developed by Molly Cochran (1999; 
200-1). It was argued that the Deweyan turn in Cochran's work has the effect of 
closing down the importance and creative potential of the public sphere she 
celebrates. Specifically, by failing to reflect on the ethical ambiguities of global 
civil society - emphasising its functionality in "making its view authoritative" 
(Cochran, 2002: 519) - such an approach risks silencing the ambiguities and 
ethical limits of global civil society. Instead, a pragmatic cosmopolitanism, based 
singularly on the work of Richard Rorty, is able to embrace the ironic voices 
within the public sphere, behaving more like a situated and embedded 'attempt' 
at global ethical reform. This approach points to a new way of thinking about and 
researching campaigns within global civil society, as an ongoing ethical 
conversation, rather than as a set of knock-down ethical arguments. 
7.3 The Research Process 
The research process for this thesis has involved a complex mix of theoretical 
and practical empirical work. Disciplinary and geographical boundaries have 
been crossed in the pursuit of a substantive ethical conversation. Such inter- 
disciplinary and global research is intrinsically important for the development of 
understandings of global ethics. 
206 
For instance, it was hard to conceive of the practical importance and difficulty of 
cosmopolitan ethics prior to taking part in social forum discussions and public 
mobilisations. These events demonstrate the complexities and disjuncture that 
pervade the global public sphere that is so attractive in cosmopolitan theory. 
Moreover, through observing civil society in action, it was possible to animate 
the praxeological aspects of the pragmatic cosmopolitan framework developed. 
In particular, the crossover between Rorty's notion of contingent and 
experimental reform and the way in which Tobin Tax campaigners pragmatically 
reflect upon and alter their positions was illuminating. 
However, the complexity also raised certain questions that may be addressed in 
future research. For instance, in any mix of theoretical and practical research It is 
possible that the balance is not always right, or perhaps not always satisfying. 
What began as a theoretical project on global ethics quickly developed a 
praxeoloo, ical focus that was oriented towards the substantive concerns of the 
Tobin Tax campaign. While this kind of cross-over is important for animating Z_ 
theory, at a certain point it became possible to conceive of a kind of under- 
theorised engagement. This is to say, the theoretical argument essentially 
supports the idea that cosmopolitanism should be regarded as a located and 
practical orientation to the reform of global governance. In that sense, there is a 
question mark as to how far the theory itself actually contributes to the task in 
hand, except in terms of understanding it. 
This is not so much a negative point as a positive one about the future course of 
research. Good theory can inform the theorist about where their attention should 
be focused. It is therefore possible to pursue some of the theoretical arguments in 
separation from new and partially improved empirical studies. In particular, a far 
4 cleaner' mode of analysis can be suggested that focuses singularly on the 
discursive pronouncements of a limited category of research subjects and the 
ethical possibilities and limits these discourses constitute. While pragmatic 
cosmopolitanism remains the guiding framework of this approach, the target 
audience becomes larger and the number and range of subjects increases. To that 
end, the final section will outline a program of future research that builds from 
this thesis. 
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7.4 Future Research Agenda 
The future research agenda that emerges from this thesis can be seen in two 
stages. First, the theoretical contributions to the study of global ethics can be 
consolidated. This will involve developing a critical analysis of cosmopolitanism 
as it is articulated in contemporary circumstances. This will focus on the work of 
people like James Bohman, who increasingly provides an account of global 
ethics, but who may produce a set of constitutive ambiguities regarding ethics 
and agency? And second, it is possible to envisage a set of case studies of global 
ethics, of campaigns and/or policy debates that have become infused with a 
moral language. In particular, this final section will introduce the emerging Z__ Z__ 
discourses of global trade justice that have been prevalent in the Doha round of 
the WTO trade negotiations (the so-called 'development round'). z! ) 
7.4.1 Cosmopolitanism and Global Governance 
The first avenue of future research, clearly envisaged in this thesis, is the 
development of a critical analysis of contemporary cosmopolitan theory. As a 
contribution to global ethics, cosmopolitanism is often dismissed as either 
idealistic or unlikely. More critical, Marxist and/or post-colonial approaches 
have identified the potential for imperialism in cosmopolitan theory. They argue 
that cosmopolitan theonsts commit the fallacy of reading contemporary liberal 
polities as the ultimate embodiment of reason, instead of envisaging new modes 
of political organisation (See Jahn, 2005). 
However, this thesis has identified a different way to think about cosmopolitan 
ethics that is deeply critical but which allows for the development of alternatives. 
On this view cosmopolitan ethics is seen as an embedded way of thinking about 
the world. It is contingent and experimental and must be understood as both a 
diverse church as well as prone to the (re)production of particular limits (Brassett 
and Bulley, 2006). And it is by engaging with this body of work that a 
sophisticated and nuanced conversation about global ethics may be evoked. 
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In concrete terms, this aaenda would involve the development of critical analyses 
of specific cosmopolitan theorists. For instance, James Bohman is emerging as a 
key figure in the field of theory that might be termed 'Deliberative Global 
Governance'. This approach refuses the possibility of creating institutions on a 
world scale that are analogous to domestic polities in power and auspices. 
Instead, the agenda is located in the evolving (social) practices of governance 
that accompany and control economic globallsation. For James Bohman the aim 
is gain a 'practical foothold' in order to subject previously technocratic and elitist 
, governance mechanisms to principles of political equality and non-domination 
by opening regimes to domination free communication (Bohman 1999: 500). I'D =ý 
The worth of the deliberative model of cosmopolitanism is that it avoids many of 
the alleged problems with liberal cosmopolitanism, i. e. teleology, extrapolation 
of the domestic analogy, and deferring the political to institutional reforrn. The Z: ' 
deliberative approach is therefore located in a contingent and experimental 
agenda of critique and reforrn - without presupposing a destination. 
However, in thinking through this (nascent) agenda there may be some grey 
areas? In particular, this thesis has suggested that the key signifier of 'global civil 
society' and its role in generating cosmopolitan publicity of 'reasons' can be 
opened up to debate. Simply put, remarkably little in the way of ethical 'content' 
has been outlined for these evolving public spheres. Thus a future aim of 
research would be to unpack many of the arguments made about the ethics of 
global civil society. Juxtaposing deliberative approaches to global governance 
with the extant political 'realities' they seek to reform is an interesting and 
worthwhile way of developing and extending the theory. 
7.4.2 Discourses of Global Trade Justice 
In addition to the theoretical possibilities identified, a future research agenda 
might also extend the empirical approach to other case studies. Examples abound 
in the context of debates over the reform of globalisation. For instance, the 
campaigns for debt alleviation, greater availability of anti-retroviral drugs in the 
developing world to combat AIDS and the burgeoning tax justice campaign all C7 
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represent avenues for analysino the emergence of global ethics in concrete 
situations. However, perhaps the emerging discourses of global trade justice C) 
represent the most promising line of enquiry? Such discourses have a large role 
to play in debates conducted within the institutions of global governance as well 
as within the mass media and the academy. 
The recent Doha Round of the WTO has been dubbed the Development Round. 
Its aim has been to foster greater inclusion of developing countries in the 
processes and benefits of the WTO (See Higgott, 2006). One of the key items on 
the agenda has been the liberallsation of agricultural subsidies. Northern farmers 
receive large subsidies to keep their crops at an affordable level that arguably 
restricts Southern farmers from competing on global markets. For many civil 
society activists, the end of agricultural subsidies is seen as a key plank in the 
trade justice campaign and they criticise the stand off which has emerged over 
the issue of how far developing markets should open in exchange (Make Poverty 
History, 2005). 
On the one hand, such debates mark a telling moment in the expansion of the 
mandate of a key institution of global economic governance to include political 
and ethical issues and therefore mark it out as an important subject of study. In 
this way, the discussion of cosmopolitanism and global governance can be 
further developed. On the other hand, the debate itself can be a key subject of 
critical scrutiny in terms of the constitutive ambiguities of trade justice. And such 
scrutiny may help to further discussions of trade justice beyond the current 
binary of global liberalisation vs. local protection? 
At a broad level, the research agenda would ask the question: what is meant 
ky 
trade justice? As a guiding hypothesis, it is suggested that the emerging 
discourses of global trade justice have produced a set of ethical limits. The stand 
off which is emerging between those trade negotiators and NGOs who posit the 
normative benefits of reducing agricultural subsidies and those 
'south-ist' 
campaigners (e. g. Hines, 2001; Bello, 2005) who argue for the 
legal protection of 
local production and supply chains can be seen as constructing a limit to the way 
in which we think about global trade justice. 
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Neither approach questions the logic of universal capitalism (specifically mass 
food consumption), nor do they address other hierarchies of power like human 
domination of the environment. Thus the construction of a binary logic that 
expresses the limit of global trade justice may be set detrimentally low. 
Moreover, and building on experiences from the Tobin Tax campaign, it might 
be further suogested that a critical examination of the complex arguments 
surrounding these issues within global civil society may be a resource for 
identifying alternatives and increasing awareness of the ethical dilemmas faced. 
Thus the praxis of global ethics is ripe for exploration and engagement. Cý zn 
Conclusion 
The thesis has explored the politics of global ethics via a critical engagement 1-n 
with cosmopolitan theory and the Tobin Tax campaign. It pointed to a number of 
ethical ambiguities in each and outlined a way to engage them by developing a 
pragmatic praxis based on the thought of Richard Rorty. 
Increasing awareness of the dilemmas which pervade global ethics, in this way, 
will not solve the numerous questions and problems that exist. However, it 
represents a credible attempt to deepen understandings, and allow for alternative 
practices, of global reform. In this way, the politics of global ethics may be seen 
more like a runnino, conversation that contains a number of contingent and 1-n 
fallible attempts to reduce suffering, than as a knock down ethical argument 
animated by the ever decreasing hope that 'might' will side with 'right'. In 
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